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Abstract 
During the evolution of the music industry, developments in the media 
environment have required music firms to adapt in order to survive. Changes in 
broadcast radio programming during the 1950s; the Compact Cassette during 
the 1970s; and the deregulation of media ownership during the 1990s are all 
examples of changes which have heavily affected the music industry. This study 
explores a similar but contemporary dynamics, examines how decision makers 
in the music industry perceive and make sense of the developments, and reveals 
how they revise their business strategies, based on their mental models of the 
media environment. 
 A qualitative system dynamics model (the Music Industry Feedback Model) 
is developed in order to support the reasoning brought forward by the study. 
The model is empirically grounded, but is also based on previous music 
industry research and a theoretical platform constituted by concepts from 
evolutionary economics and sociology of culture. The empirical data primarily 
consist of 36 personal interviews with decision makers in the American, British 
and Swedish music industrial ecosystems. The study argues that the model 
which is proposed, more effectively explains contemporary music industry 
dynamics than music industry models presented by previous research initiatives. 
 Supported by the model, the study is able to show how “n ew ” media 
outlets make old music business models obsolete and challenge th e in dustry‟s 
traditional power structures. It is no longer possible to expose music at one 
outlet (usually broadcast radio) in the hope that it will lead to sales of the same 
music at another (e.g. a CD). 
 The study shows that many music industry decision makers still have not 
embraced the new logic, and have not yet challenged their traditional mental 
models of the media environment. Rather, they remain focused on preserving 
the pivotal role held by the CD and other physical distribution technologies. 
 Further, the study shows that while many music firms remain attached to 
the old models, other firms, primarily music publishers, have accepted the 
transformation, and have reluctantly recognised the realities of a virtualised 
environment. 
 
Keywords: Music industry dynamics; Internet; Media; Production of culture; 
Qualitative system dynamics modelling; Organisational adaptation; Copyright. 
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1  
Introduction 
 
Everything about our business is changing…  
 
The music industry does not have to change –  the majors are in  good shape…  
 
 
This is a study about change. It is also a study about how copyright industry1 
decision makers perceive and understand change. The two quotes above refer 
to the evolution of the music industry, and are excerpts from conversations 
made during the study with two music industry decision makers. The words 
fairly explicitly show how two professionals in the same industry perceive the 
same dynamics completely differently. Although the latter quote suggests that 
there is no change at all, it is difficult to disregard from a number of quite 
remarkable occurrences in, or in the vicinity of, the music industry. Most of 
these can be traced back to changes within the media environment2 and 
especially within the domains of media technologies and governmental 
regulations. Digital technologies have for instance significantly reduced the 
costs of music distribution, but have also made it difficult for owners of musical 
content to control their intellectual properties. In the other domain, revised 
media regulations have for instance dramatically increased the number of 
traditional broadcast outlets but have also allowed the owner diversity within 
the broadcast industries to decrease to previously unseen levels. 
                                              
 
1 The definition of the term  ‘copyright industries’ and its relation to other industry definitions (cultural 
industries, creative industries, etc) is discussed in section 2.3. 
2 The interpretation of the term  ‘m edia environm ent’ is discussed in section 2.3. 
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 This study explores these and other similar changes with relevance to the 
music industry. The overall purpose of the study is to increase the 
understanding of contemporary music industry dynamics. Setting out from this 
purpose, two issues will be specifically addressed by the study. First, the study 
will examine how music industry decision makers perceive and make sense of 
changes in the media environment. Second, the study will examine how and 
why music firms revise their strategies, policies and routines based on their 
understanding of this media environment. 
 The two issues will be examined th ro ugh  “fo rm alised sto rytellin g”. Sto ries 
how decision makers in these music firms understand the current development, 
and stories how these men and women rationalize their decisions based on this 
understanding. 
 In order to be able to tell reasonably formalised stories, a potent 
“sto rytellin g device” (or analytical tool if you prefer) is often very useful. The 
device should be able to support the stories and provide a scenery where the 
drama can be played. Such a device, in the shape of a qualitative system 
dynamics model which represents relevant aspects of the music industry, has 
been created during the study. By introducing this model, it is possible to 
explain the complex dynamics within the music industry far more effectively 
than by confining the study merely to the written language.  
 The model is based on a combination of established theories, previous 
music industry research and empirical data. It is referred to as the Music Industry 
Feedback Model, but it is important to stress that it is not a model which embraces 
every aspect of the music industry. As John Sterman advises the user of any 
model:  
 
Beware the analyst who proposes to model an entire social 
or economic system rather than a problem. Every model is 
a representation of a system –  a group of functionally 
interrelated elements forming a complex whole. But for the 
model to be useful, it must address a specific problem and 
must simplify rather than attempting to mirror in detail an 
entire system. (Sterman 1991: 211) 
 
The problem addressed by this particular model concerns how music industry 
decision makers perceive and cope with changes in the media environment. 
Those aspects of the music industry which are not of a significant relevance to 
the examination of this problem will consequently be left out of the model and 
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the study. More details regarding the scope of the study will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
1.1 Rationale 
The subtitle of the present work is Modelling Copyright Industry Dynamics. The 
formal defin itio n  o f th e term  „co p yrigh t in dustries‟ w ill b e discussed later in  th e 
text (section 2.3), but the music industry certainly is one of the most traditional 
and least debatable members of this group of industries (Hartley 2005; 
Hesmondhalgh 2002; Howkins 2001). The copyright industries in aggregate 
grow more and more important to most industrialised economies (e.g. Towse 
2001). In the year 2002, the copyright industries accounted for 7 percent of the 
world economy, measured as GWP (Knowledge Foundation 2006). The 
sluggish economical situation during the first years of the current millennium 
has undeniably been difficult for the copyright industries. Nevertheless, in 
average, the growth rate of the copyright industries has been, and is expected to 
continue to be greater than the average growth rate of the total economy 
(OECD 2005b). As the copyright industries get more important, the 
importance of gaining knowledge about the inner workings of these industries 
grows with it. 
 The music industry has many parallels to other copyright industries, but has 
in some aspects less inertia and is more sensitive to external influences. This is 
especially true regarding changes in the domain of technology. The music 
industry has at numerous times throughout its history been affected by 
technological development (e.g. Barfe 2004; Coleman 2003; Gelatt 1977; 
Gronow 1983; Qualen 1985; Read & Welch 1976). By examining how the 
music industry is influenced and how the decision makers in this industry react 
on such changes, it is possible to gain knowledge which is transferable to the 
copyright industries in general.  
 
1.2 A note on scope 
This study takes on a broad approach to the dynamics of the music industry. 
However, some limitations have to be defined in order to ensure that the study 
remains manageable. 
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Major multinational music firms 
The music industry is currently experiencing a period of considerable 
turbulence. Regardless of the underlying reasons, the worldwide sales of 
recorded music have decreased approximately 19 percent during the period 
2000-2005 (IFPI 2005; Pasick 2006). In some territories the decline has been 
even more severe. For instance, the size of the Swedish recorded music 
wholesale market dropped approximately 40 percent during the same period 
(GLF 2003; 2004; 2005a; IFPI Svenska gruppen 2005; 2006). The dynamics of 
the industry is chaotic and fervent, as small and large companies merge, 
collapse, or expand at a staggering rate. However, during most parts of 2005 
and 2006, the global music industry was dominated by a handful of 
multinational organisations: EMI Group, Sony BMG Music Entertainment, 
Universal Music Group, and Warner Music Group.  
 These music firms control approximately 80 percent of the national 
markets for recorded music around the world (GLF 2005b; IFPI 2004b; 2005; 
Morris 2006). Although many innovations often are generated by smaller 
companies, these organisations greatly influence the evolution of the music 
industry (e.g. Burnett 1996). They are directly involved with, or closely linked 
to, almost every music industry segment of any significance, such as publishing, 
recording, marketing, distribution and talent development3. The major 
multinational music firms are consequently of significant importance to this 
study while other, smaller and nationally bounded music firms, are given 
somewhat less attention. Relevant features of the major multinational record 
companies and music publishers are listed in Appendix 2. 
 
Geographical limitations 
Although these firms have a presence in most music markets around the world, 
the study is limited to three markets; namely Sweden, the UK, and the US. The 
UK and the US warrant the attention of the study since they are two of the 
                                              
 
3 It should be noted that Sony BMG Music Entertainment is only a record company and does not have a music 
publishing division within their organisational boundaries. The firm was formed in 2004 as a joint-venture 
betw een Sony M usic and BM G Entertainm ent and did not include the tw o parties’ m usic publishing 
operations. Consequently, there currently exists two major multinational music publishers with close links to 
Sony BMG, namely Sony/ATV Music and BMG Music Publishing. 
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largest and most influential national music markets in the world4, both in terms 
of consumption and production. Sweden is a much smaller market than the 
other two, but a nation with a „fantastically rich  m usic culture‟ (BBC News 
2006) and a history as a strong exporter of popular music (e.g. ExMS 2005). 
Sweden is also interesting since it is a country with an advanced information 
technology infrastructure and a copyright legislation which has been slow to 
adapt to international treaties (e.g. Keller 2006). This combination has nurtured 
an environment which has established Sweden as „a haven for copyright 
in frin gem en t‟ (BBC News 2006; Burnett & Wikström 2006; Reuters 2006). 
 The study does not try to explain any differences between the behaviour of 
the three markets. Rather, the study focuses on the similarities between the three. 
When certain behaviour is occurring in all three markets, it is assumed to be 
indicating that the dynamics is of significance and should be included in the 
overall reasoning. The term „th e m usic in dustry‟ is o ften  used in  th e text, an d 
formally it is a reference to the national music industries in the three countries 
included in the study. However, the music industry is one of the copyright 
industries where national borders are only of minor significance (e.g. Burnett 
1996). Most markets are dominated by a handful of multinational organisations, 
and thus, innovations, practises, people, and routines easily flow across national 
borders. It may consequently be possible to extend the validity of the findings 
presented by this study beyond the three countries. At least the European 
Union and North America could be included, and perhaps also the other 
members of the OECD. Finally it should be noted that the three markets are 
examined on a national level only and no attention is paid to the dynamics of 
local markets within each territory. 
 
Issues related to genre 
Music is often structured into genres such as Jazz, Classical, House, Blues, 
Country, Soul, etc. This study is not focused on any particular genre. Rather, 
the study is focused on the chart-led mainstream part of the music industry. This 
definition implies a focus on commercially successful music which since the 
                                              
 
4 USA constitutes approxim ately 35%  of the global m arket and is thereby the w orld’s largest m usic m arket. 
The corresponding value for the UK is approximately 8%. Other major national markets are Japan with 17% 
and Germany and France which each make up approximately 6-7% of the global music market. (IFPI 2004b; 
2005) 
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1990s has been heavily dominated by genres such as Contemporary R&B, Nu 
Metal, Hip-Hop, and various kinds of Pop. 
 
An emphasis on certain parts of the industry 
The music industry is a complex system5 consisting of several sub-systems. 
Although it is relevant to include all of these in order to gain a thorough 
understanding of general industry dynamics, the study emphasises some sub-
systems on the expense of others. The sub-systems in focus are talent 
development (A&R), marketing and distribution. Artistic creation, studio 
recording, royalty collection, music journalism, and consumption, will 
consequently be somewhat moved into the background. Moreover, other 
activities which are related to the music industry, such as the performing arts, 
merchandising, and production music, are not within the scope of the study. 
 
Technological patterns rather than technological ripples 
During the last few years, the number of technological innovations related to 
production, marketing and distribution of music have literally exploded. 
BitTorrent, DC++, eDonkey, iMesh, iTunes/iPod, Kazaa, Last.fm, Launch, 
Limewire, Mercora, Musicbrigade, MySpace, Napster, Nareos, Pandora, Qtrax, 
Rhapsody, SnoCap, SpiralFrog, Urge, and Zune, are only a few out of an 
overwhelming amount of music technology brands that have been launched 
since 1999. Although many of these innovations may be relevant as markers of 
music industry dynamics, this dissertation will not analyse the details of any 
such specific innovation. The ambition of the dissertation is to stay above the 
level of these “tech n o lo gical rip p les” an d rath er try to  discern  th e lo n g -term 
patterns which are created by the innovations in aggregate. 
 
                                              
 
5 The term system is frequently used throughout the text. The term is formally defined in section 4.2, on page 
78. 
 20 
1.3 Preview of the dissertation 
This first chapter introduces the study by explicating its background and 
rationale, and by defining its purpose and scope. Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 
are intended to further enrich the presentation of the backdrop to the study by 
giving a short introduction to the history of the music industry and by listing 
relevant features of a handful of major multinational music companies. 
 The theoretical part of this work starts in the next chapter by presenting the 
two frameworks used by the study, that is to say production of culture and 
evolutionary economics. The chapter then discusses definitions and characteristics 
of the copyright industries in general and the music industry specifically. Finally, 
the chapter introduces a number of concepts, theories and models which are 
useful when explaining copyright industry dynamics. 
 The third chapter presents a set of music industry models and their 
contribution to the understanding of music industry dynamics. Then, a number 
of significant themes in previous research on music industry dynamics are 
discussed. The review is structured by level of aggregation, in other words 
whether the research initiative is focused on individuals in the music industry; 
on intra-organisational issues; or on inter-organisational issues. 
 In the fourth chapter, the modelling approach which is used to create the 
model suggested by this study is introduced. The approach is known as 
qualitative system dynamics and is based on a worldview which can be 
structured as a number of propositions. These propositions and a number of 
additional aspects of system dynamics modelling are presented and discussed in 
the chapter. 
 The fifth chapter is focused on the research process. The chapter addresses 
questions regarding how the model and the main reasoning have been 
developed and how empirical data has been gathered. Issues related to the 
validity of the model and the findings reported by the study are discussed. 
 The purpose of the study is to contribute to the understanding of copyright 
industry dynamics in general and music industry dynamics specifically. In order 
to achieve this purpose, a qualitative system dynamics model is developed based 
on the theoretical concepts, previous research and empirical data discussed in 
chapters two to five. In chapter six, the model (which I choose to call the Music 
Industry Feedback Model) is presented. In order to facilitate the understanding 
o f th e m o del‟s structure an d lo gic, it w ill b e in tro d uced in  a n um b er o f step s. 
First, components w h ich  are related to  th e firm ‟s relatio n sh ip  w ith  th e audien ce 
are in tro duced. Seco n d, issues related to  th e firm ‟s creative processes are added 
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to the model. Third, components related to  th e firm ‟s m arketin g and licensing 
effort are defined and added to the model structure. Fourth, the logic related to 
the firm‟s fin an cial p erfo rm an ce an d the relationship to its shareholders is 
presented. In the final step, issues related to costs and risk willingness are added 
to the model. 
 The seventh chapter connects the Music Industry Feedback Model to a 
media environment. The chapter explores a set of relevant changes in this 
environment and examines how they influence the behaviour and performance 
of the music firm. The chapter is structured according to three different 
relationships between music and the media, that is (1) the media as a promoter 
of music, (2) the media as a user of music, and (3) the media as a distributor of 
music. The nature of each relationship is examined, and trends with relevance 
to the specific relationship are discussed. 
 The eighth chapter examines how music firms have revised their business 
strategies in order to cope with the changes in the media environment which 
were introduced in the previous chapter. The chapter presents four strategic 
themes; the rationale behind these according to the decision makers; and their 
implications on the performance of music firms. The first three themes are 
linked to the structure from the previous chapter as they address changes 
related to media as promoter, user and distributor of music. The fourth theme 
concerns risk management related issues and can not be referred to one specific 
music-media relationship. In the end of the chapter, the aggregated impact of 
these strategies on the music firm is summarized and discussed. 
 The ninth chapter continues on the analysis in the previous chapter and 
deepens the examination of the changes in the media environment. A set of 
new media outlets are discussed in order to illustrate the dynamics. Following 
an examination of th e features o f th e “n ew ” m edia o utlet structure, th e im p act 
of the transformation on music firms is examined. The chapter also points at 
some examples where music firms actually have embraced the new logic and 
made strategic adaptations according to their revised understanding of the 
industry and the environment. 
 The final chapter summarises the findings made by the study and makes 
some general conclusions based on these. The chapter discusses the 
implications from the findings; for the copyright firm in general and for the 
music firm specifically. Suggestions are given how decision makers ought to 
change their behaviour in the light of the new findings. Finally, the chapter 
suggests directions for how the study could be taken forward in future research 
projects. 
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2  
Explaining copyright industries 
When media scholars approach the copyright industries, usually a combination 
of sociology, economics and/or literary studies6 are used as a theoretical lens. 
This study follows that tradition and uses frameworks from economics 
(evolutionary economics) and sociology of culture (production of culture perspective) to 
establish its theoretical platform. The third framework, literary studies, is indeed 
a valuable tool when exploring culture, but it will not be used in this study, 
since it is not focused on the texts per se, but rather how and why texts are 
produced. 
 This chapter will present and contextualise the two frameworks, production 
of culture and evolutionary economics. The chapter will then discuss definitions 
and characteristics of the industries covered by the study. Finally, the chapter 
will introduce a number of concepts, theories and models which are useful 
when explaining copyright industry dynamics. 
 
2.1 Production of culture 
The studying of popular culture within the field of sociology can be traced back 
to the first half of the last century (e.g. Weber 1921; Adorno 1941), but it has 
only been considered as a serious topic since the 1970s (Dowd 2002; Hirsch & 
Fiss 2000; Peterson 2000). Earlier, „mass culture‟ co uld p erh ap s b e studied as a 
social problem, b ut th e „culture in dustry‟ was not considered to be a relevant 
topic for research. During the 1970s, a young breed of sociologists began to 
approach culture and the organisations where culture is produced. These 
                                              
 
6 … or m usicology, film  studies, cultural studies, etc. 
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research ers tried to  „de-p o liticize‟ th e to p ic b y treatin g it less as a social concern 
and more as just another challenge for economic and organisational analysts. 
(Hirsch & Fiss 2000) 
 One of these sociologists, Richard Peterson, charted new ground in the 
article Cycles in symbol production: The case of popular music published with David 
Berger in American Sociological Review in 1975 (Peterson & Berger 1975). In 
this article, Peterson and Berger explored copyright industry dynamics by 
linking the level of industry concentration within the music industry to the 
diversity of cultural output. Based on their empirical material, covering 26 years, 
they were able to conclude that a high level of concentration causes a low level 
of diversity and vice versa.7 Hirsch and Fiss recognise the importance of the 
article: 
 
It opened the door to enabling sociologists to analyze the 
popular arts descriptively and non-pejoratively, leaving the 
normative and critical aspects to other fields. In keeping 
with the discipline‟s focus of that time, here was a 
connection to social structure and markets, but no longer 
critical of its capitalistic framework, and enabling the field 
to approach aesthetics without judging their quality. In 
fact, the content or quality of the product is irrelevant, or 
sim p ly a „m atter o f taste‟ that remains external to the 
framework. Whether leisure time is spent on wrestling 
matches or opera or baseball is immaterial. (Hirsch & Fiss 
2000: 100) 
 
 Building on the seminal article, Peterson (e.g. 1976; 1979; 1982; 1985) 
developed the „P ro ductio n  of culture‟ perspective which since has become a 
significant part of production related research within sociology of culture. 
P eterso n  ch allen ged th e n o tio n  th at cultural p ro ducts are „th e w o rk o f 
individual artists from whom th ey are th en  filtered to  th e p ub lic‟ (N egus 1997: 
99). In stead, P eterso n  argued th at „th e n ature an d co n ten t o f sym b o lic p ro ducts, 
are shaped by the social, legal and economic milieux in which they are 
p ro duced‟ (P eterso n  1982: 143). 
                                              
 
7 The issue of how industry or organisational structure influences cultural diversity will be discussed in section 
3.2. 
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 To be able to analyse these milieux Peterson suggested a set of facets 
„w h ich  alo n e, o r in  co m b in atio n , o ften  co n strain  o r facilitate th e evo lutio n  o f 
culture‟ (P eterso n  1982: 143). The number of facets proposed by Peterson 
varies between different texts. In a text from 1982 where Peterson gives a brief 
presentation of his perspective, five facets are considered to constrain or 
facilitate the production of popular culture (Peterson 1982). These facets are 
Technology, Law, Market, Organisational structure and Occupational careers. 
In another text from 1985, where Peterson analyses the publishing industry, a 
sixth facet, Industry structure, has been added to the previous five (Peterson 
1985). B elo w , P eterso n ‟s understanding of these six facets is briefly discussed 
and illuminated by examples taken from the copyright industries. 
 Technology is used in most kinds of cultural production. If technology 
changes in some way or the other, it will have an implication on the texts being 
produced. It is easy to identify cases in the history of music production where 
technology has changed the sound of recorded music. Music instruments, for 
instance the piano, the electric guitar or the sampler. Recording technologies, 
for instance sophisticated microphones, multi-channel recording, or more 
recently nonlinear recording. Distribution technologies, for instance the vinyl 
disc, the Compact Cassette, the Compact Disc or the Internet. (E.g. Coleman 
2003) 
 Law –  „Statute law  an d go vern m en t regulatio n  shape the financial and 
aesth etic co n ditio n s w ith in  w h ich  p o p ular culture develo p s‟ (P eterso n  1982: 
144). T h e very term  „co p yrigh t‟ is a legal term , an d it is copyright law that 
transforms cultural expressions into goods that can be traded, bought, sold, or 
infringed. 
 Industry structure –  „… th e n um b er an d  relative sizes o f th e firm s in  th e 
market producin g aesth etic p ro ducts‟ (Peterson 1982: 144). This facet was 
indirectly in focus in the Peterson & Berger article from 1975 where they 
established a relationship between industry structure and cultural diversity 
(Peterson & Berger 1975). 
 Organisational structure refers to the structures within the boundaries of the 
firm, coordinating the activities which generate the cultural products. 
Sometimes organisational structure and industry structure overlap, for instance 
due to  th e develo p m en t o f „n etw o rk o rgan isatio n s‟ (C astells 1997) where the 
actual boundary of a firm may be difficult to determine. 
 Occupational careers –  „… th e w ays th at creative p eo p le d efin e th eir 
occupations and organize their careers can influence the nature of the work 
th ey p ro duce‟ (P eterso n  1982: 148). This facet can be illustrated by how the role 
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of the studio engineer has developed parallel to the development of studio 
recording technologies. In the beginning of the history of recorded music, the 
studio engineer, was very much an engineer who was skilled at handling the 
equipment in th e stud io , m akin g sure th at th e artist‟s creative ideas w ere 
transferred to record as undistorted as possible. Nowadays, the studio engineer 
is considered to be a musician and sometimes even a star, just as other 
musicians participating in the recording session. (Kealy 1982; Levine & Werde 
2003) 
 The final facet, termed Market, is a reference to the audience, and 
sp ecifically h o w  „fin an cial decision makers redefine the heterogeneous and 
unknown mass of potential consumers into a homogeneous and predicable 
“m arket” th at can  b e tap p ed th ro ugh  stan dard m arket p ractices‟ (P eterso n  1982: 
146). 
 
                                 
 
Research initiatives in the spirit of Peterson‟s fram ew o rk o ften  aim  to  exp lain 
how changes in some of the six facets influence the character of the artefacts 
b ein g p ro duced. Sin ce „ch an ge‟ is in trin sically co n n ected  w ith  „tim e‟, th e 
initiatives are also often historical in their approach. 
 This study is heavily influenced by the fundamental concepts of Peterson‟s 
framework. The notion of popular culture as b ein g m o ulded  b y th e „so cial, 
legal, an d eco n o m ic m ilieux‟ w h ere it is p ro d uced is un derp in n in g th e en tire 
study. However, not all of the six facets suggested by Peterson will be explicitly 
used b y th e study. So m e o f th e facets, such  as „O ccup atio n al career‟ w ill n o t b e 
used at all w h ile o th er facets, such  as „T ech n o lo gy‟ an d  „L aw ‟, w ill p lay m o re 
important roles in the argumentation. T h e o th er facets, th at is to  say „In dustry 
structure‟, „O ccup atio n al structure‟, an d  „M arket‟, w ill o n ly b e im p licitly referred  
to during the study. 
 The second theoretical framework which is used by this study is also 
focused on changing or evolving phenomena. Evolutionary economics, which 
has somewhat different heritage than the production of culture perspective, will 
be introduced in the next section.  
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2.2 Evolutionary economics 
Evolutionary concepts in economic theory started to emerge in the beginning 
of the twentieth century as an answer to a growing discomfort with the 
established neoclassical economic models. There are several problems with 
neoclassical economic models which, according to evolutionary economists, 
m ake th em  „b arren  an d  irrelevan t as an  ap p aratus o f th o ugh t‟ (K ald o r 1972: 
1237). First they focus heavily on equilibrium, optimum, and static structures 
and do not actually describe the complex dynamics of an economy. If change 
occurs in neoclassical economic models, it only occurs within the given and 
static structures. Second, neoclassical economics is based on the assumption 
that organisations and individuals make well-informed, rational decisions in 
order to maximise their financial wealth. 
 Evolutionary economists argue that the assumptions of neoclassical 
economic theory make it difficult to explain actual economic behaviour. First, 
societal and economic systems are often not in equilibrium, and socio-economic 
structures do change, sometimes even rather dramatically. Second, individuals 
and organisations are often unable to make well-informed decisions, and often, 
these decisions are biased and irrational, contrary to neoclassical economic 
theory. (E.g. Simon 1979; England 1994) 
 Evolutionary economics is often linked to Darwin‟s p ub lish in g o f On the 
Origin of Species in 1859. „D arw in ian ‟ ch an ge differs fro m  n o n -evolutionary 
„N ew to n ian ‟ ch an ge in  th at th e first is caused b y ch an ges in  system  structure, 
while the latter represents change within a given structure (Hamilton 1953). The 
distinction can be used to differentiate economic growth (more of the same) 
from economic development (structural change) (Boulding 1981). Several 
economists, e.g. Marx and Marshall, w ere in sp ired b y D arw in ‟s revo lutio n ary 
understanding of biological dynamic systems and used metaphors from 
D arw in ‟s m o dels to explain complex economic phenomena (Hodgson 1994: 9-
19). One of these economists was the Norwegian-American economist 
Thorstein Veblen (e.g. 1898; 1899; 1904) who argued  th at „eco n o m ics sh o uld  
embrace the metaphor of evolution and change, rather than the static ideas of 
equilibrium that had been borrowed from physics by the neoclassical 
eco n o m ists‟ (H o d gso n  1994: 20). Veblen also wrote: „T h e questio n  is n o t h o w  
things stabilize themselves in a static state, but how they endlessly grow and 
ch an ge‟ (V eb len  1934: 8). According to Hodgson, Veblen‟s work is sometimes 
rather vague and unclear and he did not develop a systematic theoretical body, 
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but his ideas are nevertheless the foundation used by most scholars that 
followed the evolutionary school of economic thought (Hodgson 1994). 
 During the twentieth century several scholars continued to mould the 
framework of evolutionary economics. Many aspects of Joseph Schumpeter‟s 
reasoning are evolutionary in their character. His model of innovation and 
economic change is probably the most apparent example (1911) but also in his 
discussions regarding Marxist economic theory, his inkling towards 
evolutionary economics is apparent: „T h e essen tial p o in t is th at in  dealin g w ith  
capitalism we are dealing with an evolutionary process. It may seem strange that 
anyone can fail to see so obvious a fact which moreover was long ago 
emphasized by Karl Marx.‟ (Sch um p eter 1942: 82) Other scholars (e.g. Nelson 
& Winter 1982; Radzicki & Sterman 1994) have continued to contribute to the 
field by adding other metaphors and concepts to the framework. Myrdal (1956) 
introduced the theory of circular and cumulative causation which will be 
implicitly discussed in chapter 4. Boulding (e.g. 1968; 1978; 1981) applied the 
second law of thermodynamics and the concepts of time irreversibility to the 
analysis of economic systems. Others contributed with theories of self-
organisation, complexity and chaos to explain o rgan isatio n s‟ adaptive processes 
(e.g. Foster & Metcalfe 2001; Lorenz 1989; Radzicki 1990; Varian 1979; Witt 
2003). 
 Further, March and Simon (1958), and Cyert and March (1992 [1963]) used 
an evolutionary approach when they developed the behavioural theory of the firm. 
They explained intra-organisational decision making by using the concept of 
bounded rationality, i.e. the fact that decision makers are not well-informed and 
rational, but sometimes pretty far from that description. This understanding of 
organisational decision making can be traced further to the models of 
organisational learning presented for instance by Argyris and Schön (1978) and 
later by Senge (1990). 
 The concepts of evolutionary economic theory have been sparsely applied 
in the analysis of copyright industries (an exception is Georgantzas, Schmid and 
Walton 1994). Rather, in most of the work on the economics of copyright firms 
and industries to date, frameworks of neoclassical economics (Wildman 2006: 
85-7), institutional economics or political economy have been applied. The two 
latter frameworks share several traits with evolutionary economics and deserve 
some further attention. 
 Institutional economics is often considered as the predecessor of 
evolutionary economics. For instance Marx and Veblen are sometimes labelled 
as institutional economists more than anything else. Institutional economic 
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theory focuses on human-made institutions (firms, individuals, social norms) 
and the complex interaction between these. As with several heterodox 
economic schools, the definition of the framework is not totally clear, but a 
consistent feature is the focus on asymmetric information. According to 
neoclassical economic models, actors on a market have full information, or at 
least they act as if they have full information. Institutional economics argue that 
this is simply not a correct representation of reality, since information seldom is 
equally accessible to all. (Radzicki 1988; 2005) 
 Political economy is a framework which also has some parallels to 
evolutionary economics. The term refers currently to a range of different 
approaches of studying economic and political behaviour. Most of these 
approaches use a holistic and historical perspective and focus in some way on 
the balance between private enterprise and public intervention (Golding and 
Murdock 2000). In the field of media research, the term is primarily used to 
refer to neo-Marxian critical studies of culture production, such as the works 
published by Herman & Chomsky (1988), or McChesney (1999). This branch 
of political economy is often explicitly critical to the capitalistic logic that 
governs commercial production of popular culture. 
 
                                 
 
The production of culture perspective and evolutionary economic theory have 
not made any direct references to each other. However, in spite of the different 
heritage of the two frameworks, they share some important aspects (e.g. the 
importance of history and the holistic approach) and often they are used in 
similar ways to address similar issues. Based on these two frameworks; models, 
concepts and terms that will be used in the forthcoming analysis is presented in 
the following sections of this chapter. First of all, the terms used to label those 
industries that are in focus during this study need to be defined. 
 
2.3 Defining industries 
Th e term s „co p yrigh t industries‟ an d  „m usic in d ustry‟ have already been used in 
the text, but they have not yet been properly defined. There is currently an 
intense debate going on in the academia as well as in policy circles regarding 
how to label the industries which are examined by this study. In this section, the 
different propositions in this debate will be presented. The section will also 
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motivate w h y th e p refix “co p yrigh t” has been chosen rather than any of the 
other options available. 
 
Music 
The purpose of this study is to increase the understanding of music industry 
dynamics. As with most industries, it is not always perfectly clear what is meant 
by the term the „m usic in dustry‟. Hesmondhalgh (2002: 12) suggests a high-level 
definition of the music industries by including the three parts, music recording, 
music publishing, and live music performance. 
 Another music industry definition has been suggested by the Swedish 
Knowledge foundation (Almqvist & Dahl 2003). In this definition, live music 
performance is not considered as a part of the music industry‟s co re. Rather, 
live music performance is considered to be a part o f th e „p erfo rm in g arts‟ 
industry. The core of the music industry is in this definition considered as 
musicians, songwriters, producers, record companies and music publishers. 
 In a related, but more elaborated initiative funded by the British 
government, the music industry‟s, „co re activities‟, „sup p o rtin g activities‟ an d  
„related in dustries‟ were defined, Table 2.1 (DMCS 1998). Yet another 
definition has been suggested by Engström and Hallencreutz (2003). They did 
not make a distinction between core and supporting activities, but as the British 
government, they defined other industries, related to the music industry (Table 
2.2). As the two tables show, there are considerable differences between various 
definitions. It is of course important to policy makers, trade organisations, and 
others, to defin e th e w idth s an d h eigh ts o f “th eir” in dustries. H o w ever, sin ce 
most copyright industries are evolving, lists such as the ones presented above, 
usually get obsolete relatively quickly. Hence, they are not very useful as a 
starting-point for academic research. 
 Negus (1992) approaches the definition issue from a different perspective. 
He describes the music recording industry as 
 
… co n cern ed w ith  develo p in g glo b al p erso n alities w h ich  
can be communicated across multiple media; through 
recordings, videos, films, television, magazines, books and 
via advertising, product endorsement and sponsorship 
over a range of consumer merchandise.  
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Core activities Supporting activities Related industries 
 Production, distribution 
and retailing of sound 
recordings 
 Administration of 
copyright in composition 
and recordings 
 Live performance (non-
classical) 
 Management, 
representation and 
promotion  
 Song-writing and 
composition 
 Music press 
 Multimedia content 
 Digital media 
 Retailing and distribution of digital 
music via Internet  
 Music for computer games 
 Art and creative studios 
 Production, distribution and 
retailing of printed music 
 Production, retailing and 
distribution of musical instruments  
 Jingle production 
 Photography 
 Education and training 
 Internet/e-commerce 
 Television & Radio 
 Film & Video 
 Advertising 
 Performance Arts 
 Interactive Leisure 
Software 
 Software & Computer 
Services 
Table 2.1: The music industry as defined by the British governm ent’s 
department of media, culture and sport. (DMCS 1998). 
 
 
 
Music industry organisations Related industries 
 Music press 
 Record labels/Producers/Studios 
 Music publishers 
 Mastering studios 
 Suppliers of stage equipment 
 Distributors & wholesalers 
 Music Retailers 
 Retailers of music instruments and 
studio equipment 
 E-business 
 Management 
 Artists/Musicians/Performers 
 Tour production and concert arrangements 
 Artist agencies 
 Daily press 
 Other retailers, e.g. gas 
stations 
 Hotels 
 Restaurants, pubs, clubs 
 Catering 
 Photography 
 Graphic design 
 Video production 
 Broadcasting 
 Stylists 
 Lawyers and auditors 
Table 2.2: The music industry according to Engström and Hallencreutz (2003: 39) 
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 This study adopts Negus‟ defin itio n , but suggests two minor adjustments. 
First, the word global should be removed since there are many musical artists 
that simply are not intended for a global market. Second, by adding the words 
musical content, the importance of controlling and developing different kinds of 
intellectual properties is emphasised. It is thereby possible to extend the 
definition beyond the recording industry to the entire music industry. These 
changes result in the following music industry definition which will be used by 
this study: The music industry consists of those companies concerned with developing musical 
content and personalities which can be communicated across multiple media. 
 
Entertainment 
The next step after defining the music industry is to situate that industry in a 
larger context. Negus does this by stating th at „the music business is one 
integral component of an increasingly global network of inter-connected leisure 
and entertainment industries‟ (Negus 1992: 1). Burnett continues on the same 
p ath  an d  argues th at „m usic is p erh ap s th e essen tial co m p o n en t in  lin kin g th e 
differen t secto rs o f th e glo b al en tertain m en t in dustry‟ (B urn ett 1996: 10). 
Additional scholars have also pointed to the symbiotic relationship between the 
„m usic in dustry‟ an d  o th er „en tertain m en t in dustries‟, for instance 
Hesmondhalgh (2002) and Toynbee (2000). Turow has defined the 
„entertainment industry‟ as „th e in ter-organisational creation and release of 
performances (narrative or non-narrative, recorded or live) to attract audiences 
for financial profit rather than for explicitly educational, journalistic, political or 
advertising go als‟ (T uro w  1991: 166). Although this definition incorporates the 
music industry quite well, the definitions of what is entertainment and what is 
not is rather fuzzy. Other terms which do not make the distinction between 
what is entertaining and what is not have emerged, for instance „creative 
industries‟, „experience industries‟ and „cultural industries‟. These terms will be 
discussed below, starting with „cultural in dustries‟ sin ce th at term  is somewhat 
older than the other two. 
 
Culture  
T h e term  „culture industry‟ is usually traced b ack to  th e F ran kfurt Sch o o l o f 
Critical Theory and its most recognized scholars Max Horkheimer and Theodor 
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Adorno. Between 1935 and 1949 the research institute was relocated to 
Columbia University in New York, and it was during this period, Horkheimer 
and Adorno wrote their most important work8, the Dialektik der Aufklärung 
(1944). In this very influential and pessimistic book, Horkheimer and Adorno 
outline how the world is moving closer to self-destruction. One of the chapters 
of the book is examining th e „culture industry‟ and the writers argue that the 
culture industry is the result of a process where an increase in media and 
communication technologies leads to the industrial production, circulation and 
consumption of cultural commodities. The industrialisation of these processes 
result in formulaic, standardized, repetitive, pre-digested products which reduce 
th e audien ce in to  a „ch ild -like‟ state. (E.g. Adorno 1941; Burnett 1996; 
Horkheimer & Adorno 1944; Negus 1996; 1997; Hesmondhalgh 2002) 
 During the 1970s, French scholars (e.g. Miège 1979) and policy makers (e.g. 
Girard 1981) decided to pick up the term. However, they also decided to revise 
its meaning considerably. First they changed its form from singular to plural 
(cultural industries) to denote the diversity between different cultural industries. 
Second, they rejected the pessimistic and nostalgic position assumed by the 
Frankfurt School. Instead they argued that the commodification of culture, 
facilitated by new technologies, also had its positive sides. For instance the new 
technologies enabled innovation, and in addition, ordinary people were allowed 
access to culture that previously had been out of their reach. Third, while 
Horkheimer and Adorno considered the field of popular, industrialised culture 
as frozen and static, these scholars argued that the cultural industries is a 
dynamic zone of continuing struggle between commerce and art. 
(Hesmondhalgh 2002: 15-7; Towse 2001: 25) 
 The early definitions of cultural industries and cultural products are not 
radically different from today. Hirsch defined cultural products as „nonmaterial 
goods directed at a public of consumers, for whom they generally serve an 
aesthetic or expressive, rather than utilitarian function‟ (1972: 641). 
 Three decades later Hesmondhalgh defined the cultural industries as 
„in dustries b ased up o n  th e in dustrial p ro ductio n  an d circulatio n  o f texts, an d  
w h ich  are cen trally relian t o n  th e w o rk o f sym b o l creato rs‟ (2002: 14). 
 Hesmondhalgh‟s definition requires two comments. First, the interpretation 
o f th e term  „text‟. A ll cultural artefacts co uld b e co n sidered as texts. H o w ever, 
some cultural artefacts can be mainly functional (e.g. cars, clothes, furniture) 
                                              
 
8 The book was actually written while Horkheimer and Adorno were living in Pacific Palisades, California, but 
the research institute remained formally located at Columbia University. 
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while other artefacts are mainly communicative (e.g. songs, images, stories, 
performances). In his definition of cultural industries, Hesmondhalgh is only 
referring to the latter, that is to say texts that are mainly communicative or 
symbolic in their nature (2002: 12). Seco n d, in stead o f usin g th e term  „artist‟, 
Hesmond h algh  uses th e term  „sym b o l creato rs‟ fo r th o se w h o  m ake up , 
interpret or rework these texts (2002: 4-5). 
 When explicitly defining which industries are cultural and which are not, 
Girard suggested that Broadcasting, Publishing, Music and Film should be 
included (Girard 1981). Hesmondhalgh‟s list of „co re cultural in dustries‟ is 
similar to  G irard‟s list, b ut w ith  th e additio n  o f A dvertisin g  and Interactive 
media9 (Hesmondhalgh 2002: 12). Girard did actually consider Advertising as 
one of the cultural industries, and it is quite understandable why he in 1981 did 
not choose to add Interactive media to the list. 
 
Experiences and creativity 
Several other terms aimed at defining these industries have been suggested 
since the renovation of the term „cultural industries‟. In  p o licy circles, „creative 
industries‟ an d „experience industries‟ h ave b eco m e very p o p ular. T h ese 
definitions are usually wider than the original term and include industries or 
activities such as Architecture, Design, Fashion, Performing arts, Crafts, and 
sometimes even Tourism, Sport and Restaurants. 
 These newer concepts have changed the relationship between government 
and culture. As Hartley describes it: 
 
T h e “creative in dustries” idea b ro ugh t creativity from the 
back door of government, where it had sat for decades 
holding out the tin cup for arts subsidy [… ] to the front 
door, where it was introduced to the wealth-creating 
portfolios, the emergent industry departments, and the 
enterprise support programs. [… ] Creative industries 
[helped] revitalize cities and regions that had moved out of 
                                              
 
9 Hesmondhalgh does not use the term Interactive media, but rather he uses a combination of the terms 
‘internet industry’, ‘electronic publishing’ and ‘video and com puter gam es’. I w ould though argue that the 
term  ‘Interactive m edia’ or ‘Interactive leisure softw are’ w hich is the term  suggested by the British CITF is 
incorporating the terms suggested by Hesmondhalgh. 
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heavy industry, had never developed a strong 
manufacturing base or who were over-exposed to declining 
IT industries. (Hartley 2005: 19) 
 
 Manchester, UK and Hultsfred, Sweden are but two examples of many 
such governmental reform initiatives (Bjälesjö 2005; O ‟C o n n o r 2000). This 
focus on regional development has also led to an increased interest in these 
industries by economic geography scholars (e.g. Hallencreutz 2002; Leyshon 
2001; Power 2003). In addition, the mapping of these industries has turned into 
a lucrative business for scholars and consultants alike. Many region and nations 
decide they need healthy creative industries and in order to achieve that goal, 
the definition of what actually is a part of these industries differs from nation to 
nation and region to region. For instance in Sweden, the term chosen is the 
„experience industry‟ w h ich  in cludes to urism  an d restauran ts. T h ese tw o  
industries combined, account for almost 40 percent o f th e en tire „experience 
in dustry‟ in Sweden and makes the definition quite different from many other 
n atio n s‟ in dustry defin itio n s (Almqvist & Dahl 2003). However, by using this 
defin itio n  it is p o ssib le to  in flate th e size o f th e „exp erien ce in dustry‟. Leif 
Pagrotsky, at the time Swedish Minister of Industry, explains how he thinks 
ab o ut th ese in dustries: „T h ey are all h elp in g to  p ut Sw eden  o n  th e w o rld m ap , 
to enhance the image of Sweden as a creative and forward-th in kin g co un try‟ 
(Pagrotsky 2003). 
 T h e term  „experience industry‟ stem s fro m  P in e and Gilmore (1998) and 
according to the creators, it may include many business sectors including 
retailing, transportation, tourism, banking, media, etc. Pine and Gilmore did not 
use the term experience industry, but referred to the experience economy. The 
experience economy is emphasising how an activity is executed rather than what 
that activity is all about. The experience industry, which is based on this 
concept, may be a useful management theory or a powerful tool to enhance a 
region‟s image, but it is of less use as an industry definition. 
 The other alternative already mentioned in this section is the term „creative 
industries‟ (Caves 2000; Howkins 2001; Hartley 2005). It differs from 
„experience industry‟ sin ce it is n o t focused on how an activity is executed but on 
the input required for that execution. However, the problem with this term is 
alm o st th e sam e as w ith  th e „experience in d ustry‟; it is too inclusive. Most 
definitions of the creative industries include Architecture, Design and Fashion. 
The same arguments motivating the inclusion of these industries could be used 
to for instance include the consumer electronics industry, the automotive 
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industry or the pharmaceutical industry where creativity also is of great 
importance. Proponents of the term answer this criticism by stating that 
creative processes are found across all industries, and it is not possible to define 
th e „creative in dustries‟ b y its o utp ut, sin ce it is fo cused th e in p ut o f th ese 
processes (Hartley 2005: 27). That claim is true indeed, but industries are not 
defined by input, or by the manner in which activities are performed. Industries 
are defined by the goods or services produced or supplied. 
 
Media 
A term which certainly deserves some attention is the term „m edia in du stries‟. 
Ferguson (2006: 297), Hadenius and Weibull (2003) and Picard (2002: 12-7) all 
give th e term  a m ean in g w h ich  is very sim ilar to  „cultural industries‟ b ut 
nevertheless there are some minor differences between the various definitions. 
Traditionally, the (mass) media industries include the newspaper, magazine, 
radio, and television industries (e.g. Hadenius & Weibull 2003). However, due 
to the evolution of these industries the definition of what is and what is not 
part of the media industries has been challenged. The „Internet industry‟ is now 
often included and other scholars choose to include book, film, videogame, 
music and advertising in the definition (Ferguson 2006; Picard 2002). In other 
words, a definition which is almost identical to Hesmondhalgh‟s listing of the 
core cultural industries (2002: 12). Apparently, the definition of the term is still 
associated with a certain level of ambiguity which makes the term less useful as 
a definition of those industries in focus during this study. 
 T h o ugh  th e term  „m edia in dustries‟ w ill n o t b e used in  th is study, th e text 
frequently refers to m usic firm ‟s „m edia en viron m en t‟. This term is used to broadly 
refer to the media-related parts of the m usic firm ‟s surroundings. A similar 
practice is often used when referring to o th er p arts o f an  o rgan isatio n ‟s 
environment; fo r in stan ce th e firm ‟s cultural en viro n m en t, th e firm ‟s business 
environment, etc. 
 
Copyright 
As indicated by the subtitle of this work, the term which will be used to denote 
the industries in focus is none of the terms above, but rather the term „copyright 
industries‟. The use of this term is not new in any way, but has been used by 
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several institutions, for instance OECD (2005b), IFPI (2004a) or the Congress 
of the United States (CBO 2004). The meaning of the term is identical to 
Hirsch‟s (1972) an d  H esm o n d h algh ‟s (2002) defin itio n s of cultural products and 
cultural industries. However, the abandoning of th e p refix „cultural‟ in  favo ur of 
th e term  „co p yrigh t‟ marks a distance to the heritage which still lingers to 
„cultural in dustries‟.  
 The term  „copyright industries‟ also  lack th e am b iguity w h ich  b urden s so m e 
of the terms discussed above. The term is defined by copyright legislations, 
which means that the debate regarding what is or what is not part of the 
industries is irrelevant. By examining the legislation in Sweden, UK, and USA, it 
is possible to conclude that the types of works protected by copyright are 
identical in the three countries (Swedish Ministry of Justice 2005; UK Patent 
office 2003; US Copyright office 2000): 
 
 literary works,  
 dramatic works, 
 musical works, 
 artistic works, 
 published editions of works,  
 sound recordings,  
 films, including videos and broadcasts. 
 
 Conclusively, when the prefix „copyright‟ is used in this text, it is a 
reference to the products in the list above or related firms or industries. In the 
next section, a number of important characteristics that distinguish the 
copyright industries from other industries will be discussed. 
 
2.4 Characteristics of the copyright industries 
There are many characteristics of the copyright industries that make them 
differen t fro m  o th er „n o n -copyright‟ in dustries (e.g. Caves 2000: 2-10; Chan-
Olmsted 2006: 173; Hesmondhalgh 2002). Some, but not all, of these 
characteristics will be discussed in this section. 
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On the nature of copyright products 
Hirsch defined cultural products as „nonmaterial goods directed at a public of 
consumers, for whom they generally serve an aesthetic or expressive, rather 
than utilitarian function‟ (1972: 641). In  additio n  to  b ein g „n o n m aterial‟, th ese 
products have some specific properties that differentiate them from products 
traded in many other industries. Some of these properties will be discussed 
below. 
 The products traded in copyright industries are often categorised as 
information goods simply because they are intangible and „can  b e digitized‟ 
(Shapiro & Varian 1999: 3). It is important to note what actually is traded on 
copyright markets. When an individual purchases a vase or a CD, she/he does 
not purchase the design of the vase, or the copyrights to the sound recording. 
The only thing purchased is an instance of the vase design, or a right to listen to 
the sound recording within certain carefully defined restrictions. Only very few 
are able to actually own music, since full and exclusive copyright of a single 
commercially successful song is most likely far beyond the financial constraints 
of the average consumer. The question of the value of information vs. the price 
of information will be returned to in this analysis. The issue has been pondered 
by many scholars and thinkers, but Stewart Brand‟s w o rds really hit the nail on 
the head:  
 
Information wants to be free. Information also wants to be 
expensive. Information wants to be free because it has 
become so cheap to distribute, copy, and recombine –  too 
cheap to meter. It wants to be expensive because it can be 
immeasurably valuable to the recipient. That tension will 
not go away. It leads to endless wrenching debate about 
p rice, co p yrigh t, “in tellectual p ro p erty”, th e m o ral 
rightness of casual distribution, because each round of new 
devices makes the tension worse, not better. (Brand 1987: 
202) 
 
 The agreement between the holder of the copyright and the consumer 
governs the latter‟s ab ility to  use for instance a sound recording. The degree of 
freedom which is allowed to the consumer is often referred to as th e p ro duct‟s 
„option value‟ (Shapiro & Varian 1999). If an information product has a high 
option value, the restrictions on the consumers‟ ability to use the product is 
relatively relaxed, and vice versa. A rented DVD has a lower option value than 
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a purchased DVD. A song distributed via broadcast radio has lower option 
value than a song distributed on a CD or Compact Cassette.  
 Another interesting property of copyright products is that in order to 
determine the true value of a copyright product it has to be experienced. A 
consumer is not able to determine whether a book is good or not until it has 
been read. Such goods are called experience goods and should be contrasted 
against search goods and credence goods. The value of a search good can to a great 
extent be determined after reading th e p ro duct‟s sp ecificatio n s (e.g. a 
microwave oven). The value of credence goods are difficult to determine even 
after purchase and use. For instance, it is usually difficult for an artist or a band 
to determine how much their career was facilitated by the manager they have 
hired. (Hoskins & McFadyen 2004: 76-8). 
 Promotion of experience goods is often based on the ability to distribute 
the product with a lower option value. For instance, demo versions of 
computer software are information goods with limited option value, which is 
supposed to create a demand for the same product, but with a higher option 
value. Traditional promotion of popular music is based on the same logic. By 
playing the song on the radio (low option value) the record company is hoping 
that a demand is generated for the same information, but with a higher option 
value, for instance distributed on a CD. 
 Copyright products have a very intimate link to time. Copyright products are 
experience products, and in order to experience something, consumers have to 
spend time. They also have to make priorities between which copyright 
products should be awarded their attention. For instance it is not possible to 
exp erien ce every n ew  so n g released, sin ce th ere sim p ly isn ‟t en o ugh  tim e. This 
phenomenon is covered by Herbert Simon‟s w o rds: 
 
What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes 
the attention of its recipients. Hence, a wealth of 
information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to 
allocate that attention efficiently among the overabundance 
of information sources that might consume it. (Simon 
1971: 40) 
 
 The audience is consequently unable to make well-informed decisions 
regarding their consumption of copyright products. In the case of music, the 
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consumer is only able to experience a fraction of the total number of new 
products released in the market10. Compare this for instance to the refrigerator 
market, where the consumer is in a much better position to be well-informed 
about the available options. She can compare different retailer‟s prices and 
make a rational decision based on solid information. Hirsch describes the 
completely different situation in the copyright industries: „In  all [such] 
industries, the number of already available goods far exceeds the number that 
can be successfully marketed. More goods are produced and available than 
actually reach  th e co n sum er‟ (Hirsch 1970: 5). In order to cope with this 
situation, structures have been developed, labelled by Hirsch (1970) as 
„P reselectio n  system s‟. T h e purpose of the Preselection systems is to reduce the 
number of available products in order to facilitate the audien ce‟s decision-
making. The Preselection system consists of a number of subsystems, and the 
members of the different subsystems, the gatekeepers, determine whether the 
product shall pass through the filtering process or not. H irsch ‟s co n cep t o f 
filters and gatekeepers has been heavily criticised by several scholars (e.g. Negus 
1992). Nevertheless, Hirsch highlights the difficulties of m atch in g th e „righ t‟ 
p ro ducts w ith  th e „righ t‟ audien ce which is essential when explaining copyright 
industry dynamics.  
 
An industry with a high level of uncertainty and volatility 
The level of uncertainty and risk in the copyright industries is highlighted by 
many scholars. Negus ponders about uncertainty in the music industry: 
 
… I fo un d m uch  un certain ty am o n g p erso n n el in vo lved in  
producing music. Neither business executives, fans, the 
musicians themselves nor journalists can predict what is 
going to be commercially successful or what new musics 
are going to be critically acclaimed. (Negus 1996: 48) 
 
                                              
 
10 According to one of the m usic industry’s trade organisations (IFPI 2004b), 100,000 new albums were 
released 2004, which equals more than 250 albums per day. If each album contains ten songs, and each song 
lasts for 3½ minute, more than 8,500 minutes of new music is released every day. This means that the avid 
consumer has to listen to at least six songs simultaneously, 24/7, to be able to keep up. 
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 Hirsch notes how members of a Preselection system have limited ability to 
„predict accurately which of the items produced will pass successfully through 
each  stage o f th e co m p lex filter‟ (Hirsch 1970: 5). Hesmondhalgh concludes: 
„A ll b usin ess is risky, b ut th e [copyright] industries are particularly risky 
b usin ess‟11 (2002: 17). Other scholars, for instance Burnett (1996), Caves 
(2000), Hartley (2005), Hoskins & McFadyen (2004), and Picard (2002) make 
similar observations. It is possible to explain this apparently exceptional 
condition by examining the characteristics of the copyright industries. First, the 
development and release of new products, regardless of industry, always involve 
a great level of risk and uncertainty. In most industries it is difficult to forecast 
whether a new product will be successful or not. However, the potential success 
of an „experience product‟ is even more difficult to predict than that of a „search 
product‟. If the product category is reasonably established in the market, 
consumers are able to determine whether they would be interested in a new 
product which follows a certain set of specifications. But an „experience good‟, 
can  o n ly b e evaluated b y th e co n sum er after „th e first co p y‟ h as b een  p ro duced. 
Only then (maybe) is market research of any relevance. Second, the 
consumption of copyright products is highly volatile and unpredictable 
(Hesmondhalgh 2002: 18; Picard 2002: 7-9). „F ash io n ab le p erfo rm ers or styles, 
even if heavily marketed, can suddenly come to be perceived as outmoded, and 
o th er texts can  b eco m e un exp ectedly successful‟ (H esm o n d h algh  2002: 18). 
Combine these two observations and a situation emerges where it is extremely 
difficult to gain information about the potential success of a coming release. 
Consequently, decision makers in copyright firms often have to make decisions 
about how to spend their investment monies based on intuition and gut feeling. 
One common way of dealing with such a high exposure to risk is to use the 
principles of portfolio theory (Picard 2002; 2005; Reca 2006). Risk is reduced by 
investing in several diverse markets and products, in the hope that aggregate 
return from these investments at least will attain some degree of stability. 
H esm o n d h algh  (2002) refers to  th is strategy as „th ro w in g m ud‟ an d see w h at 
sticks. Denisoff (1975) referred to it as the „th e b ucksh o t th eo ry‟ w h en  h e 
explored the music publishing industry. Following this strategy, a considerable 
number of contracts are signed. By monitoring how consumers react to the 
songs, the company is able to focus its resources to those products the 
audiences seem to like. The number of new products released in copyright 
industries is impressive. Data on how many new titles (books, music albums, 
                                              
 
11 Hesmondhalgh attributes the phrase to Prindle (2003). 
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magazines, movies, videogames, etc) are annually released worldwide is not 
readily available, but at least 1,000,000 books were published worldwide during 
2002 (Zaid 2003), and at least 100,000 music albums were released worldwide 
during 2004 (IFPI 2004b). Hesmondhalgh (2002) refers to Neuman (1991: 139) 
when claiming that 80 percent of the revenues in the book publishing industry 
stems from 20 percent of the portfolio, and to Wolf (1999: 89) when claiming 
that only 2 percent of music albums sold in the US during 1998 sold more than 
50,000 copies. In other words, it is this small percentage that shall support all 
the other titles that are unable to deliver acceptable earnings. 
 
High production costs, low reproduction costs 
The dominant part of the costs in copyright industries is attributed to 
p ro ductio n  o f „th e first co p y‟ an d  th e m arketin g  of the title in question. This is 
to say that once the first copy or the design has been made, most of the project 
costs have been paid. Two observations can be made about these costs. First, 
they are mainly fixed, that is to say they are independent of the number of 
products sold. Second, they are usually considered as sunk costs, that is to say 
they are paid before the products are available to the public and are not 
recoverable, even if the project is immediately halted. (Hesmondhalgh 2002; 
Picard 2002; Shapiro & Varian 1999; Vogel 2001) 
 The cost structure in the copyright industries has considerable effects on 
the behaviour of copyright firms, primarily since it „leads to  co n siderab le 
economies of scale, i.e. the more you produce, the lower your average cost of 
p ro ductio n ‟ (Sh ap iro  & Varian 1999: 21). This means that while it may require a 
considerable number of items sold before profitability is achieved, the 
profitability beyond the point of break-even may be substantial. This logic 
„leads to a very strong orientation towards audience maximisation in the 
[copyright] in dustries‟ (H esm o n dh algh  2002: 19). In other words, it makes 
much more economic sense to sell a single title to a large audience rather than 
to sell the same number of items, but distributed across ten different titles. 
 
Art and commerce - the hero and the villain? 
An interesting aspect of the copyright industries is the apparent conflict 
between art and commerce. Following the reasoning of Horkheimer, Adorno 
 42 
and their disciples, the combination is simply impossible (Adorno 1941; 
Horkheimer & Adorno 1944). To achieve authenticity, texts should be created 
by a symbol creator which is independent from any commercial pressure. Those 
symbol creators who choose to be associated with th e “m ajo rs”, major 
commercial institutions in the copyright industries, are traitors or victims, 
depending on perspective. Negus (1996: 46) comments on this way of 
understanding the music industry: „O n  o n e side are th e h ero es –  the musicians, 
producers and performers (the creative artists); opposing them are the villains –  
the record companies and entertainment corporations (the commercial 
co rrup ters an d m an ip ulato rs).‟  
 T h e co n cep t o f th e “m ajo r”  deserves some further attention. Although 
there is no definition, a major is usually the term used to represent a large 
copyright firm with operations in several countries and a well-established 
distribution machinery. The major is usually publicly traded or is a part of an 
entertainment conglomerate. This should be compared with “in dep en den t 
(co m p an ies)” o r “in dies” which usually are the opposite of everything above, 
and have a stronger focus on the text, the creativity and the art, rather than the 
commerce. The work created within the realms of an indie, is considered to be 
less a part of the capitalistic system. Based on the logic of Adorno and others, it 
is also  m o re “auth en tic” th an  a w o rk created w ith in  th e w alls o f a major.  
 Frith (e.g. 1978; 1983) has argued that there is no conflict between art and 
commerce, at least not in the music industry. Frith claims that rock music, 
which sometimes is considered as a musical genre with relatively high level of 
authenticity, was not created outside the system of commercial music. Rather 
rock music was created within that system, and is a result of combining 
creativity and commerce. Building on this analysis, Frith concluded that the 
relationship between art and commerce should not be described as antagonistic, 
but rather as integrated. Negus (1996) has challenged Frith by pointing to the 
actual exp erien ces o f audien ces an d artists. „If th o se o f us who study popular 
music are to take seriously the vocabularies of participants, [… ] then the use of 
clichés [… ] in discussions about the music industry cannot simply be dismissed 
as artistic co n ceit o r audien ce n aïveté‟ (N egus 1996: 47). One such artist who 
very explicitly explained his feelings of being trapped within the capitalistic 
system and unable to express his creativity is Prince Roger Nelson and his 
former record label12 Warner Bros (e.g. Mitchell 2005; Orwall 1995; Rosen 
                                              
 
12 A “record label” is an organisation that releases a certain form of music with a certain brand, such as 
Motown – Soul/R&B, Blue Note – Jazz, or Roc-A-Fella – Hip-Hop/Rap. Major multinational music firms usually 
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1994). If the words of Prince and many other symbol creators are taken 
seriously, there apparently is some kind of tension between art and commerce 
which is contrasting the copyright industries from other industries.  
 
                                 
 
This section has discussed a number of characteristics of the copyright 
industries th at set th em  ap art fro m  o th er „n o n -co p yrigh t‟ in dustries. The section 
has explained that the products traded in the copyright industries are 
categorised as experience goods, which makes the marketing of these products 
different from the marketing of other so called search goods or credence goods. 
 The section has also explained that the costs in the copyright industries are 
mainly fixed and how that is influencing the behaviour and performance of 
these firms. Finally, the section has briefly touched upon the eternal conflict 
between art and commerce. This issue will be returned to in the next section 
when the issue of profit maximisation and creativity is discussed. 
 
2.5 The copyright firm in theory 
Firms are economic entities which acquire and organise resources in order to 
produce goods and services (Picard 2002: 2). According to the neoclassical 
economic theory usually referred to as the theory of the firm, the objective of a firm 
is to maximise profit and shareholder value (e.g. Hoskins & McFadyen 2004: 
141; Picard 2002: 3). P ro fit is usually defin ed as „th e m o n ey th at rem ain s after 
exp en ses are sub tracted fro m  in co m e‟ (P icard 2002: 4). Shareholder value is 
assumed to be created through share price appreciation and dividends in 
combination (Knight 1998: 21). 
 According to this reasoning, economic value is the end, and the activities 
taking place within the firm are merely means in achieving that end. It is not 
particularly important whether those activities are generating milkshakes or 
movies, as long as they are delivering profit. However, though there may be 
entrepreneurs and managers who subscribe to this perspective, many 
entrepreneurs in the copyright industries are motivated by something else, 
beyond profit and economic value (Nilsson & Brulin 1997: 9). The business is 
                                                                                                                             
 
own and control several labels; EMI Music for instance, controls more than 50 different labels across the 
world. 
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an evil necessity and the creative process, not the profit, is the single and 
ultimate objective (Karlsson & Lekvall 2002). Regardless of these priorities, 
there are very few symbol creators who are able to disregard from economic 
realities completely. Any venture has to be able to pay the bills, make 
improvements in facilities, have access to capital markets, experiment with new 
methods and so on; otherwise the venture will eventually vanish. Most 
copyright en trep ren eurs quickly co n clude th at a „firm ‟ is a co n ven ien t w ay to  
structure their ventures; the practising of their craft. By establishing a firm they 
are able to enter business agreements with other economic entities, they are 
able to compete for external funding for various projects, they can regulate 
various uncertainties, they are able to attract talent, etc (e.g. Coase 1937). 
Consequently, any firm, regardless if it is operating in a copyright industry or 
not, has to deliver some kind of profit. It may be that it is not entirely necessary 
to maximise profit, but rather to deliver good enough profits which allow the 
symbol creator to continue practising their craft as long as they are able keep 
their spirits burning. 
 The reasoning above assumes the firm in question is small and that the 
owners and managers are the same individuals. This is probably a fair 
representation of most firms operating in the copyright industries, including the 
music industry (e.g. Karlsson & Lekvall 2002: 11). As the copyright firm 
evolves, it generates profits that can be accumulated in the firm and used for 
various future projects. Some larger projects might nevertheless require 
additional capital, for instance the production of a movie or the investment in 
new studio facilities. In these instances, the smaller copyright firm might turn to 
a bank to borrow additional capital (Picard 2002: 172). This allows the firm 
access to capital without giving up the control of the firm. However, larger 
copyright firms have during many years turned to the public stock markets to 
get access to capital13. The larger firms require considerable financial resources 
to support their investments in expensive technologies, expansions into new 
territories, etc. A publicly traded firm has considerably better access to capital 
compared to the unlisted firm. In addition, the firm is able to use their own 
                                              
 
13 For instance, the four largest music companies in the world are all directly or indirectly listed on public 
stock markets: EMI Music is listed for trade on London Stock Exchange; Sony BMG is partly owned by Sony 
which is listed on the most important stock exchange for media firms, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); 
Universal Music is owned (92%) by Vivendi Universal which is listed on NYSE; and Warner Music is since May 
2005 also listed on NYSE.  
(http://www.emigroup.com; http://www.londonstockexchange.com; http://www.nyse.com; 
http://www.sonybmg.com; http://www.umusic.com; http://www.wmg.com)  
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shares as currency, which facilitates mergers with and acquisitions of other 
firms.  
 Firms listed for trade on a public stock market get access to capital in 
exchange for ownership of the firm. Although there are many pros of having 
access to a public stock market, there are also some considerable cons. When 
listed on a public stock market, the firm is constantly scrutinized by investors 
who are comparing the financial performance of the firm with every other 
investment opportunity available. Since the deregulation and internationali-
sation of the financial markets during the last two or three decades, these 
investment opportunities may range from real estate in Moscow, Mexican bio-
tech companies, Scandinavian hedge funds, and literally thousands of other 
objects (e.g. Albarran & Chan-Olmsted 1998; Castells 1997; Picard 2002: 185). 
If the copyright firm is unable to avoid below-average financial performance in 
comparison to the other options, investors will simply move their monies 
elsew h ere. W h en  th is h ap p en s, A dam  Sm ith ‟s in visib le h an d  w ill lo w er th e 
share price until investors again will regard the share as good value for money. 
This logic puts the publicly traded copyright firm in a situation where the 
decision regarding what profits are good enough is determined by the international 
financial market rather than by the management of the firm. The firm has to 
deliver maximum profits to satisfy the shareholders‟ quest fo r h igh est p o ssib le 
return on investment, otherwise the future of the firm is jeopardized. In other 
words, when a firm is listed for trade on a public stock market, the only profit 
good enough, is the maximum. (Knight 1998; Picard 2002) 
 A final note from the evolutionary economist is required here. Claiming 
th at th e firm ‟s go al is p ro fit maximisation is not to claim that the firm makes 
continuous rational decisions which are maximising profit. As Cyert and March 
(1992 [1963]) noted, and which will be noted when discussing organisational 
learning later in this text, the decision making process is complex, and often the 
firm ‟s decisio n s are n o t ratio n al an d n o t at all b ased o n  co rrect, unbiased 
information.  
 
Profit maximisation and creativity 
Is it really possible to create “authentic art” in organisations where profit 
maximisation is one of the most important goals? Can truly creative processes 
exist under such circumstances? Previously in the text, the views of Adorno and 
others have been briefly discussed, and their answer to this question is a 
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deafening “No” (e.g. Adorno 1941). But what is authentic art? Another way of 
approaching the issue is to focus on creativity rather than trying to distinguish 
the “authentic” from the “fake”. The social psychologist Teresa Amabile has 
done extensive research on creativity within organisations (e.g. 1996; 1998). 
When defining creativity, she chooses to focus on the output: 
 
A product or response will be judged as creative to the 
extent that (a) it is both a novel and appropriate, useful, 
correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and (b) the 
task is heuristic rather than algorithmic. (Amabile 1996: 35) 
 
 A fundamental questio n  is w h eth er th e „tasks‟ w ith in  copyright industries 
are heuristic or algorithmic14. Amabile reflects o n  th is issue: „… an  artist who 
fo llo w ed th e algo rith m  “paint pictures of different sorts of children with large 
sad eyes, using dark-toned backgrounds” would not be producing creative 
paintings, even if each painting were unique and technically perfect‟ (Amabile 
1996: 36). This is exactly what is happening in industrial production of culture 
according to the reasoning by the Frankfurt school. Symbol creators in the 
copyright in d ustries fo llo w  „an  algo rith m ‟ in  o rder to  deliver p ro ducts th at fulfil 
certain criteria and hence are commercially successful in the marketplace 
(Adorno 1941).  
 Based on her research, Amabile concludes that individual creativity, to a 
large extent, is dependent on the perso n ‟s so cial en viro n m en t. She stresses the 
importance of finding your own, internal motivation, and to be able to stay 
independent of demands and reactions from the environment. A symbol 
creato rs‟ primary driver has to be the joy, will or need to create for its own sake; 
independent of whether it will be received by good reviews or commercial 
success. Amabile summarizes her conclusions b y statin g th at „In trin sic 
motivation is conductive to creativity, but extrinsic motivation is detrimental‟ 
(Amabile 1996: 15). 
 Scholars (e.g. Burnett 1990) have shown that creative cultural production 
normally does not take place in large, mature organisations. Rather, it is the 
smaller firms (the Indies) which are able to create an environment where 
                                              
 
14 An algorithmic task is a task where the road to the solution is straightforward and obvious. A heuristic task 
has no pre-defined road to its goal. A heuristic task most often does not have a predefined goal either, but 
can end in m any w ays. An exam ple of an algorithm ic task is “M ake som e m uffins!”, and an example of a 
heuristic task is “Cure cancer!”. 
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creativity is intrinsically motivated. Within the domains of popular music, this is 
confirmed over and over again, as new genres are developed or picked up by 
the smaller firm long before any larger firm has discovered the novelty. 
Apparently, the milieu within smaller firms is able to nourish a greater level of 
creativity than the milieu within larger firms. It has already been discussed in 
this text how the larger firm has to be more focused on profit maximisation 
than the smaller firm. In addition, the larger firm requires more complex 
administration, including strategies, budgets, marketing plans, financial reports, 
etc. All these structures create a whole range of external demands and 
restrictions. Where the small firm is driven forward by the joy of independence 
and the pleasure of creating something new (intrinsic motivation), the larger 
firm is primarily driven forward by the need to fulfil the next financial plan 
(extrinsic motivation). 
 In order to answer to this problem, many larger firms have created 
structures which aim at establishing a social environment within the firm which 
allows creativity to flourish, though external demands remain in place. One 
such initiative is to establish „sem i-independent‟ business units within the larger 
firms (Burnett 1990). These smaller intra-organisational units are given a 
considerable amount of freedom in order to let the intrinsic motivation guide 
the organisation forward. Hesmondhalgh is pointing to a similar strategy within 
the copyright industries w h en  h e refers to  th e „lo o se co n tro l o f sym b o l creato rs‟ 
within copyright in d ustries, w h ich  is m o tivated b y th e „lo n g-standing 
assumptions about the ethical desirability of creative autonomy, which derive 
from the romantic conception of symbolic creativity, and traditions of free 
sp eech ‟ (Hesmondhalgh 2002: 22).15 
 Conclusively, there is a considerable conflict between profit maximisation 
and creativity. However, larger copyright firms have tried to address the 
p ro b lem  b y allo w in g sym b o l creato rs a certain  level o f “sp ace”, in  o rd er to  let 
the intrinsically motivated creativity to prosper. 
 
Core business, value chain and business model 
The importance of profit maximisation to a publicly traded firm has been 
established in the sections above, but few firms state their raison d ‟être as 
maximising profit or shareholder value exclusively. Most prefer to use a more 
                                              
 
15 This is also touched upon in relation to the concentration/diversity debate on pages 68ff. 
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elaborated way to communicate their purpose or mission which gives some 
indication on how they intend to create value to their shareholders (e.g. Karlöf 
& Helin Lövingsson 2003). The London based multinational music firm EMI 
express their mission as follows: 
 
Our aim is to build shareholder value by developing the 
best musical content at EMI Music and EMI Music 
Publishing and fully exploiting this unique content on a 
global basis through all viable and economically attractive 
channels. We do this by working with, and nurturing, the 
w o rld‟s b est reco rdin g artists an d so n gw riters; marketing 
and promoting their music; and delivering it to consumers 
in the ways they want. (EMI 2005) 
 
 This statement is constituted by two sentences, which both have 
approximately the same meaning, but EMI have varied the jargon in order to 
reach out to different audiences. The statement starts out with: 
 
Our aim is to build shareholder value…  
 
 … which is in compliance with the previous reasoning in this chapter. It 
then continues with a description of the chain of activities intended to deliver 
profit which will turn into shareholder value. Without too many superlatives, 
the EMI work flow goes as follows: 
 
… develo p in g m usical co n ten t…  / …  w o rkin g w ith , an d  
nurturing recording artists and songwriters…  
 
… fully exp lo itin g th is co n ten t o n  a glo b al b asis…  /  
… m arketin g and promoting th eir m usic…  
 
… th ro ugh  all viab le an d eco n o m ically attractive ch an n els…  
/ … deliverin g it to  co n sum ers in  th e w ays th ey w an t…  
 
 The EMI statement provides a high level description of their core business, 
„th e cen tral co m m o n  activity o f th e firm ‟ (P icard  2002: 37). Picard argues that 
th e co re b usin ess in  an y m edia firm  is „th e develo p m en t o f in fo rm atio n  an d  
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en tertain m en t an d its p ackagin g an d p ro gram m in g fo r use‟ (ib id ). T h e E M I 
statement is clearly an excellent instance of this concept in practice. 
 It is also possible to understand the statement as a simplified version of the 
EMI value chain. Note that this value is not a value created for their 
shareholders, but a value created for their customers. The value that is 
generated by the activities in the value chain is supposed to motivate potential 
customers to spend their monies on EMI‟s music. Each component in the 
chain constitutes a significant part of this value creation process. A graphic 
representation of the EMI value chain is shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: A graphic representation of the EMI statement. 
 
 
 Though the concept of the value chain is fairly intuitive, Michael E. Porter 
is usually recognized as the inventor of the generic value chain model (Porter 
1985). In his model, Porter describes nine activities which combined create the 
value a firm delivers. Five o f th ese are „primary activities‟, which includes 
receiving material from suppliers (inbound logistics), converting them into 
products (operations), shipping them to customers (outbound logistics), 
marketing them (marketing and sales) and eventually servicing (service), once 
the products are delivered. The remaining four activities, are considered as 
„support activities‟ which the organisation requires in order to be able to 
perform the primary activities. 
 The concept of the value chain is a common and useful method when 
describing the operations of a firm. The models are usually focused on primary 
activities, and leave the support activities out. Several value chain models have 
been developed to describe firms in copyright industries. Picard (2002) 
suggested such a model which is focused on the three components Porter 
referred to  as „O p eratio n s‟, „O utb o un d lo gistics‟ an d „M arketin g  an d sales‟. 
Picard uses another linear structure to describe these activities, termed 
„P ro ductio n  value ch ain ‟ an d „D istrib utio n  value ch ain ‟ (Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.2: Copyright firm value chains. Adapted from Picard (2002: 34). 
 
 
 Picard reco gn ises th at th o ugh  th ere are variatio n s b etw een  firm s‟ value 
chains in different copyright industries16, the basic activities shown in the 
illustration above are common for most of them (Picard 2002: 33). In the 
production part of the model, content is initially acquired or created, then 
packaged, processed and transformed into a distributable form. The second 
part of the model starts off with the actual distribution of the media product, 
which may be either physical or virtual. The last and final component in 
P icard‟s m o d el is th e m arketin g , advertising and promotion of the product. 
 Another theoretical concept closely related to „core business‟ and „value 
chain‟ is business model. A business model is the fundamental logic explaining 
how a firm conducts commerce (e.g. Magretta 2002; Picard 2002: 25). The 
model usually describes how information, goods, cash and other resources flow 
between the various actors involved in the business. Besides the firm itself, the 
actors might be customers, advertisers, suppliers, service partners, etc. The 
model explains the value delivered to these actors and how revenues and costs 
are shared between them. Business models are very sensitive to changes in a 
firm ‟s en viro n m en t. A s th e en viro n m en t ch an ges, „th e facto rs th at sup p o rt a 
b usin ess m o del ch an ge sim ultan eo usly‟, an d co n sequen tly, in  o rder to  rem ain 
successful, the business model has to be revised (Picard 2002: 26). 
 
                                 
 
This section has focused on the purpose or objective of a firm. The issue 
whether a copyright firm can choose a strategy with the intention only to 
deliver a profit th at is „go o d en o ugh ‟ o r if the firm always is required to aim for 
profit maximisation has been discussed. The section has also debated whether 
                                              
 
16 Picard uses the term  ‘m edia industries’ and ‘m edia firm ’ rather than ‘copyright industries’ and ‘copyright 
firm’. 
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creativity is able to thrive in an organisation where profit maximisation is the 
objective. Finally, three concepts which are useful when analysing the mission 
and internal operations of a firm has been introduced; namely core business, 
value chain and business model. 
 In the next section the attention will be turned from the interior of the 
copyright firm to its surroundings. The well-established model presented by 
Michael Porter (1980) which often is referred to  as th e „five-fo rces m o del‟ w ill 
be introduced. 
 
2.6 The microenvironment of the copyright firm 
There are several ways to structure the factors that influence the behaviour of a 
copyright firm. The six facets (Technology; Law; Organisational structure; 
Industry structure; Market; Occupational career) of the production of culture 
perspective presented in section 2.1, offers one such structure, but there are 
other scholars who have discussed similar issues from other perspectives (e.g. 
Baden-Fuller & Stopford 1992; Miles & Snow 1978; Picard 2002).  
 A useful model which complements the six facets is Michael Porter‟s m o del 
for determining the competitive situation within an industry (Porter 1980). The 
model uses concepts from industrial organisation economics17 to derive five 
forces, which together constitute the microenvironment where a firm is 
operating. Based on an understanding of this environment, managers should be 
able to make strategic decisions regarding where to manoeuvre their 
organisation. These five forces which are listed below will be presented and 
discussed in this section. 
 
 Threat of new entrants,  
 substitutability of products or services, 
 bargaining power of suppliers, 
 bargaining power of buyers,  
 rivalry among competing firms. 
 
                                              
 
17 Industrial organisation economics or IO economics is a field of economics that studies the strategic 
behaviour of firms, the structure of markets and their interactions. 
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Threat of new entrants –  barriers to entry and mobility 
Is it likely that new or existing companies enter the market with competing 
products or services? The threat of new entrants may be determined by several 
different factors. One such factor may be capital requirements, for instance the 
financing needed to establish operations and pay start-up losses (Picard 2002: 
72). A second potential factor is product differentiation, for instance if existing 
firms already have unique products with great consumer loyalty, a new firm will 
have difficulty in getting a foothold in the market. A third factor is what is 
known as switching costs, for instance if consumers have acquired a content 
library from a supplier using a specific media technology, it will be costly for the 
consumer to switch to another supplier which is using another, competing 
technology. Depending on your perspective and specific situation, this 
mechanism may be referred to as lock-in and is a well established strategy in 
many industries (e.g. Hax & Wilde 1999; 2001; Shapiro & Varian 1999)18. 
Limited access to distribution channels, for instance the limited shelf space available 
for the display of magazines is also a factor that is determining the barriers to 
entry. A new player might for instance be unable to access to that shelf space 
which will make it difficult to enter the market. Finally, governmental regulations 
may be a barrier to entry if they for instance restrict access to the frequency 
spectrum available for terrestrial broadcasting. 
 
Substitutability of products or services 
How great is the risk that buyers replace the current product or service with 
something else, which satisfies the same need, but in a different way? In the 
copyright industries, products are normally relatively differentiated and the level 
of substitutability and competition between them are limited. A cheering U2 fan 
is not very likely to substitute Bono with another artist without great reluctance. 
The customer loyalty that can be found within the music industry is often 
                                              
 
18 An ongoing example is the dominating retailer of Internet distributed music content, Apple’s iTunes Music 
Store. ITunes uses a proprietary copy-protection technology called Fairplay which restricts consumers from 
playing the music they have acquired on iTunes on any other portable music player, than the Apple iPod. 
Consumers, who have purchased a set of songs on iTunes, will have to continue using the iPod if they want to 
be able to continue listening to their music when they are on the move. If they decide to switch to another 
non-Apple portable music player, they have to purchase the same songs all over again. System lock-in in 
practice. (http://www.itunes.com) 
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looked at with envy by actors operating in other industries. However, as with 
most of the forces in Porter‟s m o d el, sub stitutab ility m ay vary b etw een  d ifferen t 
parts of a value chain. The same content may for instance be distributed using a 
number of different media technologies, (e.g. VHS, DVD, and BitTorrent). 
Even though the substitutability on content level is low, the substitutability and 
level of competition between different distribution technologies may be fierce. 
 
Bargaining power of buyers and suppliers 
Are the buyers able to negotiate a lower price, improved quality, etc, or are they 
restricted to accepting whatever is offered? In consumer oriented businesses, 
the bargaining power of buyers is generally low. It is not particularly easy to 
negotiate a lower ticket price at the box office. 
 The corresponding reasoning can be directed towards suppliers: Are the 
suppliers strong enough to demand higher prices, better contractual terms, etc, 
or are the suppliers restricted to accept whatever terms is offered by the players 
in the industry? There are many different kinds of suppliers to a music firm, but 
if the focus is set on the artist, the bargaining power depends heavily on the 
artist‟s p revio us success. T h e n ew  an d  un kn o w n  artist h as a b argain in g p o w er 
which is close to zero. If the artist wants to get international and physical 
distribution, there are few other options than to aim for a contract with one of 
the majors. The terms of these contracts are usually dictated by the record label 
and accepted by the artist. At the other end of the spectrum is the megastar 
who is able to act quite differently. During the last couple of years, there have 
been several cases where a record label has signed agreements where the firm 
has taken a large portion of the business risk and a minor portion of the 
expected profit (e.g. EMI 2002b).  
 
Rivalry among firms already operating in the market 
How intense is the competition between existing actors in the industry? The 
competition between firms is to a great extent linked to the structure of the 
industry. Neoclassical economic theory defines a market structure continuum, 
ranging from monopoly, to oligopoly, monopolistic competition and finally to perfect 
competition (e.g. Hoskins & McFadyen 2004; Wildman 2006: 72-5). Perfect 
competition is the condition where a considerable number of equally sized 
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firms compete with identical products. Consumers are also numerous and have 
complete and correct information regarding the products and prices offered by 
the firms competing on the market. Under these conditions, price is usually the 
only competitive weapon. 
 However, this condition is not relevant to the copyright industries: „M arkets 
for information will not, and cannot, look like text-book-perfect competitive 
markets in which there are many suppliers offering similar products, each 
lacking the ability to influence prices‟ (Sh ap iro  & Varian 1999: 23). 
Monopolistic competition is somewhat more realistic than Perfect competition, 
since the products offered are differentiated rather than identical. In this kind 
of market, it is possible to compete by using product innovation, rather than by 
price only. Oligopoly is an industry dominated by few large firms producing 
differentiated products. Under these conditions the barriers to entry are usually 
substantial. The competition between these large players is consequently lower 
than in the previous two cases. Copyright industries such as music, movie, and 
broadcasting are best described as oligopolies (e.g. Hoskins & McFadyen 2004; 
Picard 2002). Finally, Monopoly is an industry with a single player, and 
consequently with no rivalry at all.  
 
                                 
 
Porter‟s m o del includes a number of concepts which are useful in most industry 
analyses, though it is based on static assumptions from neoclassical economic 
theory. In combination with the production of culture perspective which has a 
more historical and evolutionary approach, the model is able to be a useful tool 
for analysing the environment of the copyright firm. 
 As was stated earlier in this section, the five-forces model is useful when 
th e decisio n  m akers are carvin g o ut th e firm ‟s strategy. Numerous scholars have 
since the 1960s and onwards tried to understand exactly how th e firm ‟s strategy 
should be developed or designed. Some of the conclusions from that research 
will be presented in the following section. 
 
2.7 What is strategy? 
The concept of „Strategy‟ is a word originally used in the planning of military 
campaigns. „Strategy‟ is considered to be the higher-level, longer-term, planning 
and should be distinguished fro m  „tactics‟, w h ich  is m o re sp ecific and short-
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term (e.g. Ansoff 1965; Mintzberg 1994). According to Ansoff (1965: 118), the 
concept was first introduced to non-military applications by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern when they created the field now known as „game theory‟ (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern 1944). Game theory unifies all kinds of conflicts, 
whether economic, social, political or military and identifies different strategies or 
decision rules ap p licab le to  th e vario us „gam es‟. In other words, a „strategy‟ is a 
formalized set of rules for making decisions (Ansoff 1965). The decision rules 
can also be understood as a position which is to be assumed based on where the 
organisation is today and where it wants to be within a certain period of time. 
Several scholars have followed this school of thought. For instance during the 
1970s, Glueck suggested th at strategy is a firm ‟s unified, comprehensive and integrated 
plan, and during the 1980s, Porter explained strategy as th e firm ‟s position taken 
after the investigation of the competitive environment (Glueck 1972; Porter 
1980). P o rter‟s co n cep t is p ro b ab ly th e m o st in fluen tial o f all co n tem p o rary 
strategy frameworks (Hax & Wilde 1999). He suggests that there are merely two 
ways a firm can compete; either by focusing on low cost or by focusing on 
product differentiation (Porter 1980). It is not possible to successfully combine 
the two options (ibid). 
 Since some years back, scholars have brought the attention to the increased 
volatility and uncertainties in many industries, such as the copyright industries. 
This has turned the focus of strategy theorists from questions regarding which 
strategic position is most appropriate during a specific environmental situation, 
to a firm‟s ability to assume new strategic positions as swiftly as possible. 
C o m p etitio n  is n o t as m uch  a „w ar o f p o sitio n ‟ as it is a „w ar o f m o vem en t‟. 
(E.g. Ghemawat 1991; Hamel & Prahalad 1993; Porter 1991; Stalk 1988; Stalk, 
Evans and Shulman 1992; Sterman 1994) 
 This development of the field is in many regards parallel to the 
development of evolutionary economics. Both evolutionary economics and 
theories of dynamics strategy turn the focus from static structures to dynamic 
processes. A number of theories on these dynamic processes will be discussed 
in the sections below. 
 
Emergent strategy 
Mintzberg and Waters pointed to the fact that the changing environment forces 
the firm to continuously revise their strategies. Instead of describing the 
strategy develo p m en t p ro cess as a p ro cess o f „design ‟ o r „co n cep tio n ‟, 
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Mintzberg and Waters argued that it should be considered as a process of 
„craftin g‟, w h ere th e strategy is co n stan tly m o ulded b y th e firm ‟s decision 
makers. A cco rdin g to  th is p ersp ective a firm ‟s realized strategy is the actual 
„p attern  in  a stream  o f decisio n s‟, rather than some formalized and often 
obsolete rules for making those decisions (Mintzberg & Waters 1985: 257). The 
reason why the intended formal strategy differs from the realised strategy is 
because parts of the intended strategy have been discarded or new insights have 
been made since the formulation of the initial strategy. (Mintzberg & Waters 
1985: 258; Mintzberg 1987) 
 Hax (1990) builds on the understanding of strategy as the actual decisions 
made by the firm. Based on this reasoning, Hax suggests how to go about when 
exp lo rin g a firm ‟s strategy: 
 
… strategy is a m atter o f reco rd –  it emerges from what the 
firm does. To examine strategy as an evolutionary process, 
we can study the nature of an organisation‟s decisio n  
making and its resulting performance. Strategic patterns 
can be discerned by examining major changes or 
disco n tin uities in  a firm ‟s directio n . (H ax  1990: 35) 
 
 The key sentence in this section is „the changing environment forces the firm to 
continuously revise its strategy‟. The process where the firm continuously tries to 
adapt its policies, routines and resources in order to sustain in a changing 
environment is essential to this study. Two scholars who in 1978 published a 
seminal work on these organisational adaptation processes are Raymond Miles 
and Charles Snow. The most important contribution from this work is 
presented in the section below. 
 
The process of organisational adaptation 
Miles and Snow published Organizational Strategy, Structure and Process in 1978 
with the purpose to explain why different organisations react to environmental 
changes in different ways. They suggested a typology consisting of four types of 
organisations, each with its own way of adapting to environmental changes 
(Miles & Snow 1978: 30).  
 Defenders are organisations which are producing a limited set of products 
directed at a narrow segment of the market. Their most important strategic 
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question is how to produce and distribute goods and services as efficiently as 
possible. The management team of the Defender is usually dominated by 
production and cost-control specialists and has little or no expertise focused on 
scanning the environment for new product or market opportunities. Since these 
firms have chosen this organisational structure, their greatest risk is that of 
being unable to respond to a major shift in their environment. Consequently, 
the Defender strategy and structure is most viable in stable industries, such as 
mining or food-processing. (Miles & Snow 1978; Miles, Snow, Meyer & 
Coleman 1978) 
 Prospectors are organisations which in many respects are the opposite of the 
Defenders. Their prime capability is that of finding and exploiting new product 
and market opportunities. The Prospectors domain of markets and products is 
usually broad and in a continuous state of development. They are frequently the 
creators of change in their industries, and change and innovation is often a 
major tool in gaining an edge over their competitors. For Prospectors, the 
reputation as an innovator is as important, perhaps even more important than, 
high profitability. In fact, because of this prioritization and the inevitable 
“failure rate” asso ciated w ith  sustain ed p ro duct an d m arket in n o vatio n , 
Prospectors may find it difficult to consistently reach the profit levels of the 
more efficient Defenders. (ibid) 
 While Defenders and Prospectors reside at opposite ends of a continuum 
of adaptation strategies, the Analyser is the balanced combination of the two 
extremes. A true Analyser is an organisation that attempts to minimise risk 
while maximising the opportunity for profit. To achieve this aim, Analysers 
usually operate in several product-market domains, one relatively stable, the 
other changing. In their stable areas, these organisations operate routinely and 
efficiently through use of formalized structures and processes. In their more 
turbulent areas, top managers watch their competitors closely for new ideas, 
and then rapidly adopt those which appear to be the most promising. (ibid) 
 The fourth type, the Reactor, is not really an adaptation strategy, but rather 
the lack thereof. An organisation of this type acts inconsistently and seldom 
makes adjustments of any sort until it is absolutely forced to do so by 
environmental pressures. Unless the organisation is operating in a monopolistic 
or highly regulated industry, it cannot continue to behave as a Reactor 
indefinitely. Sooner or later, it must move toward one of the consistent and 
stable strategies of Defender, Analyser, or Prospector. (ibid) 
 Previously in this text, the copyright industries have been described as 
volatile and chaotic. Based on that observation combined with the reasoning of 
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Miles and Snow, it is possible to argue that in the copyright industries, the 
„P ro sp ecto r-like‟ firm  h as a m uch  greater sustainability th an  th e „D efen der-like‟ 
firm. 
 
Strategy development as organisational learning 
Miles and Snow explore how organisations use different strategies to adapt to a 
changing environment. Adaptation requires learning (e.g. Mintzberg 1987; 
Senge 1990; Sterman 1994). The firm has to learn about the environment, 
assess the acquired information, decide how to act on it, put those actions in 
practice; observe the effects on the environment; again assess the new 
information; and so on. The concept of strategic learning has already indirectly 
been touched upon w h en  discussin g M in tzb erg‟s framework of emergent 
strategies. The strategy that emerges due to  „n ew  in sigh ts‟ and becomes a part 
of the realized strategy can be seen as a result of a learning process (Mintzberg 
& Waters 1985; Mintzberg 1987). Strategy formation should according to this 
school of thought be considered as a process of organisational learning rather than 
one of conception and design (Mintzberg 1990). Several scholars have 
contributed to the field of organisational learning, for instance Chris Argyris 
(e.g. 1977; 1990), Donald Schön (1978 (with Argyris); 1983), Henry Mintzberg 
(1987), Peter Senge (1990), John Sterman (1994) to name but a few. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Learning as a feedback process (Sterman 1994: 293). 
 
 
 Learning can be understood as a feedback process. Either by using the 
cumbersome phrase in the previous paragraph or a formal model such as the 
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one illustrated in Figure 2.3 (Sterman 1994). The model explains that a firm 
receives in fo rm atio n  ab o ut its en viro n m en t („real w o rld‟). T h e firm ‟s decisio n  
makers analyse this information and make decisions in order to influence the 
real world in a certain way. However, the model is not totally complete since it 
is n o t o n ly in fo rm atio n  regardin g th e firm ‟s en viro n m en t th at affects w h at 
decisions are made. Decisions are primarily made in order to achieve certain 
goals and are governed by existing strategic plans, the structure19 of the firm, 
etc. (Sterman 1994: 293) 
 T h e firm ‟s strategy an d structure is b ased  o n  th e decisio n  m akers‟ 
perceptions and understanding of the real world; their cognitive or mental models 
of the environment. Mental models may be unique to a person or shared 
among many. They may be relatively correct representations of reality, or they 
may be totally flawed. The mental models may be surfaced or hidden in the id. 
Regardless, every decision made by an organisation (or an individual) are 
governed by their mental models. (E.g. Forrester 1961; Miles & Snow 1978: 
20-1; Norman 1983; Senge 1990; Sterman 1994: 294) 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Single-loop learning (Argyris 1985; Sterman 1994: 294). (Adapted) 
 
                                              
 
19 The concept of “structure” w ill be further developed later in the text, but for now , it m ay be considered as 
constituted by organisational structure, resources, capabilities, routines, etc. 
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 Figure 2.4 illustrates a situation where decisions are made, and the firm is 
moving closer to its goals, but the mental models, th e firm ‟s w o rldview , remains 
unchanged. This is what Argyris (1985) lab els „single-loop learning‟, an d it 
m igh t w o rk just fin e as lo n g as th e en viro n m en t is stab le an d th e firm ‟s curren t 
mental models are reasonably correct. H o w ever, if a firm ‟s en viro n m en t is not 
stable, but rapidly changing, the organisational learning has to go deeper than 
single-loop learning. The firm has to challenge and revise their mental models 
in order to be able to adjust their strategy and structure to match the new 
environmental conditions. This process is called „double-loop learning‟ (Argyris 
1985) and is illustrated by Figure 2.5. Many scholars are referring to 
organisational learning in similar dichotomies; for instance „sh o rt-term and 
long-term  learn in g‟ (C yert & March 1992 [1963]) o r „adap tive and generative 
learning‟ (Sen ge 1990). 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Double-loop learning (Argyris 1985; Sterman 1994: 296). (Adapted) 
 
 
 By linking the concepts of organisational learning to the Miles & Snow 
typology it is possible to argue that the Prospector requires an efficient double-
loop learning process to be able to survive and prosper while more Defender-
like firms are not in the same dire need. A parallel reasoning would be that the 
copyright firm requires an efficient double-loop learning to survive in the 
chaotic and volatile environment of the copyright industries. However, many 
impediments make learning difficult. Sterman (1994) identifies some of these 
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„learn in g impediments‟. First and foremost, the real world is an ambiguous, 
complex and chaotic place. There are severe time delays between cause and 
effect which make it difficult to understand what is truly generating the 
observed behaviour. For instance the „len gth  o f tim e b etw een  an  artist sign in g a 
recording contract and the subsequent recordings, videos and promotional 
material being released [, may] be anything between six months an d tw o  years‟ 
(Negus 1996: 49). Second, the information feedback from this real world is 
often limited, biased, filtered and distorted. Third, when the information 
challenges mental models, it is common to react with defensive routines in 
order to for instance save face or assert dominance over others (Argyris & 
Schön 1978). Fourth, it is difficult to transfer mental models into explicit 
strategies and appropriate structures. The final learning impediment discussed 
by Sterman concerns how the implementation of decisions fails due to for 
instance asymmetric information or private agendas. (Sterman 1994) 
 The copyright industries have been described with w o rd s such  as „ch ao tic‟, 
„un certain ‟, „co m p lex‟, and „co n tin uo usly in exo rab ly ch an gin g‟. This makes the 
an sw er to  th e questio n  „w h at is strategy‟ in relation to the copyright industries, 
to focus on the firms‟ ability to adapt to their environment (e.g. Hax & Wilde 
1999; Sterman 1994). The concepts of organisational learning show that it is 
vital to the copyright firm to understand the learning impediments, and to 
minimise their hamperin g effect o n  th e o rgan isatio n ‟s b eh avio ur an d 
performance. 
 
                                 
 
This chapter has presented the production of culture perspective and the 
concepts of evolutionary economics. Definitions of the music industry and the 
copyright industries have been discussed and some important characteristics of 
these industries have been introduced. This has been followed by the 
presentation of a number of theories and concepts which are useful in the 
forthcoming model development. First, the concept of the firm and the 
importance of profit maximisation were discussed. This was followed by the 
presentation of a model to analyse the firm ‟s competitive environment. Finally, 
fundamental concepts of strategy were discussed, with a particular focus on 
dynamic, or adaptive, strategies. The two main theoretical bodies in this area 
were the Miles and Snow typology and the concepts of organisational learning. 
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 The next chapter will continue the contextualisation of the study by 
narrowing the focus from the copyright industries in general to the specific 
conditions which is characterising the music industry. 
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3  
Music industry models and research 
The previous chapter introduced a number of concepts, models and terms that 
are useful when analysing copyright industry dynamics. This chapter is based on 
these concepts, but is focused on the specific structure and dynamics of the 
music industry. First, a set of music industry models will be presented and their 
contribution to the understanding of music industry dynamics will be examined. 
Second, a number of important themes in the previous research on music 
industry dynamics will be discussed. 
 
3.1 Linear music industry models 
This section will present five models describing music industry structure and 
dynamics (Burnett & Weber 1989; Hirsch 1970; Leyshon 2001; Tuomola 2004; 
Wallis 2004). All of them, to a varying degree, rest on the same linear structure 
as the value chains discussed in the previous chapter. The presentation of the 
models is ordered according to the level of linearity of the structures. In other 
words, the first model presented (Hirsch 1970) is more linear than the last 
(Burnett & Weber 1989). 
 
The popular music industry model 
The purpose of the first model, presented by the sociologist Paul Hirsch in 
1970, is to explain how music becomes popular. When Hirsch published his 
model he did not use the term value chain, but it is a linear structure illustrating 
a number of sequential activities which support and add value to the core 
product, the audio recording. Hirsch‟s m o del describes that part of the music 
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industry which traditionally is referred to as the „top 40 m usic in dustry‟. The top 
40 format was invented in the US during the 1950s when the new TV medium 
forced the radio medium to change its programming (e.g. Thorburn & Jenkins 
2003). A radio station which follows this format plays the 40 most popular 
songs during a certain  w eek. „M o st p o p ular‟ is in  th is case equal to  th e reco rds 
which have sold the most during the week. Still to this day, similar formats are 
used by most commercial mainstream radio stations. „T o p  40‟ is to day referred  
to as Contemporary Hit Radio (CHR) and is but one of many different radio 
formats. Other formats are for instance Classic Rock, Country, Urban, Adult 
Contemporary (AC), News/Talk, Oldies, Modern Rock, Classical, and Smooth 
Jazz. 
 The record labels, w h ich  are p ro d ucin g m usic aim ed fo r th e „to p  40  music 
in dustry‟ is h eavily dep en den t o n  th e co m m ercial radio  stations for the 
promotion of their artists and music. Hirsch recognized the close relationship 
between the two copyright industries: „T h e reco rd an d radio  in dustry h ave 
grown up together and live in a symbiotic relationship. Each plays an important 
role in the dissemination and popularization of culture; both have affected its 
form and its direction. Although mutually dependent organisations, their goals 
vary, an d o ftim es co n flict.‟ (H irsch  1970: 10) This relationship is clearly 
illustrated by the Figure 3.1 w h ere th e „p o p  m usic in dustry‟ is m ap p ed to  th e 
Preselection system framework20. 
 A  great am o un t o f „filterin g‟ takes p lace at each  o f th e stages o f th e 
Preselection system. It is only a small fraction of all artists that ever are able to 
even meet an A&R agent, and only very few out of all the acts an A&R agent 
ever listen to get the attention of the record executive, etc. Eventually only one 
artist “in a million” will be heard by the mainstream audience on commercial 
radio stations.  
 
 
                                              
 
20 The Preselection system framework is discussed on page 38. 
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Figure 3.1: The Organisation of the Pop Music Industry (Hirsch 1970: 17A). 
 
 
 Hirsch has identified four subsystems within the music industry, which the 
artist has to pass to be able to reach the final subsystem, the audience. Below, 
Hirsch‟s un derstan din g o f th ese fo ur subsystems will be briefly presented. 
 The first subsystem is the creative sector, including the artist, the producer and 
the A&R agent. Hirsch states that: 
 
… th e success o f every p erfo rm in g artist is clo sely tied to  
the number of his records that come to the attention of 
 66 
and are purchased by the public. Records are the means by 
which an artist gains or enlarges his popular following. 
(Hirsch 1970: 25) 
 
 The A&R (Artist & Repertoire) agent is the first strategic checkpoint in the 
Preselection process which eventually may take the artist all the way to 
commercial success. The agents have a crucial job since they are the ones who 
shall find new talents with artistic as well as commercial potential.  It is critical 
to each record company to  co n tin uo usly fin d n ew  talen ts sin ce th e life o f a „h it‟ 
record is only from 60 to 120 days. „Replacements are needed for those items 
currently on the “charts”. The unknown artist and the companies each share a 
vital interest in his discovery and success, for the hit record industry is based on 
the fads of the moment. The styles in vogue change rapidly and unpredictably.‟ 
(Hirsch 1970: 25) 
 The second subsystem is the record company. When an artist has been 
discovered by an A&R agent, the next step is to meet the record company 
policymakers. These men and women have the task to select from the output of 
the creative subsystem the records which are to be released. (Hirsch 1970: 31) 
 Hirsch n o tes th at „… w hile the decision to release a record is theirs, 
policymakers have little control over the media, little power to ensure the 
exposure of a particular release. Record companies‟ p ro m o tio n  of some artists 
at the expense of others (all under contract to them) is in large part an attempt 
to structure the ambiguity of this situation.‟ (Hirsch 1970: 33) 
 Promoters and distributors constitute the third subsystem. The function of this 
subsystem is to filter the output from policymakers at the record companies. In 
the scenario described by Hirsch, there are far more record companies than 
there are promoters. In such a situation, the promoters add value to the process 
by selecting the songs which they expect to have the best chance for 
commercial success. 
 The final subsystem is labelled gatekeepers and is constituted by radio 
stations and other media outlets. The interdependence between gatekeepers and 
record companies has already been mentioned in the text. Hirsch adds to the 
descrip tio n  o f th is sym b io tic relatio n sh ip  b y claim in g th at „… radio  airp lay21 for 
                                              
 
21 Airplay is a technical term used in the radio industry to state how frequently a song is being played on a 
radio station. For example, a song which is being played several times everyday would be classed as receiving 
a large amount of airplay. The term is also used in the same way regarding music video channels, to state how 
often a music video is being played. 
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a n ew  reco rd is alm o st alw ays a p rerequisite fo r its sale.‟ (H irsch  1970: 9) 
However, only very few out of all the albums released are able to get into 
gatekeep ers‟ p laylists. Hirsch continues: 
 
Radio station managements demand high audience ratings, 
for the rates charged advertising sp o n so rs (i.e. th e statio n ‟s 
income) are based solely on the number of listeners the 
statio n  can  “deliver”. Advertising agencies place ads with 
radio station s acco rdin g to  th e “co st p er th o usan d ”  
listeners. The fierce competition between stations requires 
that the program director successfully select a group of 
records that will appeal to the widest possible audience. 
(Hirsch 1970: 61) 
 
 Consequently, „the record promoter [… ] m ust o p erate w ith in  th e co n text o f 
th e statio n  p ro gram m er‟s quest fo r certain ty. T h e p ro gram  directo r is co n stan tly 
on the lookout for advance intelligence regarding the “hit” potential of every 
record he selects for airplay‟ (Hirsch 1970: 56). The record promoter tries to 
address this request by providing sales figures to  d em o n strate h is reco rd s‟ 
popularity. 
 The Pop Music Industry model was the fruition of one of the first attempts 
to explore the music industry. Though it has been criticised and supplanted by 
newer and more useful models, it still is able to encapsulate important aspects 
of the workings of the mainstream music industry. 
 
Copyright and the composer 
Value chain models are often used to explain a process known as disinter-
mediation. Disintermediation is the removal of one or more components in a 
value chain without reducing the value delivered to the consumer. During the 
“dot-com hype” this process was expected to take place in several industries 
since new technologies make it possible to link producers closer to consumers 
without the need of a whole range of middlemen. However, the process is 
usually more complicated than this one-way disintermediation. While some 
intermediaries may be removed, other, new intermediaries are introduced. Such 
a general process of value chain transformation is usually referred to as 
reintermediation. (E.g. Rahman & Bignell 2001) 
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 The model (Figure 3.2) presented by Wallis is a good example of such a 
value chain. The model differs from Hirsch‟s in  tw o  w ays. F irst an d fo rem o st, 
W allis‟ m o del is fo cused o n  th e co m p o ser rather than the performer. The 
composer creates the work and usually signs an agreement with a publisher. 
The role of the publisher is to administrate and promote th e co m p o ser‟s so n g. 
In  W allis‟ value ch ain , th e o n ly p o ssib ility is to  h ave th e so n g p icked up by a 
record company‟s A & R  department and subsequently recorded by an artist. 
There are of course other opportunities and revenue sources available to the 
composer. These are recognised by Wallis, but left out of the graphical 
representation. Second, the relationship with the media which is illustrated by 
H irsch ‟s m o del h as n o t b een  taken  in to  th e illustratio n . (W allis 2004) 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: A traditional music industry value chain (Wallis 2004: 105). 
 
 
 Wallis discusses whether th e „disin term ed iatio n  visio n ‟ w h ere all 
intermediaries between production and consumption are removed is realistic. 
Wallis makes the same conclusion as most analysts of value chains; he notes 
that though the digital technologies enable a shortening of the value chain, the 
change is in practice „rem arkab ly sluggish ‟ (W allis 2004: 109). 
 
Virtual distribution 
Another linear music industry value chain model used to illustrate processes of 
disintermediation and reintermediation is presented by Tuomola (2004). 
Tuomola creates his model by combining Leyshon‟s (2001) m usical n etw o rk 
model (discussed below) with Picard‟s (2002) value ch ain  m o del. T h e m o del, 
 69 
which also builds on a multimedia industry value chain model developed by 
Wirtz (1999), describes a music industry where the distribution is virtual rather 
than physical (Figure 3.3). 
 
 
Figure 3.3: The “enhanced” value chain and musical networks (Tuomola 2004: 33). 
 
 
 The first three components of the model are similar to the first two 
components in Picard‟s (2002) m o del. T h e fourth component stems from 
Wirtz‟s (1999) „m ultim edia m o del‟ an d  in cludes services such  as b illin g o r secure 
tran sactio n  m an agem en t. „A ccess/co n n ectin g‟ is th e activity p ro vided b y 
infrastructure companies such as broadband operators and Internet service 
providers. The sixth component, „N avigatio n /in terfacin g‟ is th e activity which 
allows the consumers to browse and find the song they are looking for. Several 
acto rs are in vo lved in  th is activity. T h e co m p uter‟s o p eratin g system  (e.g. A p p le  
OS or Microsoft Windows22), the browser software (e.g. Mozilla Firefox or 
Microsoft Explorer23), and the actual music software (legitimate systems, for 
instance Apple iTunes or Real Rhapsody24, or more controversial technologies 
such as LimeWire, iMesh, BitTorrent, or Direct Connect25). 
 Tuomola‟s m o del (2004) is indeed updated an d „rein term ediated‟ in  
comparison to more traditional popular music industry models (e.g. Wallis 
                                              
 
22 http://www.apple.com/macosx/; http://www.microsoft.com/windowsxp/ 
23 http://www.mozilla.com/firefox/; http://www.microsoft.com/windows/ie/ 
24 http://www.itunes.com; http://www.rhapsody.com 
25 http://www.limewire.com; http://www.imesh.com; http://www.bittorrent.com; http://www.dcpp.net/ 
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2004). In  T uo m o la‟s m o del, m arketin g  activities are for instance not nicely 
placed as one of the components, at the end of the chain; rather, marketing is 
an integral part of several components along the chain. Aggregation of the 
content, Distribution o f th e co n ten t as w ell as „N avigatio n /in terfacin g‟ can  all 
be considered as promotional activities.  
 
Musical „networks‟ 
Leyshon reco gn ises th at „th e m usic eco n o m y co n sists o f a series o f sequen tial 
p ro cesses‟ (L eysh on 2001: 57). Building on this understanding, Leyshon 
presents a music industry model based on Attali (1985) and Scott (1999). The 
m o del is co n stituted  b y fo ur „m usical n etw o rks‟ w h ich  „p o ssess distin ctive b ut 
overlappin g fun ctio n s, tem p o ralities, an d geo grap h ies‟ (Leyshon 2001: 60). The 
first network is one of creativity. The second is a network of reproduction, the third 
is distribution and the last is a network of consumption (Figure 3.4). Although 
L eysh o n  uses th e term s „n etw o rk‟, it is actually o n ly th e creativity n etw o rk th at 
has a “network-like” structure. The other parts of the model have a relatively 
linear structure, which makes it possible to categorise L eysh o n ‟s m o del as a 
fairly traditional value chain model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Musical networks (Leyshon 2001: 61). 
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 The model begins with the network of creativity where music is created, 
performed and recorded. This network gravitates around the contractual 
relationship between the artist and the record company. Leyshon explains this 
as the core of the music industry where functions such as artists, producers, 
studio musicians, sound engineers, musical instruments and supplies, song 
writing, artist management, legal services, performance venues, recording 
studios and recording companies are found (Leyshon 2001). Hence, this 
understanding of the creative network is based on a wider definition of the 
music industry than the one used in this study. 
 In the network of reproduction, Leyshon primarily includes the 
manufacturing of CDs and other forms of physical carriers. Economy of scale 
is of greater importance in this network compared to the previous one. In the 
network of creativity, small entities, sometimes even single individuals are able 
to generate creative products with professional technical quality. In the network 
of reproduction, a single manufacturing plant normally serves a large market, 
such as UK, Japan, USA, or continental Europe. Leyshon also includes music 
publishing in the network of reproduction. A music publisher‟s b usin ess 
concept is to control an intellectual property portfolio, and to license songs 
from this portfolio to various clients. The client can for instance be an artist 
who wants to use a (part of a) song in a recording or performance of her own. 
The client can also be in need of background music in a TV commercial, or 
some other kind of video production. (Leyshon 2001) 
 Being a geographer, Leyshon puts lots of emphasis on the spatial issues of 
th e m usic in dustry. C o n sequen tly, in  th e n etw o rks term ed „distrib utio n ‟ an d  
„co n sum p tio n ‟, w h ere h e in cludes p h ysical p ro motion, distribution, retail stores 
and consumers, he is more interested in how the CDs are moved from one 
place to another than how the music firms are ab le to  raise th e co n sum er‟s 
awareness of a certain project. This stands in stark contrast to for instance the 
model presented by Hirsch which is focused on the promotion and marketing 
of music rather than how the physical product is transported from the 
manufacturing site to the consumers. (Leyshon 2001) 
Loosely coupled systems model 
T h e last m o d el to  b e d escrib ed in  th is sectio n  is th e „lo o sely co up led  system s 
m o del‟ suggested b y B urn ett and Weber (1989). The Burnett & Weber model 
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consists of the same components as the other models, but the structure is 
somewhat different. The model is not a linear structure describing how 
consumer value is created, but rather how different activities or institutions in 
the industry are related (Burnett & Weber 1989). The model is structured as 
two loosely connected systems of production and consumption (Figure 3.5). 
The aggregate behaviour of each system only weakly influences the behaviour 
of the other. As a contrast, the relations among record producers, trade press, 
artists are strong, and in a similar way, consumers actively interact among 
themselves and with media when developing their musical tastes and consumer 
behaviours.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Production/consumption systems of Popular Music (Burnett & Weber 1989). 
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Concluding remarks on the music industry models 
The five models emphasise different aspects of the music industry: 
 
 Hirsch – Filtering and promotion 
 Wallis – Copyright and the composer 
 Tuomola – Virtual distribution 
 Leyshon – Geography and distribution 
 Burnett & Weber – The interplay between production and consumption 
 
 Although they are using different perspectives, the structures of the models 
are all more or less linear in their character. There are also other structural 
similarities between the models. First, the m o dels‟ components are almost 
exclusively institutions, roles, or activities. Sometimes, an activity may refer to 
the institution carrying out the activity, and sometimes vice versa. Second, the 
meaning of links between components varies. In general, an arrow from 
component A to B indicates that A has some kind of influence on B. Except in 
the case of the value chains, where the links denote a chronological order of the 
activities performed, th e ch aracter o f th e lin ks‟ in fluen ce is rarely exp licitly 
defined. 
 An important question to answer is whether the models and the graphical 
representations presented above are able to add to the understanding of the 
music industry. According to Sterman (2002), „all m o dels are w ro n g‟, an d by 
definition, all models are, in the sense that they always present a simplified 
reality where some aspects have been taken out in order to increase simplicity 
and readability. However, the relevant question is not whether a model is right 
or wrong but rather how useful the model is in a certain context. Think about 
the difference between the tourist map and the military map representing the 
same area. They are both wrong, and their value is determined only by how 
useful they are to the tourist and the military when travelling the area. 
 The five models above are all analytical tools which are useful when 
examining different aspects of the music industry. The five models may all be 
„wrong‟, but nevertheless they are useful in concert. As pieces of a puzzle, all 
five models are valuable contributions to a comprehensive understanding of the 
complex structures, logic and dynamics of the traditional music industry. The 
Music Industry Feedback Model, suggested by this study, builds on the 
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knowledge conceptualised by these five models, and aims to make yet another 
contribution to this puzzle. 
 The five models presented above are all the outcome of a number of 
previous research initiatives focused on music industry dynamics. In the section 
below, additional research initiatives with a similar purpose will be presented 
and discussed. 
 
3.2 Previous research on music industry dynamics 
Industry dynamics research initiatives typically start with the observation of 
some kind of change. The change may be new products or genres, change of 
consumer behaviour, technology changes, regulatory changes, change in 
aggregate sales, change in financial performance, change in organisational or 
industry structures, change in (production-/distribution-/marketing-) routines, 
etc. The purpose of the research initiative is then to gain more knowledge about 
this change. Possibly to be able to understand or explain why the change has 
occurred or how a change might influence some aspect of the industry. The 
concept of change is intrinsically associated with the concept of time, and when 
exploring change, the object of study has to be set in a historical context. 
Questions of causality are also by definition important in these studies. 
However, the complexity of economic and social systems often makes such 
attempts very difficult, sometimes even impossible. This is noted by Peterson 
w h o  co n siders h is p ro ductio n  p ersp ective as a „retreat from confronting the 
unanswerable questions about the causal links between so ciety an d  culture‟ 
(Peterson 1994: 185). Miles and Snow have also reflected on the difficulty of 
examining these dynamic processes: „A n y attem p t to  exam in e organisational 
adaptation is difficult since the process is both h igh ly co m p lex an d ch an geab le‟ 
(Miles & Snow 1978: 4). 
 Though the task is difficult, a considerable number of research initiatives 
with the purpose to explain music industry dynamics have been launched. In 
this and the previous chapter several of these initiatives have already been 
touched upon, but in this section, a number of significant research themes from 
the 1970s and onwards will be discussed. Do note that the review is focused on 
research within the social sciences solely and that it is far from complete. 
 One way to structure a review is by level of aggregation, in other words 
whether the research initiative is focused on individuals in the music industry; 
on intra-organisational issues; or on inter-organisational issues. Some initiatives 
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approach their research question from multiple levels of aggregation, but often 
it is possible to place an initiative in one of the categories. It is also possible to 
link the levels of aggregation to the facets in the production of culture 
perspective which are most relevant (Table 3.1). 
 
 
Level of  aggregation Related facets 
Individual level Occupational career 
Intra-organisational level Organisational structure 
Inter-organisational level Market 
Technology 
Law 
Industry structure 
Table 3.1: Levels of aggregation and the facets of the production of culture perspective. 
 
Research on individuals and roles 
Research on the first level has been discussed earlier when referring to Kealy 
(1982) and his analysis of the development of the role as „studio  en gin eer‟. 
Another example of research in the same alley is Ryan and Peterson‟s an alysis 
of the development of the singer-songwriter during 1960s (Ryan & Peterson 
1982). Toynbee (2000) is yet another scholar who followed this tradition by 
exploring the role of the musician in an industrial context. 
 
Research on intra-organisational issues 
Research on the intra-organisational level often also touch upon issues on both 
lower and higher levels of aggregation. One such example is the concentration-
diversity issue (discussed later in this section) which is both an inter- and intra-
organisational issue. Negus has pursued a number of research projects on the 
intra-organisational level, for instance one project with a particular focus on the 
A&R process (1992). This research might as well be considered as research on 
individuals or specific roles in the companies, as the analysis ranges between 
issues of strategy and organisational structures to issues of individuals‟ 
reasoning and routines. Negus has continued on this path and has explored 
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how corporate cultures influence the personalities created and musical content 
produced (Negus 1999). 
 
Research on inter-organisational issues 
It is not particularly surprising that research on music industry dynamics most 
often is positioned on an inter-organisational level. Research on the music 
in dustry‟s interplay with other copyright industries; how governmental policy 
and copyright law regulate cultural production; effects caused by technological 
development; issues related to geography; etc, all fall into this category. This 
study is also positioned on the inter-organisational level, although some intra-
organisational excursions occasionally are made. 
 Simon Frith, perhaps the most prolific writer on popular music and its 
industry, has published several works on inter-organisational issues (e.g. 1978; 
1981; 1988; 1998). Frith often uses a cultural studies approach with a strong 
focus on the meaning and value of popular culture, but he also makes profound 
analyses of the evolution of the industry in general. 
 A number of research initiatives on the inter-organisational level will be 
discussed below. In order to introduce some kind of structure, the initiatives 
will be presented as four distinctive themes: Governmental regulations; 
Concentration and diversity; Cluster dynamics; and Online copyright 
infringement and physical sales. 
 
Governmental regulations 
The research theme concerned with how governments should formulate media 
and copyright regulations in  o rder to  create th e „b est‟ cultural landscape has a 
long history in the social sciences. U sually, „b est‟ is equal to  a h igh  level o f 
diversity and sometimes also the p ro tectio n  o f a „n atio n al cultural h eritage‟ fro m  
globalisation and commercialisation (e.g. McQuail 2005: 192).  
 The media researcher Roger Wallis has explored how the music industry is 
affected b y go vern m en ts‟ m edia regulatio n s. Together with various co-writers, 
Wallis has published several articles and books on the subject (Kretchmer, 
Klimis & Wallis 2001; Malm & Wallis 1992; Wallis 1990; Wallis & Malm 1984). 
As a chair of the Swedish Association of Popular Music Composers (SKAP), 
Wallis is also heavily involved in the development of royalty collection societies. 
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Wallis has touched on the role of these societies in several articles, for instance 
in (Wallis, Baden-Fuller, Kretchmer & Klimis 1998) and in (Wallis 2004). 
 Another policy related issue which has become more and more acute 
during the last twenty years or so is the question of copyright law and the music 
industry. As Brand (1987) forecasted, digital technologies have made it difficult 
to control the circulation of information. Governments have reacted to this 
development by tightening intellectual property laws, which in turn has 
hampered the recycling aspects of creativity. The relation between copyright, 
creativity, technology and culture has been discussed by several scholars for 
instance, Bennett, Frith, Grossberg, Shepherd & Turner (1993), Frith & 
Marshall (2004), Lessig (1999; 2001; 2004), Negus & Pickering (2004), and 
Towse (2001; 2002). 
 
Concentration and diversity 
Social scientists have long been interested in the question of what fosters and 
what limits cultural diversity. The issue has also been important within 
copyright industry dynamics research. Before the excursion among these 
research initiatives sets out, a few words on the meaning and relation between 
the words creativity, innovation, and diversity, are required. These words will be 
used as follows: A high level of creativity (or highly creative people) is able to 
generate innovations, or novelties. The relationship can also be turned around: 
People or organisations which generate innovations are creative. If this creative 
process is allowed to go on for some time, there will be many innovations or 
novelties, which by definition will be different from each other. Consequently, a 
high level of diversity is established.  
 A seminal contribution to the discussion on what determines diversity in 
the copyright industries is Richard Peterson‟s and David Berger‟s article Cycles in 
Symbol production (1975). In their article, Peterson and Berger linked the level of 
concentration in the market to the level of creativity and product diversity. 
Their hypothesis was that „increased competition among music producers 
should make for a greater diversity of product [and vice versa]‟ (Peterson & 
Berger 1975: 165). They also assumed that an „oligopolist strives for that 
product which pleases the most without offending any major group of 
consumers, [a] process [which] makes for a homogeneity of product‟ (Peterson 
& Berger 1975: 159).  
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 Peterson & Berger tested their hypothesis by using data from Billboard 
m agazin e‟s W eekly T o p  T en  Sin gle C h art. B y calculatin g th e n um b er o f songs 
that different music companies were able to chart during a year and by adding 
up the market share of the four dominating firms, they were able to establish a 
„co n cen tratio n  ratio ‟ w hich indicated the level of concentration in the industry 
durin g a p articular year. T h e „diversity‟ durin g a p articular p erio d was defined as 
the number of artists or songs reaching the top ten positions of the chart during 
the period. (Peterson & Berger 1975) 
 When analysing the data, Peterson and Berger were able to confirm their 
hypotheses. They showed that the higher the concentration is in the industry, 
the lower is the level of diversity. They were also able to establish that the 
variables were cyclical in their nature. Longer periods of high concentration and 
low diversity were followed by „a b rief b urst o f co m p etitio n  an d creativity‟ 
(Peterson & Berger 1975: 170). Later, this cyclical model has been supported by 
for instance DiMaggio (1977) and  Nord (1980) who extended its validity into 
other copyright industries, and by Rothenbuhler and Dimmick (1982) who 
extended its validity in time. 
 The cyclical model was not challenged until Burnett (1990) extended the 
analysis to the period between 1981 and 1989. During the 1980s, the level of 
industry concentration increased, which according to the cyclical model should 
lead to a lower level of diversity. However, contrary to the established model, 
Burnett found that diversity remained at a high level in spite of the increased 
level of concentration (Burnett 1990). 
 Burnett exp lain ed th is n ew  situatio n  as caused b y th e m ajo r co m p an ies‟ 
sym b io tic relatio n sh ip  w ith  sm aller „in dep en d en t‟ m usic co m p an ies. Sin ce th e 
early days of the music industry the independents have been developing new 
artists while the majors used their size and resources for international marketing 
and distribution of the successful acts. What was new was the fact that the 
majors created the same fruitful organisational structure by establishing semi-
independent or in-h o use lab els, o p eratin g alm o st like „true‟, co m p etin g, 
independent companies. In this way, the majors were able to control a 
significant part of the market, while they also were able to emulate competition 
which maintained innovation and diversity on a relatively high level. (Burnett 
1990) 
 Other scholars have later added to this body of knowledge and supported 
the findings introduced by Burnett (e.g. Christianen 1995; Dowd 2000; Lee 
2004; Lopes 1992; 2002). Dowd (2004) has also extended the reasoning to other 
media industries and has been able to show that decentralized production of 
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culture leads to high levels of cultural diversity while centralized production 
leads to the opposite. 
 
Cluster dynamics 
Michael Porter has in a number of significant works (e.g. 1990; 1991) explained 
how the success of companies is influenced by geographical conditions. Porter 
based his conclusions on the analysis of a number of industrial clusters around 
the world, among others the automotive cluster in the south-west of Sweden. 
The conclusions from this research were packaged as yet another Porter model, 
this time branded th e „D iam o n d‟ (P o rter 1990). T h e Diamond summarises a 
number of factors which determine whether a certain geographical area is good 
for business or not. Porter concluded that the factors in the Diamond model 
constitute a dynamic system. The system requires considerable time to develop, 
but if the circumstances are right, a reinforcing feedback loop may be 
established which may create considerable competitive advantages. The model 
has been used by economic geographers in the analysis of various national and 
regional economies. It has also been used to analyse the copyright industries 
linked to such regions. Hallencreutz (2002) and Power (2002; 2003) have been 
influenced by P o rter‟s th in kin g ab o ut regio n s as dyn am ic systems and have 
applied the model to the Nordic music industries (Hallencreutz 2002; Power 
2003) and to Swedish copyright industries in general (Power 2002). 
 
Online copyright infringement and physical sales 
The development of Internet based technologies26 which enable massive music 
distribution beyond the control of the copyright holders has turned the 
attention to a very specific research question. The question is whether the 
copyright infringement which is enabled by these technologies (“o n lin e p iracy”) 
is (A) hurting or (B) improving CD sales. The first argument (A) goes as 
follows: Digital technologies enable consumers to acquire music without paying 
for the products. This has caused consumers to reduce their CD purchases and 
                                              
 
26 These technologies are primarily various peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but also various online communities 
and instant messaging services. The present work is not focused on the details of these technologies per se, 
but a short review of peer-to-peer networking technologies is given in section 7.3 on page 143.  
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turn to illegal methods of acquiring music. According to the second argument 
(B), Internet based technologies make music more accessible to the audience. 
This will have a positive effect on consum ers‟ in terest in  m usic, an d th o ugh  
some music may be illegally acquired, the aggregated effect from these activities 
on music industry revenues is positive. 
 Several scholars, research companies and lobby organisations have 
contributed to the debate. Research on US consumers show a negative 
relationship between files downloaded and CDs purchased (Edison Media 
Research 2003; Ipsos-Reid 2002). Research made on European consumers also 
shows that the impact of online piracy on sales is negative. Forrester Research 
concluded that more than 40 percent of frequent „downloaders‟ buy less music 
now than they did before they began downloading. Indeed, 2 percent of the 
„downloaders‟ say they bought more CDs after started downloading, but that is 
in no way able to balance the loss (Forrester Research 2003). Enders Analysis 
(2003) joins the choir by stating that online piracy „cost about 35-40 percent of 
the reduction in the size of the glo b al m usic m arket‟. 
 The conclusion from these research report indicates that there are other 
factors influencing CD sales, besides the emergence of specific Internet 
technologies. This conclusion is supported by several scholars, for instance by 
Liebowitz (2002a; 2002b) who points to the overall state of the economy and 
Wikström (2005) who points to changes among the broadcast media and music 
firms‟ revised  A&R strategies. Some scholars go as far as to argue that the effect 
of the Internet tech n o lo gies o n  C D  sales „is statistically in distin guish ab le fro m  
zero ‟ (O b erh o lzer & Strumpf 2005). 
 The time has not yet arrived when it is possible to close the debate. After 
analysing a number of research reports, Blomqvist, Eriksson, Findahl, Selg and 
Wallis (2005) co n cludes th at „there is no clear picture of the effects of [online 
piracy] on the sales of CD music records‟ (2005: 80). The OECD (2005b) 
agrees by saying that „it is very difficult to  estab lish  a b asis to  p ro ve a causal 
relationship between the size of the drop in music sales and the rise of [online 
piracy]‟ (2005b: 11). 
 Though the jury is still out, the bulk of the reports presented since the turn 
of the century indicate that the impact of online piracy on CD sales is negative 
rather than anything else. However, the exact size of that impact, measured as a 
percentage of total change, will probably never be determinable. 
 
                                 
 
 81 
This chapter has described the workings of the music industry by presenting 
models which all add to the current understanding of music industry dynamics. 
The five models presented have all served as important input during the 
development of the model suggested by this study. 
 The chapter has also provided a review of a number of research initiatives 
focused on music industry dynamics. The review is by no means complete, but 
it gives a glimpse of significant and relevant research initiatives made by social 
scientists during the last three decades. 
 The next chapter will leave the music industry temporarily and will instead 
introduce an approach for modelling complex and dynamic phenomena, such 
as the music industry. The modelling approach is called qualitative system 
dynamics and is used by this study to develop the Music Industry Feedback 
Model which will be defined in chapter 6. 
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4  
Modelling complex dynamic systems 
One of the issues discussed in the previous chapter, was the value of using 
models as an analytical tool when examining complex phenomena, such as the 
music industry dynamics. A number of linear models were presented which all, 
from different perspectives, contribute to a comprehensive understanding of 
the music industry. One aim of this study is to add to this body of knowledge 
by building and using a new kind of music industry model. That model will be 
defined in chapter 6, but in this chapter, the modelling approach used to create 
the new model will be introduced. The approach is called qualitative system 
dynamics and is a subset of system dynamics as presented by Forrester in 1961, with 
important predecessors in Allen (1955; 1963), Cooper (1951), Philips (1950; 
1954), Simon (1947; 1952; 1954; 1957; 1962; 1979), Tustin (1953) and others. 
Scholars previously mentioned in relation to the discussion on modern 
evolutionary economics (e.g. Boulding 1968; 1978; 1981; Myrdal 1956 and 
Radzicki 1990; 2005) have also used concepts related to system dynamics in 
their work. 
 System dynamics has an impressive record when it comes to explaining 
complex dynamic phenomena. The approach has been successfully applied to 
such a wide range of topics as: 
 
… the dynamics of regional planning, research and 
development, urban stagnation and decay, commodity 
cycles, problems of growth in a finite world, economic 
development, economic fluctuations, community drug 
policy, human services delivery, energy lifecycles and 
transitions, dynamics and management of ecosystems, and 
various corporate policy studies. (Richardson 1991: 296) 
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 System dynamics modelling is primarily an approach how to build a certain 
kind of models. However, the approach is based on a worldview which often is 
structured as a number of propositions. This chapter will initially present and 
discuss four of these propositions in the sections 4.1 to 4.4. Then, the 
discussion will gradually move closer to methodological issues in the remaining 
sections, 4.5 to 4.8. Chapter 5 will continue on that route as it is exclusively 
dedicated to the methodological aspects of this study. 
 
4.1 Events as emergent properties 
 
Proposition #1: Events emerge from an underlying structure 
 
When we experience reality, we experience it as a number of, often isolated, 
events. When trying to explain why a certain undesirable event (A) has 
occurred, we look for some other event (B) which can serve as a reasonable 
explanation. By addressing B we hope to be able to have an effect on A. In 
contrast; system dynamics argue that no causal relationships can be established 
between two separate events. Instead, one has to look beneath the events and 
try to unveil the structure that is generating the problem behaviour. This structure is 
constituted by (1) a set of relevant objects (tangible as well as intangible, 
measurable as well as immeasurable); (2) the nature of these objects and (3) the 
causal relationships between them. Instead of looking for a scapegoat as the 
cause of an event, one should try to change the structure which is generating 
the behaviour as well as the undesirable event (Figure 4.1). (E.g. Forrester 1976 
[1968]; Richardson 1991; Senge 1990) 
 This understanding of the world as divided into discrete strata, is generally 
known as emergentism and was developed by Alexander (1920), Broad (1968 
[1925]), Lewes (1874-79), Mill (1856), and Morgan (1923) among others. The 
events and the patterns of behaviour discussed in the previous paragraph are 
examples of emergent properties. Emergent properties are generally defined as 
„p ro p erties th at “arise” o ut o f m o re fun dam en tal en tities an d yet are “n o vel” o r 
“irreducib le” w ith  resp ect to  th em ‟ (O ‟C o n n o r &  W o n g 2005). 
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Figure 4.1: Structure is generating behaviour which is experienced as events. 
 
 
 System dynamics is not the only framework using the concepts of 
emergentism. For instance, important aspects of contemporary critical realism 
(Bhaskar 1978 [1975]) are based on an analogous philosophical framework. 
Other examples are General systems theory (e.g. von Bertalanffy 1945), 
Cybernetics (e.g. Wiener 1948), Chaos theory (e.g. Lorenz 1989), and 
Complexity theory (e.g. Gell-Mann 1992; Holland 1995; 1998). 
 
4.2 Open dynamic systems 
 
Proposition #2: Structures are best understood as systems 
 
As the name implies, system dynamics assumes those structures that are causing 
the patterns of behaviour is best understood as systems (e.g. von Bertalanffy 
1945; Wiener 1948). System is a commonly used word, and it has already been 
used in this text numerous times, but without a proper definition. I choose to 
use a defin itio n  o f th e w o rd  as „a group of interacting, interrelated, or 
interdependent components that fo rm  a co m p lex an d un ified w h o le‟ (e.g. 
Anderson & Johnson 1997: 2; Sterman 1991: 211). This interrelatedness of 
systems makes them very difficult to understand if they are examined one 
component, or one interconnection at a time. To be able to truly understand 
the nature of a system, and its emergent properties, one has to consider all 
components and all interconnections, simultaneously. In other words, a holistic 
rather than analytic approach has to be applied. 
 A  system ‟s p arts must all be present, and must all be arranged in a specific 
way for the system to carry out its intended purpose. „Remove a cashew from a 
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bowl of mixed nuts, you will have fewer nuts, but you have not changed the 
nature of the collection of components. Therefore, a bowl of nuts is not a 
system.‟ (Anderson & Johnson 1997: 3) However, if a music firm hires (or 
looses) a talented employee, the structure, as well as the behaviour, of the 
company will change. Hence, the music firm is a system. More specifically, the 
music firm is a dynamic system; that is to say a system with properties that 
change over time. 
 Systems have a boundary which separates its internal structure from the 
environment, or endogenous variables from exogenous variables. Open systems 
allow resources, influences, etc, to pass through this boundary while closed 
systems are completely self-contained. A closed system has in other words no 
exchange with its environment, and everything that happens within the system 
is explained by the nature of the system itself. The second law of 
thermodynamics explains that the disorder, or entropy, of a closed system tend 
to increase over time. When this principle is applied to biological, social or 
economic systems it implies that any organism, organisation, society, etc, is 
bound to die if it does not receive resources or influences from its environment 
(e.g. Boulding 1966). Since most societal and economic systems do exchange 
resources and information with its environment, they are by definition open. 
 
4.3 Feedback loops 
 
Proposition #3: Feedback loops are the basic structures of systems 
 
The concept of feedback loops has been fundamental to system dynamics 
modelling since its very beginning: 
 
Systems of information feedback control are fundamental 
to all life and human endeavor, from the slow pace of 
biological evolution to the launching of the latest satellite. 
A feedback control system exists whenever the 
environment causes a decision which in turn affects the 
original environment. (Forrester 1958: 4) 
 
 Feedback loops have already been discussed in this text when the concepts 
of organisational learning were presented. Feedback loops are the foundation of 
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servomechanism engineering and control theory, where feedback processes are 
modelled by the use of differential equations. The concept of feedback loops is 
also an integral part of many explanatory models within the social sciences. 
Most commonly they are used in verbal pictures of circular causal processes 
such as „vicio us circles‟, „virtuo us circles‟, or „self-fulfillin g p ro p h ecies‟ 
(Richardson 1991: 5). 
 In order to further explain the fundamental concept of feedback loops, I 
will use a model from the field of newspaper economics, known as the 
„circulation spiral‟ (F urh o ff 1967; Gustafsson 1978). It is important to stress 
that the purpose of using this model is not to discuss its validity or usefulness. I 
am merely using the model as a Rosetta stone, in order to establish a conceptual 
link between the written language and the graphical representations used in 
qualitative system dynamics modelling. 
 According to the circulation spiral, when two or more newspapers compete 
in a market, the secondary paper will always be disadvantaged: 
 
The paper with the largest circulation in a market has 
financial and economic advantages that enable it to 
increase advertising and circulation sales by attracting 
customers from the smaller paper. As the leading paper 
attracts more circulation, it attracts more advertising, which 
in turn attracts more circulation, trapping the secondary 
paper in a circulation spiral that ultimately leads to its 
demise. (Picard 2003) 
 
 From the perspective of the leading newspaper, the circulation spiral is a 
virtuous circle, and of course, from the perspective of the secondary paper, the 
same process is probably perceived as vicious. A feedback loop is intuitively 
visual, and by using a graphical representation rather than the written language, 
the communication of the structure and nature of the feedback process is 
facilitated. In Figure 4.2, the circulation spiral (as cited above) is illustrated by 
the use of an influence diagram27. An arrow drawn from variable A to variable B in 
an influence diagram means that A causally influences B. Relationships between 
variables in a system can be very complicated, but influence diagrams abstract 
the relationships by using a simple set of symbols to describe the character of 
                                              
 
27 The diagrams are usually referred to as influence diagrams by UK based researchers while US based 
researchers usually call them causal loop diagrams. (Wolstenholme 1999) 
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the relationship. A causal influence from A to B is referred to as positive if a 
change in A causes a change in B in the same direction. Similarly, a causal 
influence from A to B is referred to as negative if a change in A causes a change 
in B in the opposite direction. It is important to note that an influence diagram, 
as an y m o del, n ever is “co m p lete” in  th e sen se th at it in cludes every causal link 
to or from the model variables. In order for a model to be useful, „it must 
address a specific problem and must simplify rather than attempting to mirror 
in detail an entire system‟ (Sterman 1991: 211). Issues related to what should, 
and what should not be included in a model, is discussed in section 4.6. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The circulation spiral as an influence diagram. 
 
 
 The influence diagram in Figure 4.2 can be read by starting from any link 
o r variab le. F ro m  th e seco n dary p ap er‟s p o in t o f view : When circulation falls, 
advertisers are less interested in the paper, which has a negative impact on profit, which reduces 
our ability to keep the quality of our product (and our marketing initiatives) on a high level 
which will result in lost subscribers. F ro m  th e leadin g p ap er‟s p o in t o f view , th e lo gic 
is the same, but the story is quite different: If we are able to get more advertisers, our 
finances will improve, and we will be able to hire better editorial staff which will make it 
possible to attract subscribers from our competitor, which in turn will make us more attractive 
to potential advertisers.  
 A feedback loop, such as the circulation spiral, where the logic of the loop 
is reinforcing is lab elled „R ‟. D o  n o te th at all the links in the loop do not have to 
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be positive for the loop to be reinforcing. The example below shows a 
reinforcing feedback loop with negative causal links. The process illustrated is 
related to the circulation spiral but is focused on the principles of economies of 
scale rather than on advertising.  
 T h is is th e sto ry to ld  b y th e diagram  fro m  th e leadin g n ew sp ap er‟s p o in t o f 
view: When we increase our subscriber base, we will increase our market share, which will 
lead to reduced costs per subscriber. This will have the opposite effect on profit which will give 
us resources to improve our product, which will attract even more subscribers. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The circulation spiral (ver. 2) as an influence diagram. 
 
 
 As the story shows, the two negative links cancel each other. The arithmetic 
of the links parallels the multiplication of signed numbers; in other words an 
even number of negative links create a reinforcing loop and an odd number of 
negative links create what is referred to as a balancing loop. Balancing loops are 
not as explicit as reinforcing loops. A balancing loop tries to eliminate 
deviations from the goal which is defined by the system. A simple example of a 
balancing feedback loop is illustrated by Figure 4.4.28 
                                              
 
28 As with the example of the circulation spiral on page 82f, the purpose of introducing this simple example is 
only to illustrate the concepts of feedback loops and influence diagrams. The purpose is not to discuss the 
principles of cost-cutting and short-term vs. long-term profitability. 
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 The shareholders of a company expect a predefined profitability to be 
delivered each year. If the company meets the desired profitability, there will be 
no gap between actual and desired profitability and no managerial action needs 
to be taken. However, if, for some reason, the profitability begins to fall or if 
shareholders increase their demands, a gap between actual and desired 
profitability will develop. To eliminate this gap, the company may decide to 
launch cost cutting initiatives with the purpose to improve profitability and 
eventually close the gap. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Balancing feedback loops are labelled “B” in an influence diagram. 
 
 
 Dynamic systems can rarely be represented by a single feedback loop. 
Rather, most dynamic systems are constituted by a number of interconnected 
loops of different polarities (balancing or reinforcing). Several such loops, 
working in concert, are often able to generate very complicated system 
behaviour. This kind of complexity will be discussed in the following section. 
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4.4 Dynamic complexity 
 
Proposition #4: Feedback loops in concert create dynamic complexity 
 
This is actually the same proposition as Proposition #1, but expressed with a 
little more stringency. The reason why complex behaviour emerges from 
seemingly simple structures is due to nonlinear relationships between variables 
and the shifting of „loop dominance‟ (Richardson 1991: 35). A system 
constituted by several loops can as time goes by experience periods when its 
behaviour is dominated by one of the loops, and other periods when other 
loops are determining system behaviour. Since the loops generate different 
dynamics, the system ‟s behaviour will be complex and may often be 
experienced as chaotic. 
 It is important to distinguish this dynamic complexity from detail complexity. 
A system may have thousands of components (detail complexity), but the 
dynamics of the system may be very simple. On the other hand, a system can 
consist of only ten or twenty components but yet produce a complex and 
chaotic behaviour (dynamic complexity). (Senge 1990) 
 Influence diagrams are able to differentiate a positive relationship between 
two variables from a negative relationship. However, relationships between 
variables in a system are often much more complicated than that. The 
relationships are sometimes delayed, random, cyclical or nonlinear in some 
other way (Figure 4.5).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.5: Examples of nonlinear influence from  variable “A” on variable “B”. 
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 Even though relationships between variables may be as complicated as in 
the figure above, in an influence diagram they are all simplified as either 
positive or negative. The exception is the relationship between variables 
characterised by a significant time lag. Such relationships are prevalent in 
complex systems; for instance, (1) it takes time to build a good reputation; (2) it 
takes time to engage a talented artist and to get the recording available to the 
audience; (3) when a new leader with poor leadership skills is hired to an 
organisation, it takes time before the performance of the organisation is 
damaged. These time lags, or delays, have significant impact on system 
behaviour. In an influence diagram, relationships between variables which are 
associated with a time lag are labelled as in Figure 4.629, which is an extended 
version of the example introduced in Figure 4.4. Although the structure in the 
illustration is seemingly simple, it is able to generate relatively complicated 
system behaviour. The diagram shows two feedback loops, one balancing and 
one reinforcing. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Short-term solutions affect long-term performance. 
 
 
 The story told by the diagram goes as follows: The short-term solution to the 
com pan y‟s profitability problem  m ay solve the problem  tem porarily, bu t it also has an  
unintended side-effect30. By focusing on cost cutting initiatives, the ability to make long-term 
                                              
 
29 Relationships with time lag are usually indicated by two lines ( // ) crossing the arrow. Sometimes, as in 
Figure 4.6, the w ord “delay” is w ritten betw een those lines to be even m ore explicit. 
30 This reasoning is based on Porter (1996). 
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investments in new products, etc, is weakened. Eventually, the weakened long-term investment 
will have a negative impact on profitability which will further add to the profitability gap, and 
the reinforcing feedback loop is closed. The complex behaviour is generated by shifting 
loop dominance. In this case, the balancing feedback loop dominates in the 
beginning of the process, and the reinforcing feedback loop kicks in after some 
time, as illustrated by the graph in Figure 4.7. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Example of the behaviour of a complex dynamic system. 
 
                                 
 
The chapter has now introduced four propositions which are fundamental 
pillars in the worldview on which system dynamics modelling is resting. A 
number of important concepts have been introduced, such as model boundary; 
open dynamic systems; balancing vs. reinforcing feedback loops; loop 
dominance; and dynamic complexity. In addition, the basic building blocks of 
influence diagrams have been introduced. The presentation is of course far 
from complete, but it provides the basic understanding required in order to 
read the model which is developed by this study. In the remaining sections of 
this chapter, additional aspects of system dynamics modelling will be discussed, 
starting with an important debate within the system dynamics community. 
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4.5 Hard vs. soft systems 
Influence diagrams are not really considered as traditional hardcore system 
dynamics. The concept was actually not introduced until almost two decades 
after Forrester‟s first p ub licatio n  in  th e en d o f th e 1950s (Randers 1980). When 
Forrester first developed system dynamics modelling, it was purely intended as 
a computer simulation method (Wolstenholme 1999). Socio-economic systems 
were described as mathematical models, and by using computers, these 
mathematical models could simulate complex nonlinear system behaviour. With 
the growing capabilities of computer technology, other methods such as 
bifurcation analysis, agent-based modelling and various stochastic modelling 
techniques have emerged. Computer modelling of complex dynamic systems is 
currently a very active field of research, especially with a focus on the study of 
complexity and chaos. However, in parallel with the successful development of 
quantitative computer modelling of socio-economic systems, a critique of this 
approach has also developed (e.g. Checkland 1981; Wolstenholme 1991). The 
essence of the critique is that it is not possible to represent ill-defined and 
messy systems such as complex human and social systems with quantitative 
computer models (Checkland 1981). Checkland labelled the orthodox system 
dynamics approach th e „h ard system s p aradigm ‟ an d suggested an o th er 
ap p ro ach ; th e „so ft system s p aradigm ‟ (1981). I will rather refer to this approach 
as qualitative system dynamics, as suggested by for instance Wolstenholme (1999) 
and Coyle (2000). Qualitative system dynamics agrees largely to the assumptions 
made by Forrester and his disciples. However, the qualitative system dynamics 
approach claims that quantification is not always required in order to grasp a 
system ‟s dyn am ic p ro p erties. Coyle even states that when modelling ill-defined 
p ro b lem s w ith  so ft variab les an d lim ited access to  em p irical data, „quan tificatio n  
m igh t b e fraugh t w ith  so  m an y un certain ties th at th e m o del‟s o utp uts co uld b e 
so misleading that the policy inferences drawn from them migh t b e illuso ry‟ 
(Coyle 2000: 226). Rather, th e b est w ay to  co p e w ith  such  system s is to  „rem ain  
qualitative‟ an d  p erfo rm  „m en tal sim ulatio n s‟ b y w alkin g th ro ugh  w ell-crafted 
influence diagrams. (E.g. Wolstenholme 1999; Coyle 2000) 
 According to some scholars of the quantitative branch of system dynamics, 
computer-based simulation is such a deeply ingrained part of the framework 
that a methodology called system dynamics without computer-based simulation 
would be an oxymoron (Coyle 2000). Though the debate is still active, the 
branch of qualitative system dynamics is now more or less accepted by most 
members of the system dynamics community. 
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 In 1990, Peter Senge used the term „systems thinking‟, as a way to 
popularise the use of system dynamics and particularly the qualitative aspects of 
the framework (Senge 1990). „Systems thinking‟ as presented by Senge, is still 
much in vogue in management circuits, and several scholars and analysts have 
used the framework to carry out research initiatives similar to the one in this 
study. However, other scholars (e.g. Capra 1996) use th e term  „system s 
th in kin g‟, n o t to  den o te a sp ecific framework, but to denote the whole range of 
frameworks based on some kind of systemic understanding of the world. Due 
to this ambiguity, the framework used in this study will not be referred to as 
„system s th in kin g‟ b ut rath er as „qualitative system  dyn am ics‟ as suggested b y fo r 
instance Checkland (1981), Coyle (2000) and Wolstenholme (1999).  
 
4.6 Model boundary and conceptual distance 
This section will address two important issues which have to be addressed 
when modelling any system. First, th e questio n  regardin g th e system ‟s 
boundary, that is to say which aspects of reality should be considered 
endogenous to the system and which should be considered exogenous. Second, 
th e reso lutio n  o r „co n cep tual distan ce‟ (R ich ardso n  1991: 342) that should be 
used in the modelling of the system. Sterman suggests that the purpose of the 
model has to be the guiding light when tackling these two issues: 
 
The art of model building is knowing what to cut out, and 
the purpose of the model acts as the logical knife. It 
provides the criterion about what will be cut, so that only 
the essential features necessary to fulfill the purpose are 
left. (Sterman 1991: 211) 
 
 How I intend to deal with these issues will become clearer later in the text 
when the Music Industry Feedback Model is presented, but below I will briefly 
explain the strategy that I intend to follow. 
 
Model boundary 
Forrester argues that th e p ro cess o f d efin in g a system ‟s b o un dary sh o uld b e 
started with the question „W h ere is th e b o un dary, that encompasses the smallest 
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number of components, within which the dynamic behavior under study is 
generated?‟ (1976 [1968]: 4). Sterman (1991) continues by suggesting that „a 
broad model boundary that includes important feedback effects is more 
important than a great amount of detail in the specification of individual 
components‟ (1991: 220). 
 By applying these two suggestions to the models in Figure 4.4 and Figure 
4.6, it is clear that the first model has been defined with a boundary that is too 
narrow. This model is not able to explain why the firm evolved as the graph in 
Figure 4.7 illustrates. In  th e seco n d m o del th o ugh , th e system ‟s b o un dary has 
been given a wider definition, and the structures that are causin g th e firm ‟s 
behaviour are included. 
 My strategy when defining the model boundary is to develop a model that 
(a) has enough explanatory power to be able to add to the understanding of the 
system and (b) is simple enough to be relatively easy to read and understand. 
This strategy is of course a parallel to th e sam e „dilem m a th at m ust h aun t an y 
social scientist worth his salt: the necessity of choosing between realism and 
simplicity as guides to  th eo ry co n structio n ‟ (E lster 1983: 6).  
 
Conceptual distance 
In the quote from Sterman (1991: 220) above, the priorities between the 
boundary issue and the resolution issue is set: Rather choose a wide boundary 
and a low resolution than the opposite. Forrester suggests that the right 
conceptual distance to choose should be th at o f th e „up p er level m an ager‟s‟: 
 
… [h e] is clo se en o ugh  to  know how desired goals are 
established. He is in a position to observe and probably 
provide the information sources to be used by the 
subordinate to determine his concept of actual conditions. 
He knows in general the guiding policies and the manner 
in which the subordinate decision maker would respond to 
various kinds of circumstances. (Forrester 1961: 96) 
 
 It follows from this advice, that when modelling a firm in an industrial 
context, the firm cannot simply be reduced to a black box consuming resources 
and generating products and profits. The model has to be able to capture the 
„in tern al p ressures‟ o f th e firm . H o w ever, th e model should not capture for 
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instance individual decisions, but rather the policies, assumptions and mental 
models that are governing those decisions. 
 
4.7 Choosing and naming variables 
Another methodological issue which is somewhat less abstract than the two 
issues discussed in the previous section concerns the choosing and naming of 
model variables. 
 The music industry models presented in section 3.1 are constituted by 
objects or variables and links between those. A system dynamics influence 
diagram may also be considered as a set of components, but the meaning of the 
different components in an influence diagram is more formalised than in the 
other models. The links (positive or negative relationships, time lags, etc) have 
already been covered in this chapter, but the variables, also needs some specific 
attention. In order to be able to create useful models, it is also important to 
ch o o se an d lab el variab les in  a certain  w ay. “A p p ro p riate” variab le n am es 
should be able to fit in  a sto ry to ld b y th e diagram  durin g „m en tal sim ulatio n s‟ 
an d „in fluen ce diagram  w alk -ab o uts‟. U sually, suitab le variab le n am es are n o un s 
or noun phrases that fit in expressions such as: w h en …  … goes up/goes down; 
w hen …   … get better/get worse; w h en …   … grow/shrink; etc. It should also be 
possible to fit the variable name in phrases such as level of… ; size of… ; 
number of… ; etc. (Anderson & Johnson 1997: 58) 
 The list below shows examples of appropriate variable names. From now 
on forward in the text, names of variables will be formatted as in the list below. 
 
 PRODUCT  QUALITY 
 PROFIT 
 CULTURAL DIVERSITY 
 REVENUES 
 ALBUMS RELEASED 
 COSTS 
 ARTISTS IN ROSTER 
 
 System dynamics models often mix hard variables (e.g. PROFIT, 
ALBUMS RELEASED) with soft variables (e.g. QUALITY, DIVERSITY, 
WILLINGNESS). Formally, variables are of at least ordinal scale, and can be 
parametric as well as non-parametric. It is important to note that the focus of 
the models is on the relationships between variables rather than on the qualities of 
 97 
the variables themselves. It is the nature of the relationships that generates 
dynamic complexity and it is b y un derstan din g th ese relatio n sh ip s, th e system ‟s 
behaviour will be explained (e.g. Coyle 2000). Consequently, system dynamics 
models tend to emphasize that (as an example) increased FATIGUE will have a 
negative impact on MOTIVATION rather than to illustrate how FATIGUE is 
experienced by a certain individual. Similarly, the models rather show that 
increased EFFORT TO CUT COSTS has a long-term negative impact on 
PROFITABILITY than to explain exactly how many percentages PROFITABILITY 
will drop.  
 
4.8 A tool for foresight 
The final issue which needs to be discussed in relation to this introduction of 
the system dynamics framework concerns the use of models as forecasting or 
prediction tools. 
 Many models developed by economists and social scientists are used to 
predict how a system will evolve in the future. However, such modelling 
initiatives are often futile since our ability to predict the future development of 
complex (and chaotic) dynamic systems is limited. Meadows, Meadows, 
Richardson and Bruckmann (1982) develop this argumentation: 
 
...at present we are far from being able to predict social-
system behavior except perhaps for carefully selected 
systems in the very short term. Effort spent on attempts at 
precise prediction is almost surely wasted, and results that 
purport to be such predictions are certainly misleading. On 
the other hand, much can be learned from models in the 
form of broad, qualitative, conditional understanding –  and 
this kind of understanding is useful (and typically the only 
basis) for policy formulation. If your doctor tells you that 
you will have a heart attack if you do not stop smoking, 
this advice is helpful, even if it does not tell you exactly 
when a heart attack will occur or how bad it will be. 
(Meadows, Meadows, Richardson, & Bruckmann 1982: 
279) 
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 Th e p urp o se o f th e m o del suggested b y th is study is to  sup p ly such  „b ro ad, 
qualitative, co n ditio n al‟ un derstan din g o f system  b eh avio ur. The model is not a 
tool for forecasting or prediction, but an a tool for foresight, w h ich  „is th e ab ility 
to  an ticip ate h o w  th e system  w ill b eh ave if and w h en  certain  ch an ges o ccur‟ 
(Sterman 1991: 238).31 
 
                                 
 
This chapter has introduced qualitative system dynamics, which is the approach 
used to develop the model suggested by this study. The chapter has addressed 
both theoretical and methodological issues which are relevant to the approach. 
In the next chapter, more methodological issues will be addressed. The 
structure of the research process will be presented, and the collection and 
analysis of data used to support the model development and the reasoning 
brought forward by the study will be discussed. 
                                              
 
31 There are other practical examples of using qualitative system dynamics models as tools for foresight. For 
instance, qualitative system dynamics models have been used to support the strategic planning method 
know n as ‘scenario-based planning’ (e.g. de Geus 1988; 1997: 38ff; van der Heijden 2005). In these planning 
sessions; “w hat if”-questions are posed and discussed by the help of ‘influence diagram  w alk-abouts’ as 
mentioned earlier in the text (e.g. section 4.5 & 4.7).  
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5  
Theory as process32 
The previous three chapters have been almost exclusively focused on the 
theoretical aspects of this study. Chapter 2 introduced relevant theoretical 
concepts, chapter 3 presented previous music industry research and a number 
of music industry models, and the preceding chapter discussed the foundations 
and principles of qualitative system dynamics modelling, the approach used 
when developing the Music Industry Feedback Model. 
 This chapter will focus on the overall research process adhered to by the 
study. The chapter will also discuss questions regarding how the model has 
been developed and how data has been gathered to support the model 
development process and the reasoning brought forward by the study. 
 
5.1 An iterative research process 
The purpose of this study is to examine contemporary music industry 
dynamics, and in particular to address questions regarding how music industry 
decision makers understand and respond to changes in the media environment. 
A qualitative system dynamics model is created in order to facilitate the 
examination of the phenomenon. It is important to recognise that the 
development of the model and the examination of the research questions are 
not two distinct and sequentially ordered activities. Rather, the two activities are 
tightly linked and performed in parallel, since the development of the model 
necessitates an examination of the research questions.  
                                              
 
32 I understand the concept of theory as a set of statements or principles devised to explain the causes or 
relationships underlying a certain phenom enon. The phrase ‘theory as process’ is a quote from  Glaser and 
Strauss (1999 [1967]: 32). 
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 The overall research process is iterative in its structure and can be described 
as a number of phases. In the first phase, information is gathered. In the initial 
iteration, this information consists of established theories and previous research 
as presented in chapters 2 and 3. In the following iterations the information 
primarily consists of empirical data, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 In the second phase, the gathered information is processed and analysed. It 
is important to note that an iterative research process requires that the empirical 
data processing and analysis is performed continuously, and is not postponed 
until after all the data is gathered.  
 In the third phase, the knowledge gained from the analysis is used to 
develop or revise the model and the reasoning brought forward by the study. 
Finally, in the fourth phase, the new understanding of the phenomenon guides 
the process in the continued gathering of new information which drives the 
iterative research process forward.33 
 The process is indeed iterative, but it is also asymptotic in its nature in the 
sense that by exposing the model and the reasoning to new information, it will 
by each iteration represent th e system ‟s b eh avio ur m o re accurately. However, 
the representation will not ever be completed or ultimately correct. The 
research process has many similarities to the research methodology known as 
grounded theory according to Glaser and Strauss (1999 [1967]): „O ur strategy [… ] 
for generating theory puts a high emphasis on theory as process; that is, theory 
as an ever-developing entity, n o t as a p erfected p ro duct‟ (Glaser & Strauss 1999 
[1967]: 32). Grounded theory is sometimes misinterpreted as an approach 
where theory is generated from a blank sheet of paper and that existing 
knowledge should not be allowed to inform or influence the research (Flick 
2002: 41). However, the suspension of the theoretical structuring of the subject, 
which  is an  im p o rtan t p art o f th e ap p ro ach  „im p lies th e ab an do n m en t o f th e ex 
ante fo rm ulatio n  o f h yp o th esis‟ (H o ffm an n -Riem 1980: 345) not the 
abandonment of previous knowledge of the subject. 
 A question of fundamental importance is what data should be gathered to 
reveal the serve as input to the research process. The approach which has been 
chosen in this study is similar to the method known as „th eo retical sam p lin g‟. In 
theoretical sampling, the collection of data is not determined in the beginning 
of the research process; rather it is the emerging theory that determines which 
                                              
 
33 The structure has many parallels to traditional models of learning, including the models of organisational 
learning discussed in section 2.7. 
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information should be gathered in order to continue the process (Glaser & 
Strauss 1999 [1967]: 45).  
 
Beyond the decisions concerning initial collection of data, 
further collection cannot be planned in advance of the 
emerging theory. The emerging theory points to the next 
steps –  the sociologist does not know them until he is 
guided by emerging gaps in his theory and by research 
questions suggested by previous answers. (p. 47) 
 
 A central theme in this study is the examination of business strategies used 
by music firms. According to the reasoning by Hax and others, business 
strategies should be studied by exam in in g „w h at th e firm  do es‟ (H ax 1990: 35). 
T h ere are n um ero us so urces o f in fo rm atio n  th at can  p ro vide in sigh ts in to  „w h at 
th e firm  do es‟. O n e o b vio us exam p le is the narratives produced by the firms 
themselves, for instance as corporate web sites, marketing activities, press 
releases, written and oral presentations, annual reports, etc. Relevant narratives 
can also be found in other documents, for instance official documents from 
governmental bodies and various reports from trade organisations. A third 
source of knowledge is data on industry performance, primarily sales data of 
various kinds. Finally, and most importantly, knowledge about „w h at th e firm  
do es‟ can be determined by examining the internal workings of the actual 
organisation. This is usually both difficult and resource consuming. Sterman 
reflects on these challenges: 
 
… disco verin g decisio n  rules is o ften  difficult. T h ey can n o t 
be determined from aggregate statistical data, but must be 
investigated first hand. Primary data on the behavior of the 
actors can be acquired through observation of actual 
decision making in the field, that is, in the boardroom, on 
the factory floor, along the sales route, in the household. 
The modeler must discover what information is available 
to each actor, examine the timeliness and accuracy of that 
information, and infer how it is processed to yield a 
decision. Modelers often require the skills of the 
anthropologist and the ethnographer. (Sterman 1991: 219) 
 
 102 
 It requires a great deal of trust to be able to get as intimate with an 
organisation as suggested by Sterman. Some ethnographically inspired studies 
of cultural production (particularly news production) have been made (e.g. 
Epstein 1973; Fishman 1980; Gans 1980; Schlesinger 1978; Tuchman 1978), 
but these researchers have usually only been allowed access to the operational 
parts of the organisation. Seldom, researchers are allowed access into 
boardrooms to listen to the reasoning of top level decision makers (Doyle & 
Frith 2006: 562). The second best choice, if ethnographical studies are 
excluded, is p erso n al qualitative in terview s: „almost any research project that 
requires data fro m  sen io r m edia executives w ill h ave to  em p lo y in terview s‟ 
(Hollifield & Coffey 2006: 587). Interviews should preferably be done by the 
researcher in person, but interviews performed by others (e.g. journalists) may 
also be a valuable source of information.  
 To sum up, narratives of the system ‟s b eh avio ur, w ith  a fo cus o n  „w h at th e 
firm  do es‟ can  b e gain ed  fro m : 
 
 Personal interviews 
 Journalistic articles 
 Corporate press releases 
 Corporate presentations (at trade shows, conferences, etc) 
 Annual reports 
 Official documents from governmental bodies 
 Reports from trade organisations 
 Corporate web sites 
 Marketing activities 
 Quantitative data on industry performance 
 
 The theoretical sampling approach has brought the study to all these 
different sources of information. In the following sections they will all be 
presented and critiqued. 
 
5.2 Personal interviews 
Personal interviews have served as the most important source of empirical data 
during this study. This section discusses relevant issues involved in the process 
of planning, doing and analysing these interviews. 
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The interview as an active social encounter 
The purpose of the interviews has been to learn how decision makers in the 
music industry understand their changing environment, and how they have 
revised their business strategies in order to cope with the change. As was 
discussed in the previous section, narratives which describe the system 
dynamics are required to develop the model and the reasoning brought forward 
by the study. It is important to note that the narratives told during these 
interviews do not necessarily reflect the true nature of reality. What actually are 
probed are the decision makers‟ mental models of the environment and their 
own existence within this environment (e.g. Kvale 1983). These mental models 
may be flawed in many ways but they are nevertheless the basis used in the 
development of business strategies and decisions (Sterman 1994). Hence, the 
mental models play a central role in the emergence of the overall dynamics of 
the music industry. 
 According to Forrester (1961) it is important to use an appropriate 
conceptual distance when modelling industrial dynamics. As has been discussed 
previously, Forrester suggests that the appropriate distan ce is th at o f th e „up p er 
level m an ager‟. In order to follow F o rrester‟s suggestion, almost all the 
informants who participated in the study hold positions somewhere in the 
range between upper level manager and vice president. 
 All the informants have been asked to only represent themselves personally 
and not the organisation where they are employed. However, this is easier said 
than done. Professionals on this level are used to being interviewed, and are by 
instinct trying to make their organisations look as good as possible (Flick 2002: 
89-90). The interviewer is challenged to see through this façade and to create a 
relaxed atmosphere during the interview which allows the informant to lower 
his or her guard. In order to create this atmosphere of trust, it is difficult to 
keep a formal distance to the subject. Negus (1999) gives an illustrative account 
of such interviews: 
 
Interviews are very specific social encounters between 
individuals which occur at particular times and places. The 
relationship which is established and which develops (or 
does not develop) during the encounter will decisively 
influence any material derived from an interview. 
In terview s are n o t ab o ut „extractin g‟ in formation or truths 
that are waiting to be revealed. Instead, an interview is an 
active social encounter, through which knowledge of the 
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world is produced via a process of exchange. This involves 
communication, interpretation, understanding and 
occasionally perhaps, misunderstanding. (Negus 1999: 11) 
 
  I do recognise that my own persona during the interviews affects the 
narratives told and the knowledge produced. However, I choose to consider 
this interaction between interviewer and informant as a pro rather than a con. It 
is through this interaction that I am able to pick a hole in the façade and to get 
a little bit closer to the decision makers‟ actual thinking. 
 It is of course difficult to know for sure if the informants are telling the 
truth or not. However, by asking questions which are not immediately sensitive 
to their own organisation, but which rather are concerned with the industry in 
general or with their competitors, they are able to speak more freely. By then 
cross checking their reasoning, with the reasoning of other informants and 
other sources of information, a congruent and relatively trustworthy picture 
eventually emerges.  
 The structure of the interviews was inspired by the episodic interview 
method, based on the assumption that: 
 
… sub jects‟ exp erien ces o f a certain  do m ain  are sto red an d  
remembered in forms of narrative-episodic and semantic 
knowledge. Whereas episodic knowledge is organized 
closer to experiences and linked to concrete situations and 
circumstances, semantic knowledge is based on 
assumptions and relations which are abstracted from these 
and generalized. For the former, the course of the situation 
in its context is the main unit around which knowledge is 
organized. In the latter, concepts and their relation among 
each other are the central units. (Flick 2002: 104) 
 
 This assumption fits well with the intention of this study since I want to 
explore decision makers‟ m en tal m o dels (which I interpret as a parallel to 
semantic knowledge). The episodic interview combines „n arratives o rien ted to  
situative [sic!] or episodic contexts and argumentation that peel off such 
contexts in favour of conceptual and rule-o rien ted kn o w led ge‟ (Flick 2002: 
104-5). 
 Two general questioning strategies were used in order to follow this 
approach. One strategy (A) was focused on revealing narratives about current 
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and specific situations. The other strategy (B) was fo cused o n  th e „sem an tic 
kn o w ledge‟ an d consequently yielded questions that were more abstract in their 
character. These questions discussed issues such as the informant‟s 
understanding of how something has evolved over time or the informant‟s own 
explanation of a specific phenomenon. Examples of the two strategies: 
 
A. How did you go about planning the promotion of this particular album? 
B. How would you characterise your relations with record companies? 
B. (Follow up question) Is it in any way different now, compared to ten 
years ago? How? 
 
 Both strategies triggered the informants to tell stories about experiences 
and their perception of the behaviour of their industry. While some of the 
narratives were short and barren and some were elaborated, most of them were 
indeed useful during the development of the model and the argumentation 
brought forward by the study. 
 As stated in the introductory chapter, the study is primarily focused on the 
three sub-systems: marketing, distribution and talent development (A&R). 
Consequently, the topics discussed during the interviews were linked to those 
three areas. Due to the iterative and evolving character of the research process, 
it is not possible to list a well-defined set of questions which were asked during 
every interview session. Although the three areas were addressed to some 
extent during every interview, the focus differed from one interview to another, 
primarily depending on the in fo rm an t‟s position and background. 
 
Sampling the interviews 
The interviews took place from March 2003 to October 2005. In order to 
adhere to the theoretical sampling approach (Glaser & Strauss 1999 [1967]: 45), 
I allowed the emerging model and argumentation to determine which groups I 
should interview next. The groups were selected based on which new insights 
they were expected to be able to add (Flick 2002: 64). 
 The study started out by addressing the marketing and promotion 
departments at a number of record companies. This decision was motivated by 
the hypothesis that marketing professionals would be able to add valuable 
insights in the examination of the research questions. The first interviews 
enabled me to develop a reasoning which posed new questions which the 
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marketing professionals were unable to explain. I decided to complement the 
study by interviewing additional groups which would be able to add new 
perspectives to the study. These additional groups were professionals in the 
distribution, publishing and creative sectors of the industry. Later it became 
evident that individuals in other copyright industries, but working close to the 
music industry could add a valuable “o utside” p erspective. Finally, in order to 
further enhance the light shed by these five groups (Figure 5.1) I carried out a 
number of interviews with individuals in various trade organisations. These 
interviews were able to give a perspective on the issues which differed slightly 
from the ones given by the professionals within the copyright firms. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Five groups provide different perspectives on music industry dynamics. 
 
 
 I was able to use theoretical sampling to choose which groups should be 
interviewed, but in the selection of which individuals to interview within those 
groups, the ability to pick and choose was restricted. Some of the professionals 
on my wish list were for various reasons unable or unwilling to participate in 
the study. Consequently, though I was aiming for maximal variation within each 
group, I was sometimes unable to reach that goal. However, I was eventually 
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able to carry out 36 interviews with 38 individuals34 (a list of the informants is 
found in Appendix 3). The interviews were evenly split between the UK, the 
US and Sweden. Six of the 38 informants were women. I did not make an effort 
to have an equal representation of men and women, but I have not been able to 
discern any important differences between answers from female informants and 
answers from male informants. The interviews took place in Cannes, London, 
New York and Stockholm with a duration which varied between 20 and 97 
minutes, with an average of 44 minutes. Most interviews took place at the 
informant‟s o ffice, but some interviews were made in restaurants, coffee shops 
and other similar public locations. I was able to engage informants from all the 
major multinational music firms (EMI Group; Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment; Warner Music Group; and Universal Music Group) and I was 
also able to get an acceptable distribution between all groups35. 
 During what came to be the last interviews, in October of 2005, I was able 
to achieve theoretical saturation in all groups (Glaser & Strauss 1999 [1967]: 
61). This means that the knowledge gained from these interviews did not 
require the model or the argumentation to be modified and consequently I 
decided to close the interview process. 
 Glaser and Strauss states th at an  „adequate th eo retical sam p le is jud ged  o n  
th e b asis o f h o w  w idely an d diversely th e an alyst ch o se h is gro up s‟ (1999 [1967]: 
63). The five groups are all covered by the music industry models presented in 
section 3.1. However, there are some additional groups that have not been 
addressed during the interview process. For instance I have decided not to 
interview artists, composers, or individuals working with live performances, 
physical retailing, CD/DVD manufacturing, legal issues, etc. Although all these 
groups probably would have been able to add some more knowledge to the 
process, the expected contribution did not defend the amount of effort which 
would be required for such an expansion of the study. I have also decided not 
to gather primary information from audiences. As Burnett & Weber (1989) 
show, the interaction between the audiences and the music industry is 
important in understanding industry logic. However, the audiences play an 
important role in the decision makers‟ m en tal m o dels. During the interviews, 
the decision makers‟ un derstan din g o f th ese audiences have been discussed, and 
                                              
 
34 There is a discrepancy between the number of informants and the number of interviews since two of the 
interviews were performed with two informants simultaneously. 
35 The interviews were split between the five groups: Marketing: 9 interviews; Distribution: 8 interviews; 
Publishing: 9 interviews; Creative: 6 interviews; Outside: 6 interviews. 
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it is their understanding of the audiences that is important and not the actual 
properties of these audiences. This reasoning is also in line with how Peterson 
(1982) relates to the audience: „decision makers redefine the heterogeneous and 
unknown mass of potential consumers into a homogeneous and predicable 
“m arket” th at can  b e tap p ed th ro ugh  stan dard m arket p ractices‟ (Peterson 1982: 
146). 
 Based on this reasoning I conclude that the five groups and the 38 
individuals who participated in this study offer sufficient diversity to be able to 
build a robust argumentation and a model which includes the relevant 
structures that are generating music industry dynamics (Forrester 1968; Sterman 
1991). 
 
Coding and processing of the interview material 
Specific quotes from interview material are often used in qualitative research to 
illustrate or support some kind of reasoning (Flick 2002: 218). The material 
from the interviews in this study will to some extent also be used in that way. 
However, a number of important questions have to be addressed in order to 
guarantee procedural reliability: How did the researcher select which narratives 
should be quoted and which should be left out? What happened to narratives 
that contradicted the conclusions? This section will describe how the interviews 
were coded and processed in order to ensure transparency (Flick 2002: 218-21).  
 Most of the interviews (30/36) were recorded. These recordings were 
transcribed, concentrated to reduce the volume of the material (Kvale 1997: 
175), and translated to English if required. In the next phase the informant‟s 
narratives and phrases were categorized depending on whether it primarily 
concerned marketing; publishing; distribution; the creative sector; or relations 
to other copyright industries. Two additional categories were also used to label 
narratives that concerned purely financial issues and narratives that concerned 
issues relevant to the industry in general. After this categorisation, the material 
was openly coded within each main category (Strauss & Corbin 1998: 101; Love 
1994) by associating the narratives with keywords. This procedure was repeated 
a few times in order to fine-tune the keywords36. Between every repetition, the 
narratives were sorted so that narratives with similar keywords could be 
                                              
 
36 Som etim es the ‘keyw ords’ are short phrases to describe the narratives: E.g. “talent developm ent”; “difficult 
to reach through media”; “pressure from shareholders”; “risk taking”; “advertising”. 
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clustered. It is important to note that during this process, the narratives were 
never altered. In addition, no phrases or narratives were discarded, regardless if 
they matched the claims put forward or not. The result of this process was a 
well-structured and tagged material which could be used as input to the 
research process. 
 
Research ethics and confidentiality 
Phrases and narratives will be used in the analysis to illustrate various claims 
and conclusions. Some of the informants did not want to be immediately 
associated with their statements. In order to guarantee this request, I have tried 
to remove any kind of information from the narratives that could link a phrase 
to a specific informant. However, in order to show that I have not used phrases 
from only a few of the informants, each quoted phrase is labelled (Interview #n), 
w h ere „n ‟ is an integer representing specific informants.  
 
5.3 Narratives from other sources 
Information about the dynamic behaviour of the music industry may be 
gathered from previous music industry research, established theories and the 
personal interviews as discussed above. However, valuable information may 
also be found in other places. 
 
Journalistic articles 
Journalists are sometimes able to meet and interview people whom academic 
researchers are unable to gain access to. Narratives from such interviews can be 
o f great value w h en  exam in in g an  in dustry‟s dyn am ic b eh avio ur. I recognise 
that commercial media operate according a logic which often is detrimental to 
the articles‟ credib ility. However, the narratives told in some specific articles are 
too important to be ignored. With this dilemma in mind I have occasionally 
used journalistic articles as a source of information. In order to recognise the 
limited credibility of these articles, I have chosen never to base a specific 
reasoning solely on narratives from journalistic articles. 
 110 
 When journalistic articles are used as a source in the text, they are 
referenced to in the traditional way, as any other source. Those journalistic 
articles that have been used during the study are listed in the reference section 
of this work. 
 
Other sources 
Several other documents and sources can be of value in order to understand 
copyright industry dynamics. Previously in this text I used an excerpt from an 
annual report to illustrate the economic concepts value chain and core business. 
Annual reports can, if used with caution, provide insights regarding how the 
company is operating. Any such corporate information, including press releases, 
presentations at trade shows and conferences, web sites, marketing activities, 
etc, is of course intended to make the company look as good as possible. It is 
not possible to consider the information as balanced and unbiased. In this 
study, documents of this kind are nevertheless used to understand how firms 
wish to appear. Music marketing practises play an important role in the study, and 
it is consequently important to examine the various communication initiatives 
launched by the music firms. (Doyle & Frith 2006: 558) 
 Other documents produced by trade organisations, governmental bodies, 
etc, have also been used to add to the overall picture. By combining these 
documents with other kinds of information, for instance the interviews and the 
journalistic articles, the understanding of industry dynamics has been enriched. 
(Doyle & Frith 2006: 556-7) 
 When documents and sources such as the ones discussed in this section are 
used in the text, they are referenced to in the traditional way, as any other 
source. A list of these documents and sources are found in the reference 
section of this work. 
 
5.4 Data on industry performance and consumer 
behaviour 
Quantitative secondary data is used at several occasions throughout the study. 
The quantitative data is not used to reveal causal relationships between 
variables but is only used to do basic univariate analyses in order to illuminate 
specific trends from a quantitative perspective. 
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 One such example is the use of quantitative data (cf. section 7.3) to show 
how the usage of a specific information distribution technology develops over 
time. Another example is the use of statistics and financial data to show how 
revenues from different product categories change over time. The most 
important source of this kind of data is the International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industries (IFPI) and affiliated organisations in the three 
countries, Sweden, UK and USA. More details on how the data has been used, 
how it has been structured, processed and analysed are presented in the sections 
where the data is put into play. 
 
5.5 A note on the validity of the study 
 „T h e success o f a research  p ro ject is jud ged b y its p ro ducts‟ (C o rb in  & Strauss 
1990: 16). The products generated by this study are the Music Industry 
Feedback Model and the reasoning supported by the model. The model and the 
argumentation are continuously challenged, as a part of the iterative research 
process, but which criteria should be used to determine its quality and 
usefulness? This text has already concluded that models should not be 
measured in terms of right or wrong. This position is for instance shared by 
Goodman (1978) who considers theories as versions of the world, which undergo a 
continuous process of revision, evaluation and construction. Flick (2002) builds 
o n  G o o d m an ‟s understanding of theories by stating that theories should be 
co n sidered as „… preliminary and relative. Further developing the version leads 
to an increased empirical grounding in the object that is studied.‟ (Flick 2002: 
43) 
 Other scholars are not satisfied by concluding that models merely are tools 
for thinking and subjected to continuous development. Hammersley (1992) 
declares th at th e „go al o f an y research  is to  p ro vide in fo rm atio n  th at is n o t o n ly 
true, but which is also of relevan ce to  issues o f h um an  co n cern ‟ (Hammersley 
1992: 85). This challenge will be addressed in the final chapter of this work, but 
the first part of the statement (validity), will be immediately addressed. 
Hammersley argues that: 
 
The assessment of validity involves identifying the main 
claims made by the study, [… ] and then comparing the 
evidence provided for each claim with what is judged to be 
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necessary, given the claim‟s plausibility and credibility. 
(Hammersley 1992: 72)  
 
 Corbin and Strauss (1990: 17-9) are even more explicit in suggesting criteria 
for assessing the validity of empirically grounded theories or models: 
 
Criterion #1: Are concepts generated and what are their 
sources? Any monograph that purports to present 
theoretical interpretations of data based on grounded 
theory analysis should permit a quick, if crude, assessment 
of concepts. [… ] 
      Criterion #2: Are the concepts systematically related? 
The key to scientific research is systematic 
conceptualization through explicit conceptual linkages. [… ] 
      Criterion #3: Are there many conceptual linkages and 
are the categories well developed? Do the categories have 
conceptual density? [… ] It is tight linkages, in terms of 
paradigm features and density of categories, that gives a 
theory explanatory power. [… ] 
      Criterion #4: Is there much variation built into the 
theory? [… ] A grounded theory monograph should be 
judged in terms of the range of variations and the 
specificity with which they are analyzed in relation to the 
phenomena that are their source. [… ] 
      Criterion #5: Are the broader conditions that affect the 
phenomenon under study built into its explanation? [… ] 
Macrosocial conditions must not simply be listed as 
background material but linked directly to the phenomena 
under study through their effect on action/interaction and, 
th ro ugh  th ese, to  co n sequen ces. [… ] 
      Criterion #6: H as “p ro cess” b een  taken  in to  acco un t? 
[… ] Iden tifyin g an d sp ecifyin g ch an ge o r m o vem en t in  th e 
form of process is important to grounded theory research. 
Any change must be linked to the conditions that gave rise 
to it. Process may be described in terms of stages or phases 
and as fluidity or movement of action/interaction over 
tim e in  resp o n se to  p revailin g co n ditio n s. [… ] 
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      Criterion #7: Do the theoretical findings seem 
sign ifican t an d to  w h at exten t? [… ] T h e questio n  o f 
significan ce is gen erally view ed in  term s o f a th eo ry‟s 
relative importance for stimulating further studies and 
explaining a range of phenomena. (p. 17-9) 
 
 Glaser and Strauss (1999 [1967]) most surely did not have the system 
dynamics approach in mind when they defined the grounded theory research 
method. Nevertheless, by structuring a theory as a qualitative system dynamics 
model, almost all the criteria in the list above are addressed and managed. 
Concepts, in the shape of variables, are generated and systematically related as 
an influence diagram, thereby fulfilling criteria #1-2. In this study, the variables 
and the links are defined throughout the text, and there are also formal 
definitions of the variables listed in Appendix 5. Criteria #3-6 implicitly 
concern issues of dynamic complexity, model boundary and conceptual 
distance. These concepts are of vital importance in the development of a 
qualitative system dynamics model and are consequently carefully considered 
throughout the study. The last criterion in the list suggested by Corbin and 
Strauss (1990: 17-9), coincides with Hammersley‟s (1992) „relevan ce criterio n ‟. 
This criterion is not possible to fulfil by referring to the system dynamics 
approach. Although I strongly believe the findings presented by this study are 
relevant, the question will be returned to in the final chapter of this work.  
 
                                 
 
In order to be able to judge the quality of the findings correctly, it is important 
to  „help the reader to assess some of the components of the actual research 
process‟ (C o rb in  & Strauss 1990: 16). The purpose of this chapter has been to 
clarify the most important aspects of this process. Although it is difficult to 
show exactly for instance how the material was theoretically coded, the chapter 
has described which measures has been taken to ensure that the research 
process is adequate and well-structured. The aim of this description has been to 
establish a high level of credibility and plausibility, in order to ascertain the 
validity of the model and the conclusions made by the study. 
 In the five chapters leading up to this point, general assumptions have been 
explicated, the theoretical platform has been carved out, and the research 
process has been presented. It is now time to define the Music Industry 
Feedback Model. 
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6  
The Music Industry Feedback Model 
 
The purpose of this study is to contribute to the understanding of copyright 
industry dynamics in general and music industry dynamics specifically. In order 
to achieve this purpose, an analytical tool in the shape of a qualitative system 
dynamics model is developed. As already stated in the preceding chapters, the 
model is based on combination of established theories, previous music industry 
research and empirical data. In this chapter, the model, which I choose to call 
the Music Industry Feedback Model, is introduced. The current model is the 
last in a series of model revisions which has evolved during the research 
process. Figure 6.7 on page 131 depicts the model in its entirety, but in order to 
facilitate th e un derstan din g o f th e m o d el‟s structure an d lo gic, it w ill b e 
introduced in a number of sections. Each new section begins with a short 
definition of those variables which are added to the model in that particular 
section. A comprehensive list of all these definitions is found in Appendix 5. 
Each section also includes an illustration which highlights the structures which 
are added to the model (e.g. Figure 6.1 or Figure 6.2). The variable definitions 
and the illustration are followed by a text where the new structure is laid out 
and discussed. In order to keep these texts as condensed as possible, no explicit 
quotes from the personal interviews have been included. Rather, in those 
occasions where a segment of the model structure is based on information 
from personal interviews, only a label (e.g. Interview #n) is used as a marker. It 
should also be noted that in the presentation of the model, variables are written 
in THIS STYLE, in order to make it easy to locate the model components in 
those illustrations which correspond to the relevant wording.  
 The sections which define the model are structured as follows: The first 
section introduces variab les an d lin ks w h ich  are related to  th e firm ‟s 
relationship with the audience (section 6.1). Seco n d, issues related to  th e firm ‟s 
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creative processes are added to the model (section 6.2). Third, variables and 
links related to the firm ‟s m arketin g and licensing effort are defined and added 
to the model structure (section 6.3). Fourth, the logic which is related to the 
firm ‟s fin an cial p erfo rm an ce an d relatio n sh ip  to  its sh areh o lders is presented 
(section 6.4). Fifth, issues related to costs and risk willingness are added to the 
model (section 6.5). In the final section (6.6) no new variables are added, and 
merely a few concluding remarks are made. 
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6.1 The Audience-Media Engine 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
ATTRACTIVENESS 
OF IP PORTFOLIO 
The ability of the firm ’s intellectual property portfolio to 
gain approval among the audience.  
AUDIENCE 
ACTION 
The fraction of the total audience who perform actions 
related to the m usic firm ’s intellectual properties. E.g. 
purchase a CD; make a mixtape37; share a song via a peer-
to-peer network; attend a music concert; publish a 
fanzine…  
AUDIENCE 
APPROVAL 
The fraction of the audience who respond positively when 
they are exposed to firm ’s intellectual properties. 
AUDIENCE REACH The fraction of the total audience who are reached by the 
m usic firm ’s intellectual properties through the media. 
MEDIA PRESENCE The total number of media outlets where the intellectual properties of the music firm currently appear. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The reinforcing feedback loop referred to as the “Audience-Media Engine”. 
 
 
This section will introduce those structures of the model which are related to 
the interaction between the music firm and the audience. The music industry 
has been defin ed as th e aggregate o f „those companies concerned with 
developing personalities and musical content which can be communicated 
                                              
 
37 A mix tape (commonly the two words are stuck together as mixtape) is a home-made compilation of songs 
recorded in a specific order, traditionally onto a Compact Cassette. 
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acro ss m ultip le m edia‟ (cf. p. 31). T h o se „p erso n alities an d m usical co n ten t‟ are 
the intellectual properties (IP) of the music firm. T h e firm ‟s IP  p o rtfo lio  m ay 
consist of compositions, lyrics, recordings, images, contracts with symbol 
creators, specific sounds, brands, etc. Some of these properties are protected by 
copyright law, but not all of them. For instance, the sound of ABBA or of the 
songwriter/producer trio Stock, Aitken and Waterman, was very characteristic 
and important to their successes, but it was not protected by copyright law (e.g. 
Haynes 2005: 14; Carlén-Wendels 2005: 24). One very important model variable 
is the “attractiveness” of this IP portfolio (Figure 6.1). The ATTRACTIVENESS 
OF IP PORTFOLIO is both difficult to define and measure, but the model is 
taking the perspective of the audience in order to make the definition. A highly 
attractive IP portfolio is simply able to gain a wider AUDIENCE APPROVAL than 
a less attractive portfolio. The variable AUDIENCE APPROVAL is defined as the 
fraction of the entire audien ce w h o  “respond p o sitively” w h en  th ey exp erien ce 
th e m usic firm ‟s „p erso n alities an d m usical co n ten t‟. 
 In order for the audience to discover the content and the personalities in 
the portfolio, the content has to appear in the media (e.g. Hirsch 1970; 
Newman 2003; Interview #14). T h e aggregate o f th e m usic firm ‟s m edia 
appearances at a particular moment is represented by the two variables MEDIA 
PRESENCE and AUDIENCE REACH (Figure 6.1). MEDIA PRESENCE represents 
the number of media outlets (television shows, radio shows, videogames, 
m agazin es, etc) w h ere th e firm ‟s intellectual properties appear during a specific 
time period. AUDIENCE REACH represents the percentage of the total audience 
which the firm is able to reach through their MEDIA PRESENCE. For instance, an 
appearance in a high-profile media event is able to reach a greater share of the 
total audience than an appearance on a media event of less significance. The 
relevance of particular media differs between genres, territories, audiences, etc. 
For instance, a highly important medium for dance music is the club scene 
(Interview #32); the crucial medium for contemporary urban music is visual 
media such as MTV and BET (Interview #18); and a few music magazines such 
as Gramophone or BBC Music Magazine, are the determining media in the 
British classical music scene (Interview #16).  
 AUDIENCE APPROVAL is certainly important to the business of popular 
music, but it is n o t ab le to  p ay th e firm ‟s b ills. AUDIENCE ACTION, in its various 
forms is what traditionally has been supposed to generate the majority of the 
income to the firm. The actions spurred by the audiences‟ ap p ro val might for 
instance be the purchase of a CD, music merchandise, concert tickets or other 
music related products. However, every action does not generate income, for 
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instance, the making of a mixtape to a friend is a significant AUDIENCE ACTION, 
but it does not generate any revenues to the music firm. Finally, it is important 
to note that AUDIENCE ACTION does not happen simultaneously with 
AUDIENCE APPROVAL, since it simply takes a while for approval to build and 
then for people to decide to act in one way or the other. 
 AUDIENCE ACTION also has a similar delayed feedback effect on MEDIA 
PRESENCE. O n e exam p le o f th is feed b ack is th e lo gic o f th e „T o p  40 ‟ radio  
format. As has been mentioned previously, a radio station which follows this 
fo rm at p lays th e 40 m o st p o p ular so n gs durin g a certain  w eek. „M o st p o p ular‟ is 
in this case equal to the records which have sold the most during the previous 
week. In other words, AUDIENCE ACTION, in the shape of sales at record stores, 
feeds back to MEDIA PRESENCE, as radio airplay.  
 Another, more specific example of this feedback concerns the Swedish pop 
act Roxette which was completely unknown in the US until Dean Cushman, an 
American exchange student from Minneapolis, brought a copy of the Roxette 
album Look Sharp! home from Sweden for the 1988 holiday break. Cushman 
urged a local Minneapolis radio station, KDWB 101.3 FM, to play the song and 
based on feedback from positive callers, the station ‟s program director copied 
the song and distributed it to other stations. Within weeks the song became 
popular throughout the region, and ultimately nationwide. On April 8, 1989, the 
single The Look reached the number one position of Billboard Hot 100 and 
eventually Roxette turned out to be one of the most successful Swedish exports 
since the days of ABBA (e.g. Burnett 1996: 127; Thorselius 2003; Billboard 
1989). There are many other kinds of audience action, for instance fanzines, fan 
sites, weblogs, or college radio that has a similar influence on MEDIA PRESENCE. 
 The links, which connect MEDIA PRESENCE, AUDIENCE REACH, AUDIENCE 
APPROVAL and AUDIENCE ACTION, constitute a reinforcing feedback loop38 
which plays a crucial role in the dynamics of the music industry. The loop may 
serve as an engine which gives rise to (or ends) fads, brands, acts or genres. If 
this Audience-Media Engine is working against an artist or a music firm, it will be 
difficult or impossible to reach any kind of success. Similarly, if the music firm 
(as in the case of Roxette) is able to get this loop to work in its favour, only the 
sky is the limit39. 
                                              
 
38 The feedback loops in the influence diagrams will not be labelled as balancing or reinforcing in order to 
keep the illustrations as plain as possible. 
39 Of course, the sky is not really the limit; there are limits to growth much closer to ground in the music 
industrial system as well as in every other system (e.g. Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens III 1972). 
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 The Audience-Media Engine provides an alternative perspective on what 
Jenkins (2006) refers to  as „p articip ato ry culture‟. The Audience-Media Engine 
illustrates the role of audience participation (or AUDIENCE ACTION) in ensuring 
that the wheels of the music industry keep turning. Jenkins argues that “n ew ” 
media technologies increase the importance of this feedback loop since the new 
technologies open up for greater and more sophisticated audience participation 
compared to the “o ld” technologies. This reasoning may certainly be valid, and 
this study will return to a similar argumentation later in the text. However, 
according to the logic which is encapsulated by the Audience-Media Engine, 
participatory culture rests on the same basic structure, regardless if the media 
technologies are new or old, and regardless if the AUDIENCE ACTION is a 
purchase of a CD at the local record store or a posting of a homemade music 
video on YouTube40.  
 The Audience-Media Engine is a typical example of a chaotic system which 
is very difficult to predict and control. The system is extremely sensitive to 
minor changes in its initial conditions. Apparently insignificant events (as in the 
Roxette story) can lead to radical shifts in th e system ‟s behaviour. This effect is 
o ften  referred to  as th e „b utterfly effect‟ (L o ren z 1984), which initially was 
intended to explain why the weather is so difficult to predict: The atmosphere is 
certainly a chaotic system; and the flight of a butterfly in one continent may 
generate a thunderstorm in another (Lorenz 1984). A similar logic governs the 
Audience-Media Engine. Although it may be possible to reduce uncertainty and 
risk by the use of various strategies, the system is fundamentally chaotic and 
unpredictable in its nature.  
 Some aspect of MEDIA PRESENCE is included in most music industry 
models. Hirsch (1970) referred to media presence as the gatekeeper sub-system 
which filters the songs on its way to the audience. As has been previously 
discussed, H irsch ‟s co n cep ts o f filters an d gatekeep ers h ave b een  criticized b y 
several scholars (e.g. Negus 1992). I agree that the gatekeeper/filtering concept 
is unable to capture the complexities of the industry dynamics and suggest the 
Audience-Media Engine as a more useful representation. 
 This section has defined those model structures which are related to the 
interaction between the music firm and the audience. The next section will also 
to some extent discuss similar issues as the focus is turned to those parts of the 
model which among other things concern intellectual property development. 
 
                                              
 
40 http://www.youtube.com 
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6.2 Unanswerable questions 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
IP DEVELOPMENT Resources invested by the music firm in intellectual property development. 
NOVELTIES Outcome of the IP development process. Novelties add to the attractiveness of the IP portfolio. 
OBLIVION 
A natural process of decay which reduces the 
attractiveness of the IP portfolio. Oblivion affects 
different IP’s in different w ays. W hile the longevity of 
some properties is measured in weeks, others have a 
lifespan that lasts for decades. The variable is exogenous. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Structures explaining the firm ’s creative processes. 
 
 
 121 
The new structures of the model which are introduced in this section show how 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF IP PORTFOLIO is influenced by NOVELTIES and 
OBLIVION (Figure 6.2).41 These structures reflect an important assumption 
which the model is based upon, namely that the newness of an IP portfolio to a 
great extent influences th e p o rtfo lio ‟s ab ility to  gain  AUDIENCE APPROVAL. This 
assumption may be contested since some of the most valuable popular music 
IP portfolios (by composers such as Jackson, Lennon/McCartney, Wonder, 
etc) are pretty far from new. However, though a few and exceptional works 
have been able to sustain their value, some kind of novel ingredient is often 
added, even to these assets, in order to increase their appeal.42 
 OBLIVION is the process where musical content and personalities become 
obsolete, irrelevant and loose their attractiveness. The speed of this process 
varies between different intellectual properties. Some properties may be 
relevant and valuable decade after decade, while other properties loose their 
value after a month or two (e.g. Hirsch 1970). NOVELTIES are the results of 
activities which occur at many places in the music firm. The most obvious 
examples are compositions, arrangements, and audio recordings. However, 
music video production; graphic design; styling; making of promotion material; 
as well as acquisition of content; are all activities which may add to the 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE IP PORTFOLIO. 
 How to create NOVELTIES which will be appreciated by the audiences is a 
key question to any copyright firm. The model simplifies this question by letting 
three drivers govern the NOVELTIES generated. Two of these will be discussed 
below. First and most straight-forward is the variable INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT. This variable represents the financial resources used 
by the firm to develop and sustain the ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE IP 
PORTFOLIO. The resources are used to pay salaries, advances to symbol creators 
and other costs related to the development, production and acquisition of 
musical content. It should be noted that it may take a considerable amount of 
time from the decision to spend resources to the day when the NOVELTY is 
available as a part of the IP portfolio (e.g. Negus 1996: 49). 
 The second driver of NOVELTIES is the link from AUDIENCE ACTION, 
referred to by Peterson as „th e un an sw erab le questio n s ab o ut th e causal lin ks 
                                              
 
41 The influences of NOVELTIES and OBLIVION on ATTRACTIVENESS OF IP PORTFOLIO can be modelled more accurately by 
introducing the system dynamics modelling concepts stock and flow. These concepts are introduced and 
discussed in e.g. Forrester (1961), Lyneis (1980), or Warren (2002). 
42 This assumption is also e.g. supported by Cam pbell (1987: 89) in his account of ‘m odern consum erism ’. 
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between society an d culture‟ (P eterso n  1994: 185). The Music Industry 
Feedback Model makes no claim of being able to solve these questions, but at 
least, a link between society and culture (or audience and musical content) is 
included in the model. The link between AUDIENCE ACTION and NOVELTIES is 
labelled with a question mark. This label denotes that there is an influence from 
the audience to the creation of new intellectual property, but it is not possible 
to refer to this influence in terms of positives or negatives. The influence can be 
both detrimental and beneficial to the m usic firm ‟s creative ab ilities. It may be 
detrimental since the influence from audience action m ay lead to  “m e-to o ” 
products, that is to say the mirroring of products that already exist and are 
successful on the market. It may be beneficial since by listening carefully to the 
audien ces‟ actio n s an d reactio n s, it is possible to get valuable stimulus which 
may enable the development of intellectual properties which are both novel and 
in tune with the tastes of the audience. 
 This section has introduced those parts of the model which concern the 
m usic firm ‟s creative activities. The next section will explain how the music firm 
acts in order to influence its presence in the media. 
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6.3 Drivers of media presence 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
LICENSING Media presence generated by licensing effort.   
LICENSING EFFORT Resources invested in order to increase the licensing of 
the m edia firm ’s intellectual properties. 
MARKETING Media presence generated by marketing effort.   
MARKETING EFFORT Resources invested in order to increase media presence with the purpose to stimulate audience action. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Drivers of media presence. 
 
 
MEDIA PRESENCE is vital to the performance of the music firm. Although it 
m ay b e difficult to  co n tro l th e p resen ce o f th e m usic firm ‟s in tellectual 
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properties in the media, most music firms try very hard at least to influence their 
MEDIA PRESENCE. This section will introduce those structures of the model 
w h ich  rep resen t th e m usic firm ‟s effo rt to  p ro p el its media presence. 
 There are several ways a music firm can influence its presence in the media. 
The model chooses to categorize these as either MARKETING or LICENSING. 
Promotion tours, street marketing, advertising in its various forms, and of 
course plugging recordings to broadcast media (e.g. Interview #21; #27) are all 
examples of activities categorised as MARKETING. The purpose of all these 
activities is to boost MEDIA PRESENCE in order to enhance the sales of various 
music related products (or AUDIENCE ACTION if you will). 
 LICENSING is defined as activities where the intellectual properties are used 
in movies, advertising, videogames, merchandise, compilation albums, etc. 
Some of these activities could certainly be labelled as marketing since the 
licensing of a certain intellectual property often has a significant and positive 
effect on consumer sales (e.g. Interview #28). However, what fundamentally 
differs licensing from marketing is the purpose of the initiative. The purpose of a 
marketing initiative is to improve the sales of a certain intellectual property. A 
licensing activity has no purpose to promote anything. It is purely a business 
agreement which is finished when the licensing deal is signed. 
 Major music firms have department(s) working with marketing and 
promotion of their intellectual properties and another department, usually 
much smaller, working with various forms of licensing issues (e.g. EMI 2005; 
Interview #34). This structure may differ though, for instance music publishers 
have by nature a much stronger focus on licensing and many publishers 
completely lack consumer oriented marketing resources (e.g. Interview #25). It 
is the resources spent, and EFFORT made, in these departments that make 
marketing initiatives and licensing deals happen. 
 Finally, as with many other links in the model, it should be noted that there 
is a considerable time lag between a LICENSING EFFORT or MARKETING 
EFFORT and the subsequent impact on MEDIA PRESENCE. 
 This section has discussed those parts of the model which concern the 
drivers of media presence. The following section will introduce the structures 
that explain how shareholders exert pressure o n  th e firm ‟s m an agem en t 
dep en din g o n  th e firm ‟s fin an cial p erfo rm an ce. 
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6.4 Profit and pressure 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
PRESSURE The pressure exerted by shareholders on the music firm in order to reduce profit gap. 
PROFIT The money that remains after expenses are subtracted from income. 
PROFIT GAP The difference between required profit and actual profit.  
REQUIRED PROFIT Financial goals defined by the shareholders. The variable is exogenous. 
REVENUES Revenues from royalties and audience action.  
ROYALTIES Fees paid by licensees using the m usic firm ’s intellectual properties in various applications.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Profit and pressure. 
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A  m usic firm ‟s REVENUES (Figure 6.4) stem from either AUDIENCE ACTION in 
the shape of product sales, or from MEDIA PRESENCE, as ROYALTIES. There are 
three different kinds of ROYALTIES in the music industry. Performance royalties 
are paid when a song is performed by an orchestra or singer, played by a radio 
station, used as a cell-phone ring signal, played in a shopping mall, etc. 
Synchronization royalties are paid when a song is used together with moving 
images, for instance a movie or a videogame. Mechanical royalties are paid based 
on actual sales of sheet-music and audio recordings. (E.g. Vogel 2001: 157-8) 
 All these REVENUES h ave a p o sitive effect o n  th e m usic firm ‟s PROFIT. 
When theories of the firm were previously discussed, it was concluded that 
profit maximisation is required by most major firms in the copyright industries. 
The Music Industry Feedback Model illustrates this logic as a REQUIRED 
PROFIT which the firm has to deliver. If the actual PROFIT is not meeting these 
requirements; a PROFIT GAP develops, which eventually turns into a PRESSURE 
from shareholders (e.g. Interview #13, #14 #18, #32). The PRESSURE is 
supposed to motivate the management to revise policies and routines; either 
with the purpose to decrease costs or to enhance revenues (e.g. Porter 1996). 
 Figure 6.4 shows a scenario when the music firm is reacting on shareholder 
PRESSURE by revising strategies with the purpose to increase revenues. Basically 
there are three revenue enhancing routes the music firm can take. One is the 
develo p m en t o f th e firm ‟s in tellectual p ro p erty portfolio, the second is to boost 
media presence in order to increase consumer sales, and the third option is to 
increase the licensing o f th e firm ‟s p o rtfo lio . By walking through the model 
structure, it is clear that these three routes constitute three distinct balancing 
feedback loops. T h is „m en tal sim ulatio n ‟ also  sh o w s th at all these initiatives are 
associated with significant delays created by time lags in four of the links in the 
loops. Consequently, it takes a considerable amount of time from the moment 
when shareholder pressure starts to build until the business strategies actually 
have been revised. 
 This structure in Figure 6.4 illustrates the dynamics of a “healthy and 
prosperous” music firm which is able to gradually adjust its resources, policies 
and routines in order to satisfy its stakeholders and to evolve and grow in a 
steady pace. The next section will introduce other strategic routes which, at 
least short-term, may be able to increase PROFIT and close a PROFIT GAP. 
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6.5 Shifting the burden43 
 
The following variable is introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
RISK WILLINGNESS The willingness of the music firm to accept risk during the development of new intellectual properties. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: Cost-cutting strategies short-circuit the balancing feedback loops of the music firm. 
 
 
                                              
 
43 Senge (1990: 104) 
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T h ere are o th er w ays th e firm ‟s m an agem en t can  react o n  sh areh o lder pressure 
than by trying to enhance its revenues (Figure 6.5). One way is to address the 
risks associated with INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEVELOPMENT. The level of 
novelty generated by this development process is heavily influenced by the 
firm ‟s willingness to accept risk. NOVELTIES which are far away from the 
mainstream may certain ly b e th e “n ext b ig th in g” b ut it m ay also  go totally 
unnoticed or unappreciated by the audience. By avoiding such novelties and 
instead develop intellectual properties which are firmly rooted in the 
mainstream, it is possible to reduce the level of risk considerably. By using this 
risk reducing strategy, th e firm  is h o p in g to  in crease its “h it rate” an d th ereb y to  
reduce the number of failures. However, as always, it is tricky to have your cake 
and eat it too. A walk through the structures of the influence diagram illustrated 
by Figure 6.5 shows that reduced RISK WILLINGNESS may lead to fewer 
NOVELTIES, diminished IP PORTFOLIO ATTRACTIVENESS, and eventually reduced 
REVENUES, rather than the opposite. 
 A second approach is focused on the costs associated with the development, 
marketing and licensing of intellectual properties. A PROFIT GAP can be 
reduced, simply by spending less financial resources in these three areas. The 
advantage of cutting costs compared to the implementation of revenue 
enhancing strategies has to do with the time lags associated with any initiative 
involving the audience. Cost reductions have almost immediate effects on 
PROFIT which means that a PROFIT GAP will be reduced much faster than if 
revenue enhancing initiatives are launched. A cost cutting initiative can have a 
positive impact on PROFIT within weeks, while revenue enhancing strategies 
usually require co n siderab ly m o re tim e b efo re it h as an  effect o n  th e firm ‟s 
financials. (E.g. Lyneis 1980; Warren 2002) 
 While cost-cutting may solve a problem short-term, it may have detrimental 
effects o n  th e firm ‟s lo n g-term performance (cf. section 4.4). By walking 
through the influence diagram it is possible to conclude that a reduction of 
costs may lead to fewer NOVELTIES, less MEDIA PRESENCE, decreased 
AUDIENCE ACTION, and lowered REVENUES which will add to the PROFIT GAP, 
rather than the opposite. The structures of the “h ealth y an d p ro sp ero us” music 
firm have in other words been converted from three balancing feedback loops 
which relieve a problem, to four reinforcing feedback loops which in the long-
term may make a problem worse. This phenomenon, which is common in 
m an y so cial system s, is o ften  referred  to  as th e „Sh ifting the burden‟ structure 
(Senge 1990: 104). Instead of solving the fundamental problem, a short-term 
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so lutio n  is used in  its p lace. A s an  effect, th e system ‟s ab ility to  actually so lve 
the fundamental problem is slowly but surely disabled. (Senge 1990: 104-13) 
 In reality, a music firm is of course not restricted to choose either cost-
cutting or revenue enhancement, but the firm is able to mix the two options. In 
order to illustrate the fact that shareholder pressure can either increase or 
decrease development, marketing and licensing of intellectual properties, the 
influence links from the variable PRESSURE has been lab elled “+ / -”.  
 
6.6 This is strategy 
All the components that constitute the Music Industry Feedback Model have 
now been introduced. This section will conclude the presentation by making a 
few final remarks on the model. 
 Section 2.7 addressed  th e questio n  „What is strategy?‟ by presenting 
concepts that particularly are concerned with organisations‟ ability to adapt to a 
changing environment. The Music Industry Feedback Model can be read as an 
application of these concepts to the business of music. The model shows how 
emergent strategies are crafted and developed (e.g. Mintzberg 1987) as a 
response to environmental changes. In the model, the input from the 
environment to the firm is represented by merely two links, namely revenues 
from royalties and product sales, and the influence from audience action to the 
development of new intellectual properties. In reality, influences from the 
environment to the firm are of course more complicated44. 
 A few words need to be spent on issues of model boundary and conceptual 
distance. As Figure 6.6 shows, the model boundary is not congruent with the 
legal boundary of the firm. The reinforcing feedback loop referred to as the 
Audience-Media Engine, which to a great extent governs music industry dynamics, 
is fo r in stan ce p laced co m p letely o utside th e firm ‟s legal b o un dary. T h ere are 
also additional aspects of music industry dynamics which can only be explained 
by considering the influence from other systems such as governmental bodies, 
the ICT industries, or other copyright industries. These and related issues will 
be discussed in the next chapter. 
                                              
 
44 For instance, there is usually some kind of information feedback from MEDIA PRESENCE to MARKETING EFFORT. A 
music firm is monitoring the success of their marketing effort, and if the impact of their effort on media 
presence is insufficient, this is (or at least ought to be) acted upon. 
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 The conceptual distance determines the level of detail considered by the 
model (cf. section 4.6). The conceptual distance chosen in this study has ended 
up with links and variables which are aggregates of complex and sometimes 
chaotic phenomena. A shorter conceptual distance would have included more 
detail complexity, but it would not enhance the usefulness of the model. Rather 
it might have hampered th e m o del‟s readability and explanatory power. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.6: The blob illustrates the boundary of the firm. 
 
                                 
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Figure 6.7: The Music Industry Feedback Model. 
 
 
This chapter has introduced the Music Industry Feedback Model (Figure 6.7). 
In the remaining chapters the model will be used as an analytical tool when 
examining contemporary music industry dynamics. First and foremost, in the 
next chapter, the model will be connected to a changing media environment, 
and the impact of these changes on the music firm will be discussed. 
 
 132 
7  
Nothing but the hits45 
Music is an integral part of most media. Movies, radio, videogames, and 
television all depend on music as the core or the enhancement of their 
products. The music industry on the other hand is completely dependent on the 
media, as a promoter, user, and distributor of its products. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to connect the Music Industry Feedback 
Model to a media environment. The chapter will explore certain changes in this 
environment and examine how they influence the behaviour and performance 
of the music firm. The chapter is structured according to three different 
relationships that exist between music and the media; the promotion 
relationship, the usage relationship, and the distribution relationship. The 
nature of each relationship will be examined, and the changes with relevance to 
the specific relationship will be discussed.  
 The model created in the previous chapter will be used to support the 
argumentation which is brought forward. As the reasoning is laid out, new 
structures are stepwise added to the model. Each new step includes a short 
definition of those variables which are introduced. A comprehensive list of 
model variable definitions is found in Appendix 5. It is important to note that 
the variables which are introduced in this chapter should not be considered as a 
part of the Music Industry Feedback Model. The new variables are exogenous 
to that model, and only serve the purpose of explaining how the model is 
influenced by its surrounding media environment. In order to be able to 
separate endogenous from exogenous variables in the influence diagrams, the 
latter are typed in italic (e.g. Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2).  
 
                                              
 
45 Inspired by the last phrases of Jeffrey Atkins’ (aka Ja Rule) Always on Time, released as track #5 on Pain is 
Love (Def Jam Recordings / Universal Music Group), in October, 2001. 
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7.1 The media as a promoter of music 
The Audience-Media Engine (e.g. Figure 6.1) illustrates the importance of 
media as a promoter of music. The audience is exposed to musical content in 
the media and hopefully a subset of the audience is triggered to spend their 
monies on some kind of product, for instance a CD (cf. p. 116). Although radio 
is far from the only tool for exposure, it has a pivotal role in traditional music 
marketing (e.g. Hirsch 1970: 10; Newman 2003). Those songs which are able to 
get added to  a m ajo r radio  statio n ‟s p laylist46 will most likely be commercially 
successful. Due to the importance of radio airplay, record labels go to great 
lengths to increase the probability of getting their songs added to playlists. They 
give away their music for free; develop the best possible personal relationships 
to  th e radio  statio n ‟s p ro gram m er; create more or less ethical incentives for the 
programmers to play their music; an d even  let th e radio  statio n ‟s m usical 
demands affect the creative process (Interview #13; #29; #32). For instance, if 
a song with a certain structure is more likely to be added to radio playlists, A&R 
professionals will ensure that their artists choose songs with that particular 
structure. Further, if the most influential radio station in the market is 
formatted as Modern Rock, artists that fit that particular format are definitely 
more likely to get a contract and promotion support by a record label compared 
to artists that do not fit as well in the Modern Rock format. (Interview #18) 
 Although radio and music companies are dependent on each other, they are 
working according to two very different business models (Interview #28; 
Hirsch 1970: 10). While music firms consider the radio to be an important tool 
for raising the p ub lic‟s awareness of their new products, radio companies have 
no immediate incentive to increase the sales of a record. A commercial radio 
station plays music in order to attract and retain a certain audience which 
h o p efully is o f value to  th e statio n ‟s advertisers. If th e fo rm at fo llo w ed b y th e 
radio station includes new, innovative music, the station will add new, 
innovative music to their playlist. B ut if th e radio  statio n ‟s fo rm at caters 
towards an audience which is not interested in new, innovative music, but 
rather in easy-listenin g “O ldies” fro m  th e 70‟ an d 80‟s, th at is w h at w ill b e 
played by the station. The loyalty of the radio station is always towards its 
advertisers and its listeners, never towards the music firm or the artists. 
(Interview #35) 
                                              
 
46 In the realms of radio broadcasting, the term  ‘playlist’, is used to refer to an ordered list of songs played 
during a given time period. 
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… radio  uses music as their programming material and 
music is what record companies are effectively sellin g…  
… w e‟re in  differen t b usin esses…  … th at is n o t so  say th at 
I do n ‟t th in k radio  is a fairly un grateful m edium , b ecau se I 
th in k it is! … radio  w o rks alo n g a differen t lin e th an  w e do  
but will happily use the programming material we give 
them to fuel and feed their business…  … but on the other 
hand, airplay is an important factor in selling records, 
people need to  h ear it, b ut th in gs ch an ge…  … I am  n o t 
saying that radio is going to disappear or whatever, but 
people are going to get their music from different sources, 
so  radio  h as co m p etitio n …  (In terview  # 28) 
 
 The n ew  „so urces‟ (o r m edia o utlets) and the increased competition which 
the informant is referring to is important in order to understand how the 
transformation of the media environment affects the music firm.   
 First of all, there is an increase in the competition between the analogue 
terrestrial radio stations themselves, primarily d ue to  th e go vern m en ts‟ revisio n  
of their regulation of commercial radio. Many of these changes were part of the 
deregulation frenzy during the 1980s and 1990s, spearheaded by the Thatcher 
and Reagan administrations in the UK and the US. In all the three countries 
included in this study (Sweden, the UK and the US), important changes in the 
broadcast regulations were put into effect during this period. The regulatory 
philosophy which since then governs the radio industries in all three countries 
can  b e lab elled as „ligh t to uch ‟ regulatio n , which reflects the ambition to 
minimise the influence of the regulator and to let market forces determine how 
the industries should evolve (Interview #4; #9).  
 The regulators in all three countries have opened up new frequencies for 
commercial radio during the last couple of decades. In Sweden, 87 new stations 
have been added to the existing public service radio and in the UK, 275 new 
stations have been added (Norbäck & Ots 2006; Ofcom 2004). In the US, the 
number of radio stations has increased considerably, due to changes in 
regulations made during the 1980s: The 6,519 radio stations operating in the US 
in 1970 had increased to 12,717 stations in 2000. (FMC 2002; Standard & 
P o o r‟s 2004 ) 
 It is important to note that though the number of outlets has increased in 
all three countries, the number of owners of commercial terrestrial radio 
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stations has developed in the opposite direction. Currently, the commercial 
radio industry in the US has a four-firm concentration ratio of somewhere 
between 50-60 percent (FMC 2002; Lee 2004; Williams & Roberts 2002), in the 
UK the same measure is 70 percent (BBC News 2005; Ofcom 2004), and in 
Sweden, the four-firm concentration ratio is as good as 100 percent (Norbäck 
& Ots 2006; Sandström 2004; RTVV 2004; 2005). 
 Analogue terrestrial radio stations also experience increased competition 
from other kinds of media outlets.  Due to the digitalisation of almost every 
part of the copyright industry value chain (e.g. Figure 2.2); the costs of 
production and distribution have dropped significantly. This has lowered the 
entry barriers (cf. section 2.6) into the copyright industries and a number of 
new media outlets (magazines, TV channels, radio channels, Interactive games, 
Internet services, etc) have consequently emerged. (E.g. Katz 2004; Lister, 
Dovey, Giddings, Grant & Kelly 2003; Owen 1999; Thorburn & Jenkins 2003; 
Ward 2003) 
 In spite of the abundance of media outlets, people still have to eat, sleep 
and go to work. Consequently, the total amount of attention these media 
outlets are able to attract has not increased at the same rate as the number of 
outlets. This has created the situation which Herbert Simon (quoted on p. 38) 
referred to  as a „poverty of attention‟ (1971: 40). T h e in crease in  media outlets 
has not resulted in increased media consumption but rather increased audience 
fragmentation. Audience fragmentation is a trend in copyright industry dynamics 
that is discussed in most contemporary media textbooks (e.g. Hadenius & 
Weibull 2003: 455-7; Hollifield 2003: 91; Picard 2002: 109-11)47. The trend has 
a profound impact on most copyright industries, since revenues often are 
intimately linked to the size of the audience each outlet is able to attract. Since 
costs in the copyright industries are mainly fixed (section 2.4), a minor 
reductio n  o f a sin gle o utlet‟s reven ues h as an  im m ediate an d severe im p act o n  
th e o utlet‟s p ro fitab ility an d sustain ab ility. In  o rder to  co p e w ith  th is unstable 
situation, copyright companies try to increase their market share and size by 
controlling as many outlets as possible. In other words, the technological 
development which leads to reduced entry barriers and audience fragmentation 
also works as an incentive for mergers and acquisitions among the existing 
players.  
                                              
 
47 Audience fragm entation is also closely linked to the reasoning on ‘increased product variety’ as presented 
by Brynjolfsson, Hu and Sm ith (2003) and popularised by Chris Anderson as ‘The Long Tail’ (Anderson 2004; 
2006). 
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                                 
The increase in the number of media outlets discussed above influence the 
m usic firm s‟ ab ility to  use th e m edia as a p romotional tool in at least two ways. 
T h ese tw o  “in fluen ce b ran ch es” from the media environment to the music 
firm, will be examined in the two sections below, starting with the influence on 
the Audience-Media Engine.  
 
Fragmentation of the Audience-Media Engine 
Figure 7.1 shows how the changes in the media environment discussed above 
influences the Audience-Media Engine. 
 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
AUDIENCE 
FRAGMENTATION 
The level of fragmentation of the total audience. If the 
time spent by the audience using media is constant and 
the number of media outlets increase, the audience 
fragmentation is assumed to rise. 
MEDIA OUTLETS The number of relevant media outlets available to the audience.  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Impact on audience reach. 
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 According to the reasoning above, certain developments during the last 
couple of decades have significantly increased the number of MEDIA OUTLETS 
available to the audience. Since the time and the resources spent by the 
audience on copyright products have not increased in the same extent; 
AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION has accelerated. In practice, this means that fewer 
people are tuned to the same outlet, and an appearance on a specific outlet 
consequently reaches a smaller part of the total audience. It also means that the 
music firm has to place its acts in more outlets in order to uphold the level of 
MEDIA PRESENCE. The marketing department has to work harder, and to spend 
more resources, to sustain the speed of the Audience-Media Engine: 
 
Previously it was enough to get the artist into Måndagsbörsen 
[a Swedish talk show during the 80s], to make the artist a 
success, now you have to be on 200 channels and places in 
order to get through. (Interview #13) 
 
 It should be noted though, that there still are some outlets which have the 
power to single-handedly influence a significant part of the audience: 
 
… th ere are p eo p le w h o  can  in fluen ce alb um  sales b y 
putting their stamp on the music, like Oprah [a US daytime 
talk show]…  If yo u get p layed at 4p m  o n  Oprah your sales 
are going to double…  (In terview  # 10) 
 
 However, in aggregate, the increased AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION has a 
hampering effect on AUDIENCE REACH. In order not to let the Audience-Media 
Engine slow down, the music firm has to increase its MARKETING EFFORT, 
w h ich  h as a n egative effect o n  th e firm ‟s PROFIT (Figure 7.1 & Figure 6.7). 
 
Impact on marketing efficiency 
The section above explained how the Audience-Media Engine is influenced by 
the changes in the media environment previously discussed in this chapter. This 
section will present the second influence branch which connects the media 
environment to the structures of the Music Industry Feedback Model. 
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The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
AUDIENCE 
VOLATILITY 
The tendency of the audiences to jump between different 
media outlets. 
MARKETING 
EFFICIENCY 
Resources required by the music firm to get accepted by a 
media outlet and added to their events and their playlists. 
MEDIA RISK 
WILLINGNESS 
The willingness among media outlets to accept risk when 
determining which music content should be added to their 
events and their playlists. 
PLAYLIST ENTRY 
BARRIERS 
Routines and policies followed by the media when adding new 
content to events and playlists. These routines and policies 
govern whether the barriers to enter the events and playlists 
are easy or difficult to pass. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2: Impact on marketing efficiency and audience reach. 
 
 
 Commercial terrestrial radio stations, as well as any other advertising 
funded media outlet, live or die by their ratings. The circulation spiral which 
was briefly discussed in chapter 4 is as applicable to these outlets as it is to 
newspaper firms. Advertisers often choose to limit their buys to the top three 
radio stations in an area, and consequently, it is very difficult for a station to 
survive if it is stuck on the lower ranks (Arbitron 2005).  
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 A media outlet, such as a radio station, can spend resources on the 
marketing of their brand (Interview #10), but even more crucial for attracting 
audien ces is th e o utlet‟s p ro gram m in g. It is b y adjustin g th e p ro gram m in g th at 
the outlet is able to attract specific audiences. However, the increased number 
of media outlets has increased the AUDIENCE VOLATILITY significantly 
(Interviews #3; #29; #35). Programmers at radio stations are therefore 
extremely careful not to air content which may cause the audience to zap to 
another station. This decrease in MEDIA RISK WILLINGNESS48, combined with a 
set o f facilitatin g tech n o lo gies h as caused th e radio  statio n ‟s p ro gram  directo rs 
to change their programming policies and routines (Figure 7.2). 
 In the early days of the Top 40 format, commercial radio was a local 
medium, operating close to the city or the area where it was based. Although 
th e in dividual D J‟s h ad to  adh ere to  th e statio n ‟s o verall fo rm at th ey h ad so m e 
level of freedom to decide which songs should be played during the show. In 
other words, the programming decisions were decentralized which resulted in a 
relatively high diversity o f th e statio n ‟s m usical o utp ut. (E.g. Lee 2004) 
 This diversity and unpredictability yielded cultural value to the audience but 
it also constituted a great risk to the owners of the commercial radio stations. If 
the DJ happened to play a song which the audience did not appreciate, it could 
result in the radio station loosing listeners to other competing outlets. To deal 
with this volatile situation, radio networks moved the programming decision 
m akin g fro m  th e lo cal D J‟s to  a cen tral co m m ittee w h ich  m ade th e 
programming decisions on network basis.  
 
… b asically everyth in g sh run k…  … th ere are less people 
m akin g th e decisio n s…  … it used to  b e th at 20 years ago , 
in New York you hear one kind of music and in Kansas 
you hear another kind of music and in LA you hear 
an o th er kin d o f m usic… .sam e fo rm atted radio  stations like 
A ctive R o ck o r M o d ern  R o ck, th ey w o uldn ‟t b e th e 
identical playlist… now with very few changes the playlists 
are p retty stan dard…  (Interview #10) 
 
 The effect of the centralised and automated programming of the radio 
statio n ‟s p laylists lowered the number of new songs added per week and 
                                              
 
48 In order not to confuse the radio station’s risk willingness w ith the m usic firm ’s risk w illingness, the form er 
is labelled MEDIA RISK WILLINGNESS in the model. 
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minimised the number of songs that did not exactly fit th e statio n ‟s fo rm at. 
Well-known, established artists with songs that fit well with the radio format 
have minor problems to cope with this situation, but less established artists or 
artists whose songs fall between the defined formats have great difficulties to 
raise audience awareness through traditional radio. (E.g. Ahlkvist 2001; Ahlkvist 
& Faulkner 2002; Ahlkvist & Fisher 2000; Lee 2004; Wallis 1995; Wikström 
2005; Interview #1; #8; #13) 
 
… th ere are so  m an y artists tryin g to  get in to  th ese b o xes 
whether it be Rock or Modern Rock or Hot AC, you know 
you have to fit into these boxes for radio [… ] if yo u do n ‟t 
fit [… ] th en  it is alm o st like… it‟s a lot harder to work your 
artist… o r m ayb e w e w o uldn ‟t even  sign  th em …  (Interview 
#18) 
 
 From the radio statio n ‟s p o in t o f view , th is move is strategically sound 
since it sup p o sedly m akes th e radio  statio n ‟s p ro gram m in g b etter adjusted to  
the tastes of the target audiences. An executive at a major US radio company 
clarifies h is p o in t o f view : „You have to ask yourself why we only play the hits; 
well we made them into hits‟ (Interview #29). 
 H o w ever, fro m  th e m usic firm ‟s p o in t o f view , th e radio  statio n ‟s revisio n  
of playlist policies radically reduces the significance of radio as a promotional 
tool. A high-ranking decision maker at one of the major record labels explains 
his view of the situation: 
 
Radio stations are very careful and very conservative and 
everyo n e tries to  go  w ith  th e sam e fo rm at…  w h ich  is n o t 
go o d, b ecause yo u w o n ‟t b reak an y artists th at w ay. W e 
have great difficulty getting new artists added to radio 
playlists. It‟s getting harder and harder. They are so tied to 
their formats; they are so worried about their ad monies, so 
very few dare to take any chances. (Interview #34) 
 
The end of radio as a promotional tool? 
Changes in the media environment have weakened the role of the radio 
medium as a promotional tool in at least three ways. First, increased AUDIENCE 
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FRAGMENTATION has reduced the share of the AUDIENCE REACHED by a 
single media outlet. Consequently the music firm is required to appear in more 
outlets in order to keep its aggregated level of MEDIA PRESENCE stable. Second, 
media outlets have decreased their level of (MEDIA) RISK WILLINGNESS. This 
has caused the outlets to revise their business strategies and to increase 
PLAYLIST ENTRY BARRIERS. The MARKETING EFFORT that a music firm has to 
spend to overcome those barriers has thereby increased considerably. A third 
effect, which has not been presented previously, is discussed by one of the 
informants: There is a significant part of the audience that is satisfied with the 
music they hear on radio and do not look for the same songs on physical 
records. The remaining part of the audience, that actually do buy records, 
explain that they look for music that is different, new, innovative or interesting. 
However, the radio stations‟ revision of their playlist policies have reduced the 
amount of new and innovative songs on the radio, which means that the record 
buying audience is unable to discover music they think is appealing on 
terrestrial commercial radio. Broadly speaking, the only part of the audience 
that are happily listening to radio are the ones that are uninterested in buying 
records, which of course reduces the usefulness of the radio as a tool for 
breaking new artists. (Interview #12) 
 
… fifteen twenty years ago if you got a hit single on radio 
yo u‟d sell reco rds! N o w  th ere is a to n  o f exam p les you can 
p o in t to … h uge [radio] h it sin gle an d th e reco rd w o uldn ‟t 
sell…  … Mario was number one for eight weeks with the 
Let Me Love You so n g b ut h is alb um  didn ‟t even  go  
platinum! I mean eight weeks on number one …  everyone 
is playing this song …  th e alb um  isn ‟t p latin um …  
(Interview #10) 
 
 Informants‟ statements, such as the one above, illustrate the frustration 
within the music industry with the development of the radio medium. In 
general, traditional broadcast media is still the most powerful tool for 
mainstream music promotion. However, the resources required by music firms 
to attain a certain level of AUDIENCE REACH have increased, primarily due to 
those changes in the media environment which have been presented in this 
section. 
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7.2 The media as a user of music 
The music business has been sluggish during the last five years (e.g. Barfe 2004; 
IFPI 2004b). However, it is important to note that not the entire music industry 
is in shambles. Primarily it is sales of physical products, for instance CDs, which 
have declined. Other music related products are doing fairly well. For instance; 
revenues from performance and synchronisation royalties have been growing 
considerably during the last five years. 
 Figure 7.3 graphs the revenues of three royalty collecting societies in 
Sweden, UK and the US. Since the size of the markets differs, and the revenue 
data is measured differently, the graph has been indexed to enable comparison. 
Although data for Sweden and the US is missing for the years before 2000, the 
graph shows that licensing revenues have increased with approximately 30 
percent between 2000 and 2004. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3: Licensing revenues have increased during the last decade. 
Source: STIM (Sweden), BMI (US), and PRS (UK). 
 
 
 Another indication of the prosperous state of the licensing business is 
fo un d in  th e m usic firm s‟ an n ual rep o rts, fo r in stan ce fro m  E M I. EMI is a 
multinational music firm with a business unit for recorded music (EMI Music) 
and a unit for music publishing (EMI Music Publishing). EMI Music Publishing 
is the little sister in the family and contributed with only 13 percent of the total 
revenues in the fiscal year of 1999 (EMI 2002a). However, the publishing unit 
receives all its revenues from royalties, and the growing licensing industry is 
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showing in their numbers. In 2005 the contribution from EMI Music 
Publishing to the total revenues had risen to 21 percent and the unit delivered 
almost half of E M I‟s to tal p ro fit49 (EMI 2005). 
 
 
 
The following variable is introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
CONTENT DEMAND The demand from media outlets to license and use musical content. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Impact on licensing. 
 
 
 One explanation of the boom in this part of the music industry could be a 
ch an ge in  m usic firm s‟ b usin ess strategies. T h is w ill b e discussed later, b ut 
another explanation is the sudden increase in the number of media outlets 
discussed in the previous section. Media outlets without content are not very 
well equipped to attract audiences. Content of some sort is consequently 
                                              
 
49 The publishing unit’s contribution to the group’s total profit was 32% in 1999 and 43% in 2005 (EMI 2002; 
2005). 
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required, and since music is an integral part of most media, the demand for 
licensing of music has increased (Figure 7.4). 
 The three influence branches originating from the variable MEDIA OUTLETS 
impact the Music Industry Feedback Model and specifically the Audience-
Media Engine in different ways (Figure 7.1, 7.2 & 7.4). As discussed in the 
previous section, th e “AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION branch ” an d th e “MEDIA 
RISK WILLINGNESS b ran ch ” h ave a h am p erin g effect b y red ucin g th e 
AUDIENCE REACHED by individual media outlets and by increasing PLAYLIST 
ENTRY BARRIERS, thereby reducing th e m usic firm ‟s ab ility to  en ter th o se 
o utlets. T h e “CONTENT DEMAND b ran ch ” w o rks again st th is dyn am ics, an d  
in creases th e m usic firm ‟s MEDIA PRESENCE by raising the demand for musical 
content licenses. These three branches constitute an illustrative example of how 
dynamic complexity makes it difficult to determine the drivers‟ aggregated 
effect on the dynamics of the music firm. The detailed dynamics is determined 
by the strength of the branches and the time lag which is involved. A walk 
through the model structure illustrated by Figure 7.4 reveals that the 
“CONTENT DEMAND b ran ch ” in vo lves less delay th an  th e o th er tw o  b ran ch es. 
A change in the number of MEDIA OUTLETS has more or less an immediate 
effect on content demand while the other two branches involve systems 
(audiences and media companies respectively) with considerable inertia. On the 
o th er h an d, th e im p act fro m  th e “CONTENT DEMAND b ran ch ” is n o t as 
significant as the impact from the other two branches. Consequently, the 
increase in music LICENSING is not able to balance the growing problems 
generated by the other two branches.  
 This section has discussed how changes in the media environment not only 
hurt the music firm, but also has a significant REVENUE enhancing effect. The 
increase in the number of MEDIA OUTLETS has raised the DEMAND for 
LICENSING music to be used in those new outlets. Evidence from royalty 
collection societies support this reasoning as they report a 30 percent increase 
from 2000 to 2004 of license fees paid. 
 The next section will discuss the third and last music-media relationship, 
namely the media as a distributor of music. 
 
7.3 The media as a distributor of music 
The distribution of music has since the fifteenth century involved some kind of 
physical product. Initially, sheet music was the prime vehicle for the distribution 
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of music, and the music industry was simply just another industry among many 
other publishing industries such as books, magazines, newspapers, etc. It was 
the development of new technologies such as the piano roll during the end of 
the nineteenth century and later cylinders, discs, and a plethora of other 
twentieth century storage and distribution technologies that established the new 
industry, separated from the traditional publishing realm. (E.g. Barfe 2004; 
Coleman 2003; Gelatt 1977; Gronow 1983; Poe 1997; Qualen 1985; Read & 
Welch 1976) 
 In the last quarter of the twentieth century, technological developments in 
the areas of digital computing and computer networking made it possible to use 
electronic media not only as promoter and user of music, but also as a distributor 
of music (e.g. Abbate 1999; Alderman 2001; Castells 2001; Coleman 2003). 
There are numerous technological innovations which have contributed to this 
transformation. In the section below, three specific technologies which have 
immediately affected the copyright industries will be presented, namely, 
Internet high-speed infrastructure, audio compression technologies, and peer-
to-peer networking. This presentation will lead into a discussion concerning 
two parallel processes. The first process concerns how the new technologies 
facilitate th e audien ces‟ access to  m usic culture. T h e o th er co n cern s h o w  th e 
same technologies make it difficult for music firms to control the dissemination 
of their intellectual properties, and thereby threaten the value of their IP 
portfolios.  
 
Inside Pandora‟s B ox  
High-speed Internet access is a requirement in order to turn the Internet into a 
workable music distribution platform. All three countries have relatively 
sophisticated Internet infrastructures and Internet user habits, compared to 
many other countries around the world. In June 2005, approximately one 
third50 of the households in all three countries had high-speed Internet access 
of some kind. In the US, the broadband Internet infrastructure is primarily 
based on cable TV technology (55% of all broadband connections) while ADSL 
is the most common technology used in Sweden (69%) and the UK (72%) 
(OECD 2005a). In Sweden, fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) technology has been 
used in a greater extent (15%) than in the other two countries, UK (<1%) and 
                                              
 
50 Sweden: 35%; UK: 32%; USA: 36%. Sources: SCB, UK government, US Census agency, and OECD. 
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the US (7%). The FTTH technology enables the delivery of high-speed Internet 
accesses (more than 100Mbps) at lower costs compared to the other 
technologies. This fact combined with new regulations and the emergence of 
Internet operators which pursue an aggressive low-price strategy has created a 
relatively competitive situation in the Swedish market of Internet broadband 
accesses (Swedish Competition Authority 2005). In Sweden, an Internet access 
with a bandwidth of 24Mbps is priced at about the same level as a 2Mbps 
access in the UK and the US51. This means that high-speed Internet 
infrastructure is more accessible in Sweden compared to the other two markets, 
and even though household broadband penetration is about the same in all 
three countries, Swedish h o useh o ld s are in  gen eral m o re “w ell-co n n ected ” to  
the Internet than households in the UK and the US. 
 Along with the development of Internet access technologies, technologies 
for digital representation of information have become increasingly efficient. In 
1989, the Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated Circuits in Erlangen, Germany, 
secured a patent for the audio compression algorithm now known as MP3 (e.g. 
Alderman 2001). This algorithm made it possible to represent sounds about ten 
times more efficient that previous technologies, with tolerable distortion of the 
quality of sound. In practice, this means that if an uncompressed audio file 
requires 100 seconds to be sent across the Internet from A to B, the same 
sound, formatted as an MP3 file, will only require 10 seconds for the same 
journey. The MP3 format has become the most widely used algorithm for audio 
compression. However, technological development continues, and since 1989, 
other compression technologies (e.g. AAC, WMA, Ogg Vorbis), even more 
efficient and less harmful to the quality of the compressed sound, have been 
released. (Alderman 2001) 
 A third technology which is immediately impacting the copyright industries 
is called peer-to-peer (or P2P) computer networking. P2P networks differ from 
traditional computer networks in the sense that they use the computing 
resources and bandwidths of all participants in the network rather than relying 
on the resources of a few powerful computer servers. Since the computers used 
by ordinary Internet users have become more potent and the bandwidth by 
which these computers are connected to the Internet has increased, P2P have 
                                              
 
51 2Mbps access is priced at approx. €25 in the UK (http://w w w .tiscali.co.uk); 3M bps access is priced at €33 in 
the USA (http://w w w .att.com ); 24M bps is priced at approx. €26 in Sw eden (http://w w w .glocalnet.se). All 
prices as advertised in March 2006.  
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become an increasingly useful model for Internet based collaboration and 
networking. (Oram 2001) 
 The advantage of P2P networks is the significantly increased efficiency in 
the usage of network resources. In a traditional client-server network, the 
cap ab ility o f th e n etw o rk is determ in ed b y th e server‟s reso urces. If a n ew  
participant is added to the network, the load on the server is increased and the 
resources available to the average participant decrease. In a P2P structure, all 
p articip an ts‟ reso urces co n trib ute to  th e n etw o rk‟s to tal cap ab ility. W h en  a 
participant is added, his/her resources become an integrated part of the 
n etw o rk‟s reso urce p o o l. T h e n ew  p articip an t w ill co n sequ ently not be a burden 
to the network, but on the contrary, she/he will be a contribution which will 
en h an ce th e n etw o rk‟s cap ab ility. (O ram  2001) 
 Peer-to-peer concepts have been discussed within the Internet 
development community since 1969 when Steve Crocker brought the issue to 
the table (Crocker 1969). Several P2P networks have been launched since, for 
instance UseNet in 1979 and FidoNet in 1984. In 1999, the concept reached 
the awareness of the general public in the shape of the Napster software 
developed by Shawn Fanning and others (Alderman 2001). Napster was actually 
not a true P2P network since some parts of the system relied on a traditional 
client-server structure. Napster is probably most known as a tool for sharing 
media files in a way that infringed copyright law. Due to the success of the 
system, Fanning was brought to trial by the major actors in the copyright 
industries, and the court soon ordered Napster to cease-and-desist. Fanning 
followed that order, but once the peer-to-peer concepts were known among the 
general public, numerous other technologies soon followed. Some of these did 
use a true peer-to-peer structure (e.g. Gnutella, Freenet, and BitTorrent) 
without an easily identifiable individual or organisation that can be charged as 
responsible for the legal violations enabled by the network. Although copyright 
owners in the music, film and videogame industries have spent considerable 
resources trying to stop illegal file-sharing (discussed in section 8.3), the 
networks still elude the threats from the copyright industries. As the graph in 
Figure 7.5 shows, in January 2006, there were more P2P users than ever. 
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Figure 7.5: The number of simultaneous P2P users worldwide continues to grow.  
Note: The graph does not include BitTorrent users. (Source: BigChampagne) 
 
 
 A Jupiter/IPSOS study, ordered by IFPI, shows that Sweden is the 
European country where most Internet users (15%) actively participate in P2P 
networks. In the UK, the corresponding number is 4 percent (IFPI 2006a). The 
study covers unfortunately Europe only, why a comparison with the US is not 
possible. It is difficult to make a causal connection between broadband 
infrastructure and consumer behaviour, but at least there is a strong correlation 
between the two in the cases of Sweden and the UK. 
 Other technologies that have been important as enablers of new media 
outlets are micro-payment technologies, mobile communication technologies 
and technologies for non-volatile information storage, to name but a few. It 
deserves to be noted that not all media outlets based on these technologies are 
illegal. Quite the contrary, most media outlets are legal services sanctioned and 
approved by the copyright industries52. In chapter 9, a number of such legal 
outlets and their implications on the music industry will be further examined. 
 
                                              
 
52 Globally in January 2006, there were 335 legal online music services in operation. 200 of these services 
were operating in Europe (IFPI 2006c). 
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Impact on the music firm 
The technologies discussed above have affected the music firm in at least two 
ways. First, the numerous new ways to listen to and acquire music have 
increased the ACCESSIBILITY of musical content (Figure 7.6). 
 
 
 
The following variables are introduced in this step: 
New variable Definition 
ACCESSIBILITY The ease or difficulty for the audience to access and 
use the m usic firm ’s intellectual properties. 
APPROPRIABILITY The m usic firm ’s ability to convert audience action into actual revenues. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Impact on accessibility and appropriability. 
 
 
 The resources required by the audience to access music, both measured as 
time or monies, have thereby decreased. This change facilitates AUDIENCE 
ACTION, since it is easier to explore new musical artists and genres. It is this 
reasoning which is used by those debaters who are the proponents of 
uncontrolled distribution of intellectual property (cf. p. 79). These men and 
women argue that by increasing the ACCESSIBILITY of musical content, more 
people will be able to discover music and broaden their musical experience 
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which is beneficial to the entire music industry. Based on that logic, the 
appropriate action by the music industry would be to support the uncontrolled 
circulation of copyrighted material on the Internet, rather than to try to wipe it 
out. 
 The other way the new technologies affect the music firm is that they make 
it more difficult to control the flow and distribution of copyrighted material, 
including music. This means that though AUDIENCE ACTION is facilitated by 
the new technologies, fewer actions are appropriable, that is to say possible to 
convert into actual REVENUES. For instance, a music firm is generally able to 
collect almost all REVENUES from AUDIENCE ACTIONS which have a high level 
of APPROPRIABILITY (e.g. the purchase of physical products such as CDs and 
DVDs). It is much more difficult to collect REVENUES from an audience action 
such as Internet-based file-sharing which has a very low level of 
APPROPRIABILITY. In aggregate, new Internet-based technologies for content 
distribution have reduced the general level of APPROPRIABILITY of AUDIENCE 
ACTIONS‟. (cf. p. 37; Brand 1987; Liebowitz 2002a) 
 This text has already reviewed the research which has been made on these 
two processes (p. 79). The conclusion which was possible to make after that 
review was that although the evidence is far from clear, it seems as the impact 
from the lowered APPROPRIABILITY on the performance of the music firms is 
more significant than the impact from increased ACCESSIBILITY. 
 
                                 
 
The purpose of this chapter has been to connect the Music Industry Feedback 
Model to the media environment and to examine how changes in this 
environment influence the performance of the music firm (Figure 7.7). The 
findings reported by the chapter can be summarized as follows. 
 First, increased AUDIENCE FRAGMENTATION and radio statio n s‟ in creased 
PLAYLIST ENTRY BARRIERS require music firms to increase their MARKETING 
EFFORT in order to uphold MEDIA PRESENCE. Second, new technologies make 
it increasingly difficult to transform AUDIENCE ACTION into actual REVENUES. 
The combination of these two effects increase costs and decrease REVENUES, 
which significantly deteriorates th e m usic firm ‟s ab ility to  gen erate PROFIT. 
 There are also good tidings. First, the increased number of MEDIA OUTLETS 
has made REVENUES from music LICENSING more important. Performance and 
synchronization ROYALTIES have increased by approximately 30 percent 
between 2000 and 2004 (cf. p. 142). Second, although new technologies make 
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content distribution difficult to control, they increase the ACCESSIBILITY of 
musical content which stimulates AUDIENCE ACTION and lubricates the 
machinery of the Audience-Media Engine. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.7: The Music Industry Feedback Model connected to a changing media environment. 
 
 
 The next chapter will continue from this exploration of how the 
transformation of the media environment affects the music firm. The chapter 
will examine how music firms have perceived the transformation and how they 
have acted in order to cope with the new conditions.  
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8  
Adapt or die 
The title of this chapter refers to the evolutionary paths which, according to 
Rupert Murdoch of News Corp, are open to traditional media comp an ies: „The 
greatest challenge for the traditional media now is to engage with more 
demanding, questioning, and better educated consumers, adapting their 
products for new technology‟ (M urdo ch  2006). That challenge has been very 
real to most music firms during the recent years. This chapter will examine how 
music firms have revised their business strategies in order to adapt to the 
transformation of the media environment discussed in the previous chapter. 
The chapter will present four strategic themes (sections 8.1 to 8.4); the rationale 
behind these according to the decision makers; and their implications on the 
dynamics of the music firms. The first three themes are linked to the structure 
from the previous chapter as they address changes related to media as 
promoter, user, and distributor of music. The fourth theme concerns risk 
management related issues and can not be referred to one specific music-media 
relationship. Each of the themes will be wrapped up by a short summary which 
lists the rationale behind the strategy, the model variables which are involved 
and the unintended side-effects (if any) that have been identified. In the last 
section (8.5), the aggregated impact of these strategies on the music firm will be 
summarized and discussed. 
 The Music Industry Feedback Model will continue to serve as the tool for 
explaining how strategic initiatives affect the firms‟ performance. As in the 
previous two chapters, walking through the model structure (e.g. Figure 6.7), 
alongside the stories explicated by this chapter, will further illustrate and 
enhance the reasoning. 
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8.1 Shout louder 
The primary purpose of the first strategic theme is to improve or sustain media 
presence b y revisin g th e firm ‟s m arketin g  strategies. The initiatives are launched 
to address the problem regarding how traditional broadcast media have become 
less useful or too expensive as promotional tools (cf. section 7.1). 
 Music firms continually seek new ways to reach their audiences. When one 
promotional technique loses its effect, new tools are picked up in order to 
sustain the required level of media presence (Interview #8). Two promotional 
tools which have become increasingly important during the last two decades are 
promotional videos and advertising which will be briefly introduced below.  
 
Music videos in the promotional mix 
There are numerous studies of how the promotional music video has 
transformed music and developed into an art form in itself (e.g. Frith, Goodwin 
& Grossberg 1993; Mundy 1999). However, though that is a fascinating 
development, it is slightly outside the scope of this study which chooses to 
consider the music video as merely a tool for promotion. 
 The use of moving images to promote music can be traced back to the 
1960s (Bob Dylan, The Monkees, The Beatles, et al.) and the 1970s (David 
Bowie, ABBA, Queen, et al) but the definitive milestone is the launch of MTV 
in the US, August 1, 1981 (Denisoff 1988: 37). MTV established a new platform 
for music promotion and spurred the music firms‟ marketing departments to 
spend a growing portion of their marketing budgets on the production of 
promotional videos. This portion expanded due to the assumption that in order 
to reach the audience, the video had to beat the extravagance of the 
competition. The assumption established a reinforcing feedback process which 
rapidly accelerated music video production costs, and eventually peaked in 1995 
w ith  M ich ael an d  Jan et Jackso n ‟s Scream, directed by Mark Romanek, and often 
cited as the most expensive music video ever made.   
 
Advertising in the promotional mix 
In traditional music promotion, the media outlet (at least in theory) decides 
which personalities and musical content should be aired, reviewed, etc. The 
m usic firm  m ay b e ab le to  in fluen ce th e o utlet‟s d ecisio n  b y usin g carro t an d  
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stick, but in the end, the decision rests in the hands of the outlet. In contrast, by 
using advertising as a promotional tool, the music firm is able to fully control its 
media presence. The firm buys space in a magazine or airtime in broadcast 
m edia, an d is free to  d o  “w h atever” th ey p refer o n  th at p age o r durin g th o se 
seconds. However, advertising is much more expensive than traditional 
promotion which (again in theory) is more or less free of charge. When the 
usefulness of traditional promotion techniques decline, advertising has been a 
convenient way to compensate for the loss of MEDIA PRESENCE and AUDIENCE 
REACH. However, though the turn to advertising has been able to compensate 
for the reduced potency of traditional promotion, the costs of sustaining the 
required level of media presence has increased considerably. 
 When advertising was less common as a promotional tool, it was possible 
to reach the audience with a moderate advertising investment. Due to the 
in ten sified use o f advertisin g, th e “advertisin g n o ise” has increased. In order to 
be heard through the noise, advertisers have to “shout louder”, and have to 
spend more advertising monies. The m usic firm ‟s marketing budget for an 
album project is usually set as a percentage of expected sales. Previously this 
percentage hovered around 10 percent, but the increased use of advertising has 
according to some informants caused the marketing budgets to climb closer to 
20 percent (Interview #14).  
 
We have accustomed the consumer to music adverts which 
has created a situation where more TV spots are required 
to get the consumer to the record store. Today you need 
maybe five to ten spots when it previously was enough 
with less than five. (Interview #14) 
 
Caught in a game of chicken 
The two reinforcing feedback loops (music videos and advertising) which 
generate the accelerating marketing costs as discussed above is similar to a 
„gam e o f ch icken ‟. As in any such game, it can not go on for ever. Eventually 
revenues are unable to cover the costs, profit declines and the promotional 
strategy has to be revised. In the case of the music videos, this policy shift is 
clearly marked by the Jackson/Romanek video in 1995, but in the case of 
advertising, the corresponding shift is not as easily identified. 
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 T h e „gam e o f ch icken ‟ is an  escalatin g dyn am ics w h ich  o ccurs in  m an y 
socio-economic systems. It has been the subject of research by several scholars, 
both within the field of system dynamics (e.g. Senge 1990: 384-5) and within 
the field of game theory (e.g. Brams 1994: 127ff). 
 In order to change the structure of the feedback loop, several policy shifts 
have been launched by music firms. First, music video production budgets have 
been considerably reduced, and fewer songs are supported by a promotional 
video. 
 
… when I started in the music business [… ] I had in the 
beginning I would say for an average music video up to 
€150,000. When I left [a multinational music firm] in 2003 
I had something like a rule that said €50,000 maximum. 
(Interview #9) 
 
 Second, television advertising is used very selectively in low risk projects 
where the return on investment is assured, for instance in album compilation 
projects, which is discussed later in this chapter (e.g. Interview #8; #32). Third, 
the managerial pressure exerted on the marketing department is increased: 
 
You could feel that the budgets definitely had been 
reduced… w e h ad to  get th e sam e m edia aw aren ess an d  
sam e m edia vo lum e fo r less b ud get …  [… ] …  we just 
didn ‟t h ave th e b ud gets to  w o rk w ith  artists th at w eren ‟t 
priority artists, key artists [that] we were hoping to exploit 
in other territories …  (In terview  # 9) 
 
 T h e p attern  o f b eh avio ur created b y th e m usic firm s‟ p ro m o tio n al strategies 
can be summarized as follows: The transformation of the media environment 
initially forced music firms to increase their MARKETING EFFORT. Advertising 
and music videos became important promotional tools, but they were 
sim ultan eo usly h urtin g th e firm s‟ PROFIT. At first, the Audience-Media Engine 
continued to run fairly well, but as the media environment continued to evolve, 
the music firms eventually were unable to follow the evolution by continuously 
increasing their MARKETING EFFORT. Consequently, the music firms pulled the 
brakes and revised their strategies again. 
 This time, MARKETING EFFORT was reduced, but the marketing resources 
were not evenly distributed across the entire artist roster. MARKETING EFFORT 
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was instead focused on a limited set of prioritised artists, based on the 
understanding that you have to focus your resources to be heard through the 
media noise. The prioritised artists required a wide audience appeal in order to 
be able to recoup the marketing costs. Consequently, artists in the major music 
firm ‟s ro ster, with a narrow audience appeal, were often less fortunate when 
com p etin g fo r th e firm ‟s atten tio n  an d reso urces. 
 The Music Industry Feedback Model (e.g. Figure 6.7) explains how the 
reductio n  o f th e firm ‟s MARKETING EFFORT and the focusing of the resources 
on fewer artists reduces th e firm ‟s aggregate MEDIA PRESENCE. The strategy in 
turn impedes the Audience-Media Engine and eventually also hurts REVENUES 
generated by AUDIENCE ACTIONS. In other words, when the music firm tried to 
address a p ro b lem  caused b y exo gen o us agen ts, th e firm ‟s strategic sh ift did n o t 
alleviate the problem but rather made the situation worse. 
 A relevant question is whether the music firms could have acted differently. 
In  h in dsigh t it is easy to  realise th at th e „gam e o f ch icken ‟ seldo m  can  b e 
considered as viable strategic thinking. However, in the heat of the battle, it is 
not easy to determine when to leave the field. 
 
                                 
 
In short:  First; increase marketing effort to sustain media presence. Then; limit 
marketing effort and focus only on priority artists. 
Rationale:  First; to cope with changes in the media environment. Then; to stop 
the escalating marketing costs in order to meet financial goals.  
Key variables:  MARKETING EFFORT; MEDIA PRESENCE. 
Unintended side-effect: The strategy leads to reduced media presence which hampers the 
Audience-Media Engine an d shrin k s th e firm ‟s reven u es from 
audience actions. 
 
8.2 Increase licensing efforts 
As the traditional tools for music marketing and promotion has become less 
useful (cf. section 7.1), m usic firm ‟s marketing departments have become more 
interested in the use of licensing as a means to increase record sales (Interview 
#8). The licensing of a song to an advertising campaign or to a film soundtrack, 
may achieve considerable MEDIA PRESENCE instantly. A high-profile 
Hollywood production aimed for the big screen usually has a marketing budget 
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which is considerably larger than the resources allotted to album projects of the 
greatest of music superstars (e.g. Dale 1997). Such resources are often able to 
turn even the feeblest soundtrack into a commercial success. Full-length 
soundtrack albums from films such as Saturday Night Fever (1977), Purple 
Rain (1984), The Bodyguard (1992), and Forest Gump (1994) have all become 
some of the w o rld‟s best selling albums of all time. Songs licensed to films such 
as Pretty Woman (Roxette –  It Must Have Been Love –  1990), Robin Hood: 
Prince of Thieves (Bryan Adams –  (Everything I Do) I Do It For You –  1991), 
The Lion King (Elton John –  The Circle of Life –  1994), or Titanic (Celine 
Dion –  My Heart Will Go On –  1997) have been propelled into sales charts 
around the world. 
 In the advertising space, music has become an increasingly important 
ingredient in the production of television commercials. One milestone in the 
history of music in advertising is the British advertising agency Bartle Bogle 
Hegarty‟s licensing of M arvin  G aye‟s „I h eard it through the grap evin e‟ to 
promote L evi‟s 501 in the UK, in 1985. The commercial, which involves Nick 
K am en ‟s legendary laundrette striptease, has probably been analysed from every 
angle possible by undergraduate media students around Europe. The 
commercial worked well fo r L evi‟s UK, b ut it also  laun ch ed N ick K am en ‟s b rief 
but sparkling career and caused a resurgence for classic soul by Marvin Gaye 
and his following (Robinson 2000). Another example of a significant event in 
the history of music in advertising is th e licen sin g o f R o llin g Sto n e‟s „Start M e 
U p ‟ for alm o st €10  million to promote Microsoft‟s operating system Windows 
95 worldwide (in 1995) (Graff 2003). Today, the days of traditional jingles is 
long gone, and music is now an integral component of most advertising 
campaigns (Korte 2005). This increased interest from advertisers and 
advertising agencies has established the licensing of music to commercials as a 
viable promotional tool. Regardless if the song is old or new, the media 
presence generated by the licensing of the song to a television commercial is 
hard to underestimate. 
 Another medium which has grown in importance as a licensee of music is 
the videogame. By mimicking their predecessors in the film industry, videogame 
producers have started to create soundtracks and license music to enhance their 
productions (e.g. Schnur 2005). Black Eyed Peas, Franz Ferdinand, Good 
Charlotte and Pussycat Dolls are all examples of acts where a videogame has 
been used as an important promotional platform (e.g. Interview #31). A 
decision maker from the videogame industry compares the marketing muscles 
of a global videogame brand to MTV: 
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… th is is an o th er p latfo rm  where you can promote your 
artist…  … if w e licen sed  a so n g in  o ur gam e it w ill b e h eard  
up to 700 m illio n  tim es…  … w e really p ro vide m o re 
marketing value to a record label than MTV would do with 
a video …  … an d o ur licen ses are all w o rldw ide…   
(Interview #17) 
 
 The final example of media which have created new opportunities for 
music licensing is mobile telephony. The significance of the mobile phone as a 
„lifestyle gad get‟ h as gro w n  co n siderab ly sin ce th e in tro ductio n  o f th e 
technology a few decades ago. As most fashion items, a mobile device serves as 
a means to construct and communicate an image of th e o w n er‟s iden tity. T h e 
actual model of the device is of course of great importance, but other signs and 
objects constitute the arpeggio which is messaged to the world. Music has been 
able to become a part of this package, in the shape of ringtones, callback tones, 
etc53. There are many varieties of these sounds (e.g. voicetones, realtones, 
mastertones), and in all instances, a music license is involved. The music 
industry has discovered that while young music consumers are increasingly 
reluctant to purchase music for listening purposes, they are willing to spend €2 
for the latest hit as a ringtone without any hesitation54. 
 It is important to note that this business is completely different to the 
traditional music business. The sounds purchased are often (but not always) 
based on mainstream pop music, but the consumer need which is satisfied by 
these products is completely different to the need which is satisfied by 
“o rdin ary” music.  
 
Personalization has really driven the mobile content 
business, people have been looking to express themselves 
with their phones…  … when I was a teenager, I wanted to 
buy a new pair of sneakers…  … to day‟s teen agers w an t to  
buy a ringtone, because to pay a few dollars to look cool is 
something that you are willing to  do …  … particularly if it 
                                              
 
53 A callback tone is the sound the caller hears when calling someone. A ringtone is the sound the called party 
hears when someone is calling her. 
54 Prices advertised by Jamster (http://www.jamster.com) in several European markets on May 4, 2006.  
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goes on your parents‟ phone bill or something like that…  
(Interview #36) 
 
 A reliable estimate of the size of the global ringtone market is not readily 
available, but informants who participated in the study estimate the size to 
„b illio n s o f d o llars‟ (In terview  # 36). The size of this business may be 
considerable, but from a technical perspective, its longevity is questionable. 
Mobile devices are increasingly able to use ordinarily formatted songs as 
ringtones and the need to purchase specifically formatted songs is decreasing. 
However, so far this development has not been able to hurt the ringtone 
business which continues on a steady path of rapid growth. 
 The increased demand for music licensing from films, advertising, 
videogames and mobile telephony is part of the transformation of the media 
environment as discussed in section 7.2. Music licensing has always been an 
integral and lucrative part of the music business, but it has often created a 
tension in the relationships between music publishers and record labels. 
Although music is the essential factor to both of them, their aims and their 
business models differ. To the music publisher or the licensing department of a 
full-service music firm, licensing opportunities such as the ones discussed 
above, are the bread and butter of their business. There is simply no other kind 
of income besides the royalties paid by the licensees. From the record labels 
point of view, the licensing has a completely different purpose, and that 
purpose is to promote an act. The licensing fee paid by the licensee is only the 
icin g o n  th e cake, sin ce th e reco rd lab el‟s co re b usin ess is the selling of audio 
recordin gs (p rim arily C D ‟s) to  co n sum ers. In  a co m p etitio n  to  h ave a song 
included in a film, etc, the record label might be inclined to waive the fee in 
order to win the competition and achieve the much desired media presence. 
 Media outlets often use th e “p ro m o tio n  argum en t” w h en  n ego tiatin g term s 
of music content licensing. The media outlet argues that the music firm should 
waive the license fee since the outlet is promoting the artist and the song. A 
music publisher explains:  
 
… this is a perennial argument that we had with MTV…  
… you can argue that most uses of music are promotion, 
but you have to draw the line…  … yo u can ‟t give it aw ay 
free, and the record companies, unfortunately, are being 
to o  w illin g to  give m usic aw ay fo r free…  (Interview #5) 
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 When licensing music to a commercial, the role of the media outlet in the 
negotiations is assumed by the advertiser or the advertising agency. In these 
negotiations, the advertiser uses the same argument as the media outlet and 
tries to get access to the musical content for the lowest possible fee. 
 
… w h at is h ap p en in g in  th e advertisin g  world is 
co n cern in g…  … so m etim es advertisers w an t to  use very 
cuttin g edge m usic… an d it is seen  as an opportunity by 
everyone to break a band, break a new song…  
… [advertisers] are beginning to turn around and say “you 
kn o w  w e are b reakin g yo ur b an d an d w e sh o uldn ‟t h ave to  
pay to use the music”…  [… ] … th ere n ever used to  b e an y 
question that the advertiser was expected to pay for the 
m usic… b ut I th in k it h as h ap p en ed durin g th e last two or 
th ree years…  (Interview #5) 
 
 The intense skirmishing in the licensing negotiations has so far not showed 
any signs of subsiding. It is interesting to note that even in those cases where 
the music publisher and the record label are parts of the same organisation, 
conflicts are just as prevalent. From a management perspective, this is an 
apparent example of sub-optimisation (e.g. Kanji 2002: 8), where individual 
departments focus on their own success rather than on the success of the entire 
music firm. The problem can be alleviated by implementing appropriate 
organisational structures and appropriate evaluation systems which rewards the 
success of the entire organisation rather than individual departments. Similar 
implications and suggestions will be discussed in the final chapter. 
 
                                 
 
In short:  Respond to the increased demand for musical content by enhancing 
licensing effort. 
Rationale:  It simply makes good business sense to respond to consumer demand. 
Key variables:  LICENSING EFFORT; MEDIA PRESENCE. 
Unintended side-effect: Remains to be seen, but there could be a risk of reducing the value of 
music.  
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8.3 Maintain appropriability 
The third strategic theme is acting as a response to the decreased level of 
APPROPRIABILITY caused by the development of new media technologies (cf. 
section 7.3). Intellectual property owners are of course protecting the value of 
their assets. The intellectual property portfolio often constitutes a major part of 
th e m usic firm ‟s b alan ce sh eet an d  if so m eth in g o r so m eo n e is th reaten in g to  
dim in ish  th e value o f th e firm ‟s assets it is the duty of the management to act. It 
is not the first time the music industry has been concerned about 
appropriability levels. When the Compact Cassette technology was developed, it 
incited a music listening culture with phenomena such as dubbing55, 
bootlegging56 and mixtaping. A whole range of new audience actions was 
opened up to the public. However, the audience actions had a very low level of 
appropriability. It was difficult to collect the legitimate revenues from the 
audien ce‟s n ew  actio n s. The industry decided to respond by launching 
information campaigns such as IFPI‟s legen dary „Home taping is killing music –  
an d it‟s illegal‟ initiative during the 1980s. The industry also successfully lobbied 
against governments in order to introduce a levy on cassette recorders and on 
blank, recordable cassettes. The levy should compensate copyright owners for 
the illegal use (e.g. dubbing) of the cassette technology. In some nations, for 
instance in the UK, the trade organisations did not want the blank cassette levy. 
They argued that by introducing such a mechanism, they were indirectly 
accepting copyright infringements, such as dubbing and bootlegging (Interview 
#5). 
 The response from the industry during this period has many parallels to 
how the industry respond to the current changes of media technologies. The 
strategic actions within this area have been documented by many scholars, for 
instance by Barfe (2004), Freedman (2003), and Imfeld (2004). I will only give a 
brief overview of the initiatives in order to be able to discuss their impact on 
m usic firm s‟ p erfo rm an ce an d th e A udien ce-Media Engine. 
 A number of initiatives have been aimed directly towards the consumers. 
Three such initiatives will be discussed next. First, information campaigns have 
been launched by trade bodies in all three nations (Interview #11; #12; #37). 
                                              
 
55 In sound recording, dubbing is the transfer or copying of previously recorded audio material from one 
medium to another. 
56 Bootlegging is trafficking in recordings that the record companies have not commercially released and may 
or may not be legal. 
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The purpose of these initiatives has been to influence the understanding and 
the attitudes, primarily among young people, about copyright related issues. The 
international trade body of the recording industry, IFPI, is running the 
„Pro Music‟ cam p aign in several music markets57. Its US affiliate RIAA has a 
similar initiative aimed for the domestic market called „Music United‟58 and in 
the UK, music publishers operate th e „R esp ect th e value o f m usic‟ campaign, 
via the trade organisation British Music Rights (BMR). In Sweden, the music 
industry has not launched any similar initiatives, but trade organisations 
representing other copyright industries (mainly software and film) operate 
Antipiratbyrån59 (the Anti Piracy Bureau) which is actively working against all 
kinds of unsanctioned distribution of copyright protected material. 
 Second, an initiative primarily launched by trade organisations representing 
record labels consists of lawsuits filed against organisations and individuals who 
are violating copyright legislations. These lawsuits have been especially 
prevalent in the US market, where 18,000 cases have been filed by the RIAA 
during the recent years. Trade organisations in Europe have been less 
aggressive and have only filed approximately 5,500 lawsuits in 18 countries. 
(Millard 2006) 
 Third, the recording industry has supported the development of various 
techniques to restrict and control the copying of music. However, these 
technologies have often failed, since some have made the listening of C D ‟s via 
certain players difficult, and others h ave serio usly th reaten ed th e co n sum er‟s 
personal integrity (e.g. Borland 2005). 
 In aggregate, these and other similar initiatives have not been able to 
change the growth of online piracy. As the diagram in Figure 7.5 (p. 148) 
shows, the number of simultaneous file-sharers has continued to grow, in spite 
of the attempts from the industry to stop the activities. It is of course 
impossible to know what the situation would be if these initiatives had not been 
launched. Maybe, there would be even more intense online piracy and maybe 
the size of the music industry would have decreased even further. 
 If these initiatives have been unable to stop unsanctioned distribution of 
copyrighted material, it seems as if the single most enduring effect has been a 
negative impact on the reputation of the music industry. Entertainment 
industries, including the music industry, have long been suffering from a rather 
                                              
 
57 http://www.pro-music.org 
58 http://www.music-united.org 
59 http://www.antipiratbyran.com 
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bad reputation. Keith Negus recognises this reputation by referring to music 
co m p an ies (in  so m ew h at iro n ic term s) as „commercial corrupters and 
manipulators‟ (Negus 1996: 46). Other texts have used Hunter Thompson‟s 
provocative description of the television business to describe the music 
industry: „Mainly we are dealing with a profoundly degenerate world, a living 
web of foulness, greed and treachery‟ (Thompson 1988: 43). 
 Music industry decision makers are well aware of the damage their efforts 
to increase appropriability cause their already injured reputation. Nevertheless 
they see no other option but to do everything possible in order to sustain the 
value of their intellectual property portfolio: 
 
… it just lo o ks like we are anti every new technology that 
co m es aro un d … b ut th at‟s not true really, I mean 
sometimes it is true but that is for good reason, for good 
business reason. T h at‟s hard to get across to the media or 
the public…  (In terview  # 12)  
 
 Another kind of strategic initiative that has proven more effective has been 
to lobby multilateral organisations and governments to revise copyright treaties 
and legislations. In 1996, the 183 member states of the World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) adopted the WIPO Copyright Treaty. The aim 
was to adapt the copyright treaty to the development of digital information and 
communication technologies. The treaty ensured among other things that 
computer software was protected by the copyright legislations in the member 
states. This treaty has since 1996, slowly been implemented in the US as the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 and in the EU as the 
European Union Copyright Directive (EUCD) in 2001. Almost all the 
individual member states of the EU have since 2001 implemented the EUCD in 
their national legislations. In the beginning of 2006, only three EU member 
states are still to implement the EUCD in their legislations; the Czech Republic, 
France, and Spain. In the countries where the treaty has been implemented, 
copyright legislations have generally been tightened and the punishment for 
infringing and violating the legislation has been increased. 
 It is not possible to attribute the revised copyright legislation among WIPO 
member states entirely to copyright industry lobbying. However, the tightening 
process that has been going on for the last decade has been eagerly applauded 
by the copyright industries. It is still too early to say which effect the new 
legislations will have on the illegal file-sharing activities. Again, as the diagram 
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in Figure 7.5 (p. 148) shows, so far, the illegal activity continues to grow. 
However, the new legislations provide tools for copyright owners to act more 
aggressively and maybe they will eventually use these tools to their full 
capability. 
 If that would happen, music firms would probably be able to increase the 
level of APPROPRIABILITY and to convert more AUDIENCE ACTIONS into actual 
REVENUES. However, as was discussed in section 7.3, the level of 
APPROPRIABILITY of a certain media technology has an inverse relationship 
with its level of ACCESSIBILITY. This means that if music firms are able to 
increase the level of APPROPRIABILITY, they will necessarily also decrease the 
ACCESSIBILITY to their products. According to the logic described by the Music 
Industry Feedback Model, such a decrease would have a hampering effect on 
the Audience-Media Engine, which would work against or maybe even cancel 
out the REVENUE increase caused by the improved APPROPRIABILITY. 
 
                                 
 
In short:  L im it u n au thorized u sage of the firm ‟s in tellectu al properties. 
Rationale:  To protect our core business from illegal use. 
Key variables:  APPROPRIABILITY; ACCESSIBILITY. 
Unintended side-effect: A) If these initiatives are not played out cleverly, they may hurt the 
firm ‟s repu tation . B) It is difficult to increase appropriability without 
decreasing accessibility. 
 
8.4 Reduce risk 
The previous three sections have been examining m usic firm s‟ strategic 
initiatives intended to cope with specific changes related to how the media 
promote, use, and distribute music. In this section, a strategic theme which is 
caused by a general increase in the PRESSURE from shareholders will be 
discussed. As the Music Industry Feedback Model shows, if the PRESSURE from 
shareholders increase, the music firm is likely to respond by decreasing its RISK 
WILLINGNESS (e.g. Figure 6.7). The reduced exposure to risk has an influence 
on how the firm uses its intellectual property development resources. This has 
in turn an impact on the NOVELTIES which are supposed to increase the 
attractiveness o f th e firm ‟s IP portfolio. Risk management is always an 
important issue on the corporate agenda of every firm, including the music 
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firm. Nevertheless, this section will point at three examples which illustrate how 
decision makers in music firms have been able to reduce their RISK 
WILLINGNESS beyond the ordinary. 
 
Same sounds, new wrapping 
Immaterial products such as audio recordings, musical works, and other 
intellectual properties may be the core product (cf. p. 47ff) of the music 
industry, but as with most consumer goods, the packaging of the product 
should never be neglected. Packaging in the music industry is traditionally equal 
to the physical album. Among the various album formats, the LP record is 
probably the most important in the history of the music industry (e.g. Gelatt 
1977). As a curiosity, among the 50 albums considered by the Rolling Stone 
Magazine to be most important in the history of popular music, 49 were 
released on the LP record format, and one (1) was released on a Compact Disc 
(Blashill, et al 2003). 
 Although the LP record has a unique position in the history of popular 
music, the format has been succeeded by other technologies, and it has no 
longer any practical relevance as a distribution technology for mainstream 
popular music. One of the technologies which have been able to challenge the 
LP record is the Compact Cassette, introduced by Philips in 1963 (Daniel, Mee 
& Clark 1999). The Compact Cassette certainly was a much used technology for 
pre-recorded music distribution, but the technology transformed music 
listening in more ways than simply as an alternative physical music carrier. The 
tech n o lo gy‟s en ab lin g o f audien ce actio n s such as dubbing, bootlegging and 
mixtaping has already been mentioned (cf. section 8.3). In addition, the 
Compact Cassette enabled the development of new listening devices such as the 
first portable cassette player introduced by Sony in 1979, and later branded 
Walkman (Sony 2006).60  
 The Compact Cassette technology has now to a great extent been 
superseded by digital technologies, but still the technology is the main music 
distribution vehicle in a number of infrastructure-poor nations. 
 The Compact Cassette is one successful technology, but an even more 
transforming music distribution technology is the Compact Disc. The Compact 
                                              
 
60 Analyses of Walkman history and culture are for instance found in Coleman (2003) or in du Gay, Hall, Janes, 
Mackay & Negus (1997). 
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Disc was the first successful use of digital technology in a music distribution 
application. It eventually pushed both the Compact Cassette and the vinyl 
record from the centre of the playing field. The Compact Disc was jointly 
introduced by Philips and Sony in 1982. The new format had considerable 
advantages compared to the previous technologies and spurred music 
consumers to replace their LP record collection with new and shiny discs (e.g. 
Coleman 2003). The introduction of the Compact Disc is often considered as 
the starting point of one of the more prosperous periods in the history of 
recorded music. As the illustration in Figure 8.1 shows, in the beginning of the 
1990s, only a decade after the introduction of the CD technology, the LP 
format was gone, and the digital technology was well-established as the main 
technology for music distribution. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: Global music sales by format (OECD 2005b). 
 
 
 The success of the Compact Disc technology, showed the music industry 
that new packaging may stimulate sales. The music industry decision makers 
adjusted their mental models accordingly, and rather than to invest in uncertain 
talent development, investment monies were put into new packaging strategies 
and distribution technologies. Since the launch of the Compact Disc, numerous 
technologies for physical music distribution have been introduced by consumer 
electronics manufacturers and record labels. For instance, the Digital Compact 
Cassette in 1992; the MiniDisc also in 1992; the Super Audio CD in 1999; the 
DVD-Audio in 2000; and the DualDisc in 2004 (Coleman 2003; Sony BMG 
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2006). It is also worth mentioning EMI‟s release o f th e R o llin g Sto n es alb um  A 
Bigger Bang on a Flash memory card in September 2005 (SanDisk 2005). 
However, most of these technologies have not been able to reach anywhere 
close to the success of the Compact Disc. 
 Successful or not, according to this strategy, NOVELTIES do not have to be 
new artists or new songs to be appreciated by the audience, but might just as 
well be the same old sounds but in a new wrapping.  
 
                                 
 
In short:  Create novelties by developing new distribution technologies rather 
than new personalities and musical content. 
Rationale:  Investing in new songs and new talent involves a great deal of risk. 
T his strategy redu ces that risk  an d m ak es the firm ‟s fin an cial 
performance more predictable. 
Key variables:  RISK WILLINGNESS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Unintended side-effect: T he firm s‟ talen t developin g capabilities w ith er w hich has severe lon g-
term  effect on  th e firm ‟s ability to sustain the attractiveness of the IP 
portfolio. 
 
Compilations  
A traditional music album consists of recent recordings made by a single artist 
or a band. However, there are other ways to assemble an album, for instance as 
a compilation album which might be any set of songs arranged according to some 
specific theme. The theme may be th e career o f a certain  artist (e.g. „B est of… ‟ 
o r „G reatest hits… ‟); a connection to a media brand (e.g. a videogame, a radio 
station, a film or a TV series); a genre (e.g. Jazz, Garage rock, Opera or 
Reggaeton); a certain activity or mood (e.g. relaxation, depression, pregnancy or 
workout); a time period (e.g. hits from the 1980s) a specific season (e.g. 
Christmas songs or summer songs); a specific record label (e.g. Sun Records; 
Motown Records); or simply a collection of recent hits. 
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 During the last decades the commercial success of compilation albums in 
the three nations has been on the rise61 (Figure 8.2). The graph shows the 
percentage of compilations among the best selling albums in each nation. 
Although data for Sweden is only available from 1991 onwards, the graph 
illustrates how the success of compilation albums has increased over the years. 
The data from the UK and USA follow the same pattern, namely only minor 
changes both before 1991 and after 1995, but a more rapid change between 
1991 and 1995. The average value during the first three periods was 21 percent 
in the UK and 7 percent in USA. The corresponding value during the three 
most recent periods was 27 percent in the UK and 15 percent in the US. Two 
interpretations of the pattern could be that a change in the measurement 
techniques has occurred, or that the shift is truly emerging from of a change of 
system structure. According to the IFPI affiliate in the UK, no change in 
measurement techniques has occurred which could explain the sudden increase 
during the beginning of the 1990s (Crutchley 2005). Consequently, the question 
which should be answered is in what way the system structure actually has 
changed. 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2: The average commercial success of compilation albums.61 
 
 
                                              
 
61 Methods and data supporting the graph in Figure 8.2 are presented in Appendix 4. 
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 The informants explain the increasing success of compilation albums by 
pointing to several significant changes. One of these concerns a change in 
consumer behaviour together with a corresponding change in music firms‟ 
marketing strategies. Previously, the music industry was primarily focused on 
teenagers, but now, older consumers have become increasingly important. 
Figure 8.3 shows the percentage of the US recording industry revenues that 
stem from consumers at age 40 and older.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.3: Percentage of US recording industry revenues that stem from consumers at age 40 and older. 
(Source: RIAA Consumer Profile) 
 
 
 Comparable data is unavailable for the other two nations, but other, 
somewhat less detailed data from the UK and Sweden point in the same 
direction (e.g. Carlsson 2004, Hepworth 2004; Interview #13; #35). The 
increased focus on an older audience has changed the aggregated consumer 
behaviour pattern and increased the demand for easily recognisable compilation 
brands. One of the informants reflects on the link between the new consumer 
focus and compilations: 
 
… [the compilation industry in the UK] will continue to 
grow as music moves into secondary distribution…  
… such things as super markets, petrol stations, that kind 
of things…  … you are talking to a probably less discerning, 
much more impulsive music buying audience, for whom 
compilations of tracks they are familiar with are more 
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p o ten t th an  alb um s w h ich  o n ly h as o n e go o d  track o n  it…  
(Interview #35) 
 
 When trying to gain deeper understanding about the ramping success of 
compilation albums, one first has to note that there are at least two parties 
involved in any compilation album project: (1) the owner of the album brand 
(e.g. „Beverly Hills Cop‟, „L evi‟s‟, „Elvis Presley‟ o r „E uro visio n  So n g C o n test‟) 
and (2) the owner of the musical content. However, it is of course possible that 
both roles are acted by one and the same organisation, for instance in 
productions of single-artist compilations or label samplers62. 
 The rationale for creating and marketing compilation albums differs 
between brand owner and content owner. The brand owner does not 
necessarily have to be part of the music industry, but might be any kind of 
consumer oriented firm. For instance, the clothing manufacturer Levi Strauss & 
Co has released a number of compilation albums which include some of the 
songs licensed for use in their commercials. The brand owner might also be an 
organisation specifically focused on compilations. One such example is the 
o w n er o f th e Sw edish  co m p ilatio n  b ran d „A b so lute‟, Eva Records, which is a 
joint venture between EMI, Warner Music and Sony BMG Music. The rationale 
behind the creation of Eva Records and similar ventures is based on traditional 
brand management strategy (e.g. Kapferer 2004). It is very costly to establish a 
new brand. First the audience has to learn about the existence of the brand, and 
then the audience has to attach the right values to the brand in question. These 
processes are usually both expensive and difficult, regardless of industry or 
product. Traditional artist b ran d s such  as „Sah ara H o tn igh ts‟ o r „V elvet 
R evo lver‟ are co n sidered to  b e successful if th ey are ab le to  create four or five 
profitable albums during their career (e.g. Interview #18). This should be 
co n trasted w ith  co m p ilatio n  b ran d s such  as „A b so lute‟, „H its‟, „P ure… ‟, o r 
„N o w , th at‟s w h at I call m usic‟. The „N o w  th at‟s w h at I call m usic‟ series h as for 
instance released 211 albums between 1983 and 2006, primarily in the UK but 
also in other markets around the world (http://www.nowmusic.com). Eva 
R eco rds‟ „A b so lute‟ series h as released 220 alb um s between 1986 and 2006 in 
Sweden only. During 2005, every tenth album sold in Sweden was an  „A b so lute‟ 
album (http://www.absolute.se). This arithmetic shows quite bluntly why it is 
much more appealing, from a business perspective, to establish a compilation 
brand compared to a traditional music brand. In addition, compilation brands 
                                              
 
62 A ‘label sam pler’ is an album  w hich includes sam ples from  a record label’s IP portfolio. 
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are in less need of promotion tours and radio airplay, they never get old and 
never have to spend time on drug rehabilitation programs. 
  „N o w  th at‟s w h at I call m usic‟ an d „A b so lute‟ are stro n g b ran d s in  
themselves, but many years of consistent marketing investments have been 
required to reach that position. Another brand management strategy involves 
the extension of a high-p ro file b ran d fro m  a “n o n -m usic” co p yrigh t in dustry 
into the music domain. Soundtracks to films, TV series and videogames are 
such examples. Other examples are compilations which are spin-offs from radio 
stations (e.g. Kiss FM in the UK) and television shows (e.g. MTV Unplugged). 
 
„K iss‟ is n o t just th e n um b er o n e radio  station for young 
people in London, but is now a national radio presence 
through digital radio, it‟s on telly…  … and part of the 
brand extension of time has been to move into 
compilation albums, so Kiss, Magic, Smash Hits and 
Kerrang!63, has led that, in terms of building a fairly 
successful portfolio of compilation titles working with the 
record labels…  (In terview  # 35) 
 
 F ro m  th e co n ten t o w n er‟s p ersp ective, co m p ilatio n  albums are licensing 
opportunities rather than anything else. During recent years, content owners 
have paid more attention to their back catalogue64, and have tried to find 
different ways to capitalize on their assets through various repackaging projects, 
such as album compilations (Interview #14). A marketing director at record 
label talks about a recent compilation project: 
 
… o ur catalo gue h as b een  licen sed in to  th e infinite number 
of compilations…  … last year w e p ut to geth er a 
compilation of the group [artist‟s n am e] for [territory] on 
the basis of some interest in the group there and we sold a 
good few thousands of reco rds…  it w as a very lucrative 
venture for us, we put a sleeve on it that kind of works, we 
just rep ackage it, yo u do n ‟t w an t fo ur h airy o ld m en  
playing guitars on the sleeve, you want something that can 
                                              
 
63 These are all radio brands in EM ap’s (a UK m edia conglom erate) m edia brand portfolio. 
64 A recording is categorised as back catalogue material if the recording was initially released more than two 
years ago (Crutchley 2005). 
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sit th ere w ith  th e n ew  releases o f th at w eek…  yo u do  a 
sleeve…  in  th is case a grap h ic sleeve th at en ab led us to  
kind o f up date w h at‟s a fairly to rrid  o ld  selectio n  o f 
so n gs…  … an d it w o rked to  th e tun e o f 50 ,000 units, that 
is an  in credib le result, very im p ressive…  (Interview #28) 
 
 In the passage above, the musical content was found in the record label‟s 
back catalogue. In those cases there are no competition between the 
compilation and some other packaging of the same song. However, when it 
comes to hit compilations, that is to say compilations which include new 
material; things get a bit more complicated. A song in medium or heavy 
rotation65 on major radio stations is usually also in demand as a full-length 
album. However, if the song also is available as part of a hit collection, it may 
have either positive or negative effects on album sales. If the compilation works 
as a promotional tool, the compilation is expected to raise the demand for the 
core product, which is the full-length album (Interview #2). However, if the 
compilation is able to satisfy the consumers‟ demand for the song, the 
compilation will slow down album sales rather than the opposite. This dilemma 
faces the content owner who has to determine the cases where licensing should 
be made and the cases where it should not (Lundqvist 2005). Similar channel 
management issues (e.g. McCalley 1996) become even more acute as the 
number of outlets for music distribution continues to rise. These issues will be 
further discussed in the next chapter. 
 Compilations may also serve as a budget saver for a record label. The 
development of new musical content is risky. If the music firm is experiencing 
financial pressure, it is very tempting to launch a low-risk compilation album 
rather than to develop a new traditional album. A marketing director at a record 
label explains: 
 
… every tim e [record labels] are unable to meet their 
b udgets… th ey create a co m p ilatio n … m ayb e yo u fin d an  
old compilation with [artist‟s n am e], and then you release it 
again … an d every fifth  o r ten th  year yo u release th e sam e 
record in a new package [… ] we have no risk in this at all, 
                                              
 
65 In radio broadcasting, a rotation is a single play of a song. A song in light rotation is typically aired 5–15 
times per week, a medium rotation tune goes over the airwaves 10–25 times per week, and songs in heavy 
rotation start at 20 or more rotations each week. 
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and we have no costs creating the record since all songs 
already exist…  (Interview #14) 
 
 Conclusively, record labels launch compilations with the purpose to 
generate NOVELTIES without exposing the firm to the risks associated with 
traditional product development within the music industry. 
 
                                 
 
In short:  Aggressively repack age or licen se th e firm ‟s existing intellectual 
property portfolio. 
Rationale:  A ) It m ak es econ om ic sen se to capitalise on  the firm ‟s musical assets. 
B) Compilation brands are more manageable, predictable and less 
risky than traditional artist brands. 
Key variables:  RISK WILLINGNESS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT; LICENSING EFFORT. 
Unintended side effect: T he firm s‟ talen t developin g capabilities w ith er w hich has severe lon g-
term  effect on  th e firm ‟s ability to sustain the attractiveness of the IP 
portfolio. 
 
Revising A&R strategies 
The two risk reduction strategies described above mainly involves the 
repackaging of existing material, either by releasing the songs with a new kind 
of distribution vehicle or by releasing the songs as some kind of compilation. 
However, the development of truly novel musical content and personalities is 
still at the core of the music business. Without developing new musical content 
or new personalities, the firm will certainly perish, sooner or later. 
Consequently, though it is risky, music firms have to engage in developing new 
musical content. However, it is o f co urse p o ssib le to  reduce th e firm ‟s exp o sure 
to risk also within this activity. 
 Some of the policy modifications intended to reduce risk in this area simply 
involves quantity. For instance, during the last couple of years, record labels‟ 
artist rosters have been significantly reduced. Artists with a broad audience 
appeal have been prioritized before artists with niche appeal since artists of the 
former category are more likely to  reco up  th e firm ‟s in vestm en t in  p ro ductio n  
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and marketing. EMI explain their version of this strategy in a press release from 
March 2004: 
 
EMI is reducing its global roster by approximately 20 
percent, affecting largely niche and under-performing 
artists.  The roster is being rebalanced to focus resources 
and efforts more effectively on the artists who have the 
greatest potential on both a global and local level. (EMI 
2004) 
 
 This change follows the same logic as the revision of marketing strategies 
described in section 8.1. As fewer artists in the roster get access to the music 
firm ‟s m arketin g sup p o rt, it m akes no sense to keep unsupported artists in the 
roster. An A&R agent at another major explains his view on the change:  
 
… seven  years ago  w e w o uld h ave h un dred s o f artists th at 
w e w eren ‟t ab le to  give 100  percent…  … b ut now when we 
have reduced the number of artists in the roster, I feel that 
we are able to  p ay m o re atten tio n  to  every sin gle artist…  
(Interview #18) 
 
 Following the same reasoning, music firms have grown less patient with 
their artists. Artists have to be continuously profitable; otherwise they will be 
dropped from the roster. One high-profile example of an artist who was unable 
to create continuously profitable albums is the R&B singer Mariah Carey. 
During 2001 Carey was signed to EMI, but when her album Glitter “only” sold 
about 500,000 units, the label decided to terminate their contract with the artist 
(EMI 2002b). 
 The increased PRESSURE does not only affect the labels‟ relationships with 
seasoned artists but also their relationships with less experienced talents. 
Previously a new artist signed to a major record label was able to learn and 
evolve during at least two full-length albums. Now, the demands on the new 
talents have changed quite considerably. The A&R agent quoted above reflects 
on the situation: 
 
… th e executives w e p lay o ur m usic fo r…  … when we 
b rin g in  so m eth in g th at w e lo ve… th ey just ask „w h ere is 
th e h it, w h ere is th e sin gle?‟, th ey do n ‟t w an t to  h ear „th is is 
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a great act, let‟s p ut th em  o n  th e ro ad fo r tw o years and see 
w h at h ap p en s‟, th ey w an t to  h ear w h ich  is th e radio  song 
and what is the immediate plan to gain them some 
audience…  [… ] … it used to  b e…  … you can build an 
artist‟s career, yo u m igh t h ave th ree alb um s w ith  th at o n e 
artist…  … if the first album is not successful you have the 
seco n d alb um  an d  th e th ird  alb um …  … now if the first 
album is not successful, the artist is probably going to be 
dropped. You have fewer chances with your artist to make 
it and to become successful…  … it‟s go t to  b e 
n o w … everyth in g is very im m ediate…  (Interview #18) 
 
 This pressure continues all the way to the question of adding new artists to 
the roster. In the same way as radio stations are reluctant to add unproven 
songs to their playlists, record labels are reluctant to add artists without proven 
track record to their roster.  
 
We are signing less number of acts per year, than we 
probably were, b ecause w e do n ‟t h ave th e sam e am o un t o f 
money as we used to…  [… ] We definitely look for artists 
that have built up their fan base already and have 
experience, because first and foremost, you get better with 
every sh o w … yes w e d efin itely w an t m o re seasoned road 
warriors to say the least…  (Interview #18) 
 
 This change of policy could be described as if the record labels outsource 
the talent development activity completely. During many years, smaller 
independent record labels have been acting as the research and development 
departments of the music industry (e.g. Burnett 1996; Wallis 1995). Smaller 
labels have often developed new artists or genres, which when they have 
reached commercial success, have been acquired by a major. Either the major 
has acquired the independent label in full or it has bought out a specific artist in 
the indie lab el‟s ro ster. During recent years this routine has been developed 
further by majors in the shape of „up stream  d eals‟ signed with the independent 
labels. (Interview #4; #18; #25) 
 An A&R director at a music publisher explains: 
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… [the labels] turn to not wanting to do any of the artist 
develo p m en t th em selves…  … labels are now signing 
p ro ductio n  deals w ith  p ro ducers an d  in dep en den t lab els…   
[… ]… every lab el w an ts to  do  w h at th ey call up stream 
deals… w h ere th ey sign  an  in dep en den t lab el an d if it is a 
ro ck b an d th ey‟ll let it go  in  th is little in die lab el first… th e 
indie label develops it…  … if it sells 50 ,000 or 100,000 
un its it gets up stream ed  to  th e m ajo r…  [… ] … and that is 
how a lot of different artist are working these days…  [… ] 
… th ey do n ‟t w an t sp en d th e m o n ey o n  studio  tim e as th ey 
used to … th ey d o n ‟t w an t to  give advan ces to  p ro ducers 
just to develop an artist even when th ey n eed to  gro w  …  
m ayb e o n  th eir seco n d  reco rd…  th e labels are not taking 
th o se ch an ces an ym o re… (Interview #10) 
 
 T h e m usic firm s‟ am b itio n  to  reduce risk  is not a new strategy in itself, 
sin ce risk m an agem en t is an  im p o rtan t p o in t o n  every decisio n  m aker‟s daily 
agenda. However, this section has described a number of strategic adjustments 
that show how music firms, and especially record labels, have reduced the RISK 
WILLINGNESS yet another notch. 
 
                                 
 
In short:  Work only with artists which already have a proven track record. 
Keep only artists in the roster that are persistently commercially 
successful. 
Rationale:  By avoiding risky projects, profit will more predictable, something 
which is appreciated by shareholders. 
Key variables:  RISK WILLINGNESS; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
DEVELOPMENT. 
Unintended side effect: As with all risk reduction strategies, by avoiding risk, the firm may 
also be avoidin g in n ovation , w hich is detrim en tal to th e firm ‟s lon g-
term sustainability. 
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8.5 These wounds are self-inflicted66 
The chapter has discussed four general themes in th e m usic firm ‟s resp o n se to 
changes in the media environment. First, music firms have revised their 
marketing strategies in order to cope with the decreased usefulness of broadcast 
media as a tool for promotion. Second, music firms have addressed new 
distribution technologies in order to maintain appropriability and to secure the 
value of their intellectual property portfolios. Third, music firms have increased 
the licensing of musical content to various outlets and purposes. This strategy 
has served as an answer to the increased demand for musical content, but it has 
also balanced the growing difficulty to reach appropriate audiences by the use 
of traditional promotional tools. Fourth, music firms have reduced their 
willingness to accept risk by backing away from the traditionally risky 
development of musical content. 
 It is possible to analyse the four strategic themes by applying the typology 
suggested by Miles & Snow (1978). None of the strategies can be categorised as 
proactive and forward-thinking. The strategies are all defensive responses to 
events that occurred outside the realm of the industry and all are focused on 
reducing risk and reducing cost rather than to increase revenues by aggressive 
pursuit of innovation and differentiation. Based on that observation it is clear 
that the firms that have launched the strategies discussed in this chapter should 
be categorized as defenders or maybe even as reactors, using the Miles & Snow 
typology. Following the discussion on page 56f regarding the character of 
copyright industries and the strategic adaptation processes which are most 
appropriate in those industries, it is possible to conclude that the strategies are 
not particularly well chosen in order to create a sustainable business in the 
music industry. Defenders are often unable to respond to major shifts in their 
environments, and the transformation of the media environment as presented 
in chapter 7 fits well in the „major shifts‟ category. 
 Another way to analyse the four strategic themes is to apply the 
understanding of strategic adaptation as organisational learning. All the 
strategies assume that the traditional logic and structure of the music industry 
still is valid. They assume that although the media environment is somewhat 
more difficult to work, and that although new distribution technologies make 
life a bit more cumbersome, in average, business models, basic structures and 
                                              
 
66 Inspired by the bridge in George M ichael’s Waiting For That Day, released as track #6 on Listen Without 
Prejudice Vol. 1 (Sony Music), in September, 1990. 
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core business still remain the same. The following statement gives a good 
illustration of their reasoning: „… let‟s p ush  th ese n ew  ch an n els, b ut w h at ab o ut 
our core business?! … How are we going to protect that?!‟ (In terview  # 12). This 
kind of organisational learning is best described as single-loop learning (Figure 
2.4 on page 59). Information is fed back from the environment and is affecting 
th e firm ‟s p o licies, structures an d rules, b ut th e decisio n  m akers‟ mental models 
remain intact. In the next chapter it will be shown how the traditional logic of 
the media environment has lost some of its relevance. The chapter will also 
argue that decision makers in music firms will not be able to make proper 
decisions nor will they be able to create sustainable businesses based on their 
traditional mental models of the media environment. 
 A further understanding on the four strategic themes can be attained by 
using the Music Industry Feedback Model. As has been stated numerous times 
in the text, the Audience-Media Engine is a decisive structure in the music 
business. In order for the artist, song, brand, etc, to be successful, the 
Audience-Media Engine has to be in synch with the activities of the music firm. 
However, when analysing the four strategies, it is possible to conclude that 
though all of them may seem rational in the short term, there are side-effects 
associated with at least three of the strategies, whose impact on the Audience-
M edia E n gin e is im p o ssib le to  n eglect. F irst, th e latter p h ase o f th e “Shout 
louder” strategy shrinks MEDIA PRESENCE since the MARKETING EFFORT is 
reduced and fo cused o n  a lim ited set o f artists. Seco n d, th e “Maintain 
appropriability” strategy lim its th e audien ces‟ ab ility to  access an d use th e firm ‟s 
products which in turn has a hampering effect on AUDIENCE ACTION. Finally, 
th e “Reduce risk” strategy m ay deterio rate th e attractiven ess o f th e firm ‟s IP 
portfolio. (The impact of the three strategies on the Audience-Media Engine is 
illustrated by Figure 6.7.) It is clear that the aggregated effect of the music 
firm s‟ strategic resp o n ses constitutes a considerable impediment to the 
dynamics of the Audience-Media Engine. Although the rationale behind all the 
strategies was to improve the performance of the music firm and to restore the 
firm ‟s p ro fitab ility, th e Music Industry Feedback Model shows that the effect of 
a major part of the strategies is the opposite. 
 
                                 
 
The presentations and analyses of the four strategic themes show that many 
music firms have not been able to cope with the changes in the media 
environment particularly well. First, the strategies are reactive and defensive 
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rather than proactive and innovative. Second, the strategies are associated with 
side-effects th at w o rk again st th e strategies‟ o rigin al p urp o se an d ratio n ale. 
Finally, the strategies indicate that they are based on mental models and 
presumptions of the industry system that has remained intact in spite of a 
radical development of the media environment. 
 The next chapter will continue from this analysis and further examine how 
the traditional logic and structures of media outlets have been overthrown. The 
chapter will explain why strategies based on the traditional logic are unable to 
solve the problems currently faced by this troubled copyright industry. 
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9  
Closing the gap 
The previous two chapters have reviewed the transformation of the media 
environment and analysed strategic adjustments made by music firms in order 
to cope with the new conditions. One of the closing remarks in chapter 8 was 
that the strategic themes which have been analysed so far indicate that merely 
single-loop learning has taken place in the boardrooms of the major music 
firms. The changes in the media environment have spurred considerable 
revisio n s o f th e m usic firm s‟ b usin ess strategies, b ut this study indicates that 
decisio n  m akers‟ m en tal m o dels nonetheless have remained intact. 
 This chapter will build on the analysis in the previous chapters and further 
examine the transformation of the media environment. A number of new 
media outlets will be discussed in order to illustrate the transformation of the 
media environment. Following the p resen tatio n  o f th e features o f th e “n ew ” 
media outlet structure, the impact of the transformation on the music firm will 
be examined. The chapter will also point at some examples where music firms 
actually have embraced the new logic and made strategic adaptations according 
to their revised understanding of the industry and the environment. 
 
9.1 The crucial gap 
According to the Music Industry Feedback Model, and particularly according to 
the structure labelled the Audience-Media Engine, th e artist‟s ability to be 
present in the media (MEDIA PRESENCE) spurs AUDIENCE ACTIONS, such as the 
purchase of an album or a song. Traditionally, there has been a certain set of 
media outlets with the purpose to expose the artist to the audience, and a 
distinctively different set of media outlets with the purpose to distribute the 
intellectual properties to the audience. Radio, television, and press have been 
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and still are members of the first set while sheet music, CDs and Compact 
Cassettes belong to the second set. All music listening, regardless if it is via a 
radio or a CD, is some kind of promotion which may stimulate th e co n sum ers‟ 
curiosity for more music (e.g. Interview #5). H o w ever, fro m  th e m usic firm ‟s 
point of view, the most important purpose of MEDIA PRESENCE is to spur the 
sales o f th e “co re p ro duct” w h ich  is th e audio recording. In contrast, the 
primary purpose of the CD is to deliver the music which is stored on the disc. 
There is nothing “after” the CD, a fact which also is illustrated by all the value 
chain models presented in section 3.1. 
 It is possible to further understand the two sets of media outlets by 
applying the concept of option value to the analysis (cf. p. 37). The music firm 
wants the option value of the first set to be high enough for consumers to start 
to appreciate the music. Since music is an experience good, the consumer has to 
be exposed to the music in order to be able to determine whether it is appealing 
or not. On the other hand, the music firm does not want the option value of 
the first set of media outlets to be anywhere close to the option value of the 
second set. Measured on an “o p tio n  value sp ectrum ”, th ese tw o  sets h ave to  b e 
distanced from each other; otherwise the consumers will not be motivated to 
spend their monies buying the same music they have already heard on another 
medium.  
 The pricing of the music placed on different media outlets is also 
depending on the option value. The higher the option value, the higher the 
consumer price. The music available at the lower end of the option value 
spectrum (browsing at the record store, listening to the radio, etc) is usually 
available to the consumer at no charge at all.  
 The strategies discussed in the previous chapter have a strong focus on 
strengthening this linear structure and to keep the distance between the two sets 
of media outlets at a comfortable range. However, as was discussed in chapter 
7, changes in the media environment have increased the number of media 
outlets considerably, and many of these new outlets do not fit well into the two 
traditional sets. In the next section, examples of such outlets will be presented.  
 
9.2 Disruptive media outlets 
The title of this section is leaning against Christensen‟s (1997) co n cep t o f 
„disrup tive tech n o lo gies‟. D isrup tive tech n o lo gies are in n o vatio n s, p ro ducts, 
services, that overthrow existing technologies in a market. Examples of 
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disruptive technologies are the CD, and of course of significantly greater 
importance, the steam engine or the automobile. It is still too early to claim that 
the technologies that underpin the media outlets discussed in this section are 
truly disruptive, but the evidence is certainly mounting. 
 The media outlets discussed below have been chosen on the basis of them 
b ein g “n ew ” in  so m e sen se. “N ew  m edia” is a slip p ery co n cep t, and the present 
study will not expound on its formal definition67. However, the outlets 
discussed below are at least enabled by digital technologies and based on 
business models which are incompatible with the linear media outlet structure 
discussed above. 
 The outlets presented in this section are also all legal and sanctioned by the 
media and music industry establishment. One might argue that the most 
important disruptive media outlets are the ones used for unsanctioned and 
illegal content distribution, such as various peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, 
online communities and instant messaging services. Indeed, it seems as online 
piracy have severely damaged the legitimate music industry (cf. pp. 79ff), but it 
remains to be seen whether this development will continue and eventually 
terminate the music industry once and for all. However, official sales data from 
2005 suggest that this is not the case. The decrease of the size of the global 
market of recorded music has been slowed down during 2005 and a legitimate 
online music market begins to take shape (IFPI 2005; 2006b; 2006c). In the 
light of such a development it makes sense to examine those ventures which 
have been able to create legitimate and viable businesses. The legitimate online 
music services are now both plentiful and relatively well-established. In January 
2006 there were 335 legal online music services in operation worldwide, and 
online music sales constituted approximately 6 percent of the global recording 
industry‟s to tal reven ues (IFPI 2006c). It is these services that will determine 
the structure of the virtualised music industry. Therefore, it is these services, 
and not the illegal services, that will be presented and discussed in the sections 
below. 
 The presentation of the media outlets has been structured depending on 
the business model which is used: The first catego ry is „Stream in g m edia 
services‟; both advertising funded and subscription funded. Next, services with 
a b usin ess m o del w h ich  I ch o o se to  catego rise as „Single-song-do w n lo ad‟ w ill 
                                              
 
67 Useful definitions of “new  m edia” and related concepts are found in Bolter & Grusin (1999) and in Lister, 
Dovey, Giddings, Grant & Kelly (2003). 
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be presented. Lastly, services which use the business model I call th e „m usic 
ren tal m o del‟ will be discussed. 
 
Streaming media services –  advertising funded 
One way to distribute media files across the Internet is to first transmit the 
entire file to the users, who have to wait for the file to be downloaded before 
they can savour the media content. This may sometimes be rather cumbersome 
since the users often have to wait a considerable time before the whole media 
file is completely downloaded. Streaming media services use another approach 
to media distribution. The transmitting end sends the media file in short 
fragments; usually of a length of a few seconds. The receiving end is able to 
view or hear these fragments as they are downloaded, and does not have to wait 
until the entire file is harboured in the receiving device (computer, PDA, 
telephone, etc). Since the users only have to wait for the first fragment to be 
downloaded, they can use the content with a time lag of merely a few seconds 
from the start of the transmission. 
 In the first half of the 1990s, radio stations and computer enthusiasts 
started to experiment with technologies based on the streaming media concept. 
They used the technologies to distribute content which was exclusively 
purposed for Internet distribution or they retransmitted the feed which also was 
broadcasted via analogue broadcast networks. As Internet infrastructure and 
computing technologies developed and became increasingly accessible, the 
number of services based on the streaming concept multiplied. Traditional 
media broadcasters now increasingly use the Internet to retransmit parts of 
their original programming. Although these Internet based radio and television 
services is yet unable to challenge the traditional broadcast media when it 
comes to their ratings (Arbitron 2005; Carlsson 2004; Ofcom 2004), the new 
outlets are one significant part of the fragmentation of the media environment 
discussed in section 7.1. 
 Another flavour of these services is a bit more advanced than the 
b ro adcasters‟ traditional point-to-multipoint services. There are for instance 
music services which allow the listener to influence the content which is 
transmitted by the service. Some services (e.g. http://www.spraydio.com), 
allo w  th e user to  w ish  fo r a so n g w h ich  even tually is added to  th e service‟s 
playlist. Other more advanced services (e.g. http://www.pandora.com) allow 
the listeners to create their own personal streaming media service based on their 
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musical tastes. The listener is urged to grade the songs and the artists which are 
played by the service. This information is then used to generate a “taste profile” 
which is individual to each listener. Some of these services compare the 
listener‟s profile to the aggregated profiles of other listeners. They are thereby 
able to predict how individual listeners would react to a specific song, before 
they have actually heard it. This recommendation technique is known as 
collaborative filtering and has been used in many commercial and non-commercial 
Internet services to give personal recommendations to a user, based on 
aggregated information from other users of the same service (e.g. Rahman & 
Bignell 2001). 
 One of these services is Yahoo! Music, which before being acquired by 
Yahoo! was known as Launch. As with many commercial streaming media 
services, the basic version of Yahoo! Music, which offers the lowest option 
value, is funded by advertising and is free to the user. The more times a listener 
is using the service, the better the service will be at adding songs which the 
listener will appreciate. Consequently, the active user who invests in the service 
by frequently adding information to their profile will get a service which is 
providing an increasingly higher value. 
 This service structure generates a considerable degree of listener loyalty 
since the effort invested by the user to create a taste profile is not easily 
transferable to another competing music service. H en ce, th e listen er‟s switching 
cost is considerable in comparison to traditional music based broadcast services 
where the co n sum er‟s switching cost is negligible (cf. p. 52). This vendor lock-
in, allows the service provider to be more experimental when determining 
w h ich  so n gs actually sh o uld b e added  to  th e listen er‟s p laylist. The service 
provider can be relatively assured that the user will not immediately leave the 
service simply because she or he does not appreciate a particular song on the 
playlist. F ro m  th e m usic firm ‟s p ersp ective th is o p en s up  a greater o p p o rtun ity 
to expose new music to the audience, compared to the traditional broadcast 
services which are only willing to accept a very low level of risk due to their 
listen ers‟ co n siderab le vo latility (cf. section 7.1). 
 Currently, the three dominating global Internet portals (Yahoo!, MSN, and 
AOL68) all have music services with a structure similar to what has been 
described above. The significance of these services as tastemakers is growing in 
importance, at the expense of traditional media such as terrestrial broadcast 
radio (Isquith 2005). Building on the option value reasoning above, it is clear 
                                              
 
68 http://music.yahoo.com; http://music.aol.com; http://music.msn.com. 
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that these individualised streaming media services provide a greater option 
value than traditional broadcast services, but not as high as when listeners 
actually own a physical copy of the song which they are able to play anywhere, 
anytime. Individualised streaming media services, based on collaborative 
filtering are consequently an example where new media outlets reduce the 
distance between the two sets (exposure and distribution) of media outlets. It is 
not immediately clear to which set the services actually belong. While the 
services are able to expose new music to an audience in a way which is more 
efficient compared to traditional broadcast media, they are also able to satisfy the 
musical demand of a greater part of the audience. In other words, the services 
are both increasing and decreasing the demand for traditionally distributed 
music, and th e aggregated effect o n  th e “co re business” o f th e m usic in dustry is 
consequently difficult to determine. 
 
Streaming media services –  subscription funded 
The services discussed above are mainly funded by advertising, but other 
business models are also used among providers of streaming media services. 
One such business model is the subscription model, where the user pays a 
monthly fee to access the service. Providers of streaming media services often 
offer different versions of their services: A basic version which is free to the 
user and financed by advertising and an enhanced version which is offered as a 
subscription service (Shapiro & Varian 1999). Subscription funded streaming 
media services are available both via the Internet and via other distribution 
technologies, such as cable, satellite or terrestrial broadcast networks. The 
services distrib uted b y “n o n -In tern et” tech n o lo gies are un ab le to  match the 
level of personalisation offered by corresponding services available via the 
Internet. Instead, these services (e.g. XM Satellite Radio; Music Choice; Sirius 
Satellite Radio) compete by offering exclusive content of high technical quality 
accessible on the go (Interview #7). Internet-based subscription streaming 
media services are fundamentally identical to the services described in the 
previous section, but the content is usually offered with a better technical 
quality and without some of the restrictions which are put on the advertising 
funded version of the services.  
 The removal of the advertiser from the business model changes the 
fundamental logic behind the programming of these services. The risk aversion 
which is associated to the programming of advertising funded media is lessened 
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since revenues from subscription fees are more stable and predictable than 
revenues from advertisers (e.g. Picard 2002). This enables these services to be 
even more experimental, and their ability to break new artists is enhanced. In 
the US, satellite based subscription radio has earned considerable attention 
from the music industry, and the expectations among the music promoters and 
marketers are high: 
 
… n o w  go  to  satellite [radio], consumers are paying a 
m o n th ly fee, th ere are n o  co m m ercials… an d  D Js h ave full 
range to decide w h at th ey are go in g to  p lay… an d yo u h ear 
so m e great m usic, so m e very excitin g n ew  m usic, yo u‟ll 
hear new bands which is very difficult to get on 
contemporary traditional broadcast radio…  (Interview 
#31) 
 
 Subscription based streaming media services (or radio), either on or off the 
Internet, is yet another kind of media outlet which does not fit into the 
traditional media outlet structure. On the option value spectrum, the services 
are positioned in between the two poles (exposure and distribution), and can be 
considered as members of both sets. As with the services discussed in the 
previous section, the subscription based services are able to satisfy a portion of 
the music audience who enjoy music but are happy without actually purchasing 
the songs on a piece of plastic. 
 
Single-song download services 
While the two previous examples of media outlets can be considered as 
extensions fro m  th e set o f „exp o sure m edia o utlets‟, other new media outlets 
have closer links to th e o th er set; th e „distribution m edia o utlets‟. One such 
example is the sales and distribution of individual songs via online services such 
as iTunes and eMusic69. The business models in these services are relatively 
straightforward with only some slight variations. The services offer songs which 
the user, after the purchase, is able use rather liberally. The users are able to 
copy the song to a limited number of CDs, and they are able to listen to the 
                                              
 
69 http://www.itunes.com, http://www.emusic.com 
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song from a computer, from a hi-fi stereo system, from various portable 
devices, etc. 
 Of all the online services that use this business model, Apple iTunes Music 
Store is certainly the brightest shining star. iTunes is an online service which at 
the time of writing carries more than 3 million songs; 16,000 audio books; 3,000 
music videos and hundreds of television shows and movies in their catalogue. 
The service is developed and operated by the computer manufacturer Apple. 
Although iTunes uses the single-song-download business model, the service 
should more accurately be described as only a small part of a larger business 
model which also includes other Apple products. The product with closest links 
to iTunes is the iPod, a portable media player developed and marketed by 
Apple. The combination of iTunes and iPod has been able to achieve an 
incredible level of success: In December 2005, music sales on iTunes 
constituted more than 80 percent of the global legal online music market and 
iPod sales constituted 75 percent of the portable media player market. Since the 
launch of the iTunes service in 2003 more than 1 billion songs have been sold 
and since the launch of the iPod in 2001 more than 45 million media players 
have been sold worldwide. (Jobs 2006) 
 Different single-song download services have opted for somewhat varying 
pricing structures. Some of the services (e.g. iTunes), offer individual songs or 
albums at a fixed price, and just as in any brick-and-mortar record store, the 
users are able to browse the catalogue and listen to short pieces of the songs 
free of charge, and purchase the items they like. Another pricing model offers 
the downloading of a certain number of songs at a monthly fee (e.g. eMusic). 
The fee is paid by the subscribers regardless if they use their monthly quota or 
not. Other variations of the concept include mobile access to the service. This 
particular technology has gained considerable attention from the music 
industry, primarily since the easy access enables impulse purchase of songs 
anytime, anyplace (e.g. Hirschman 2006). 
 Just as the music industry is hopeful about the streaming media services as 
a new way to establish a MEDIA PRESENCE, the hopes and expectations among 
music industry decision makers about Internet based music distribution is 
massive. The IFPI ch airm an  Jo h n  K en n edy sum m arises th e in dustry‟s 
expectations on the new distribution technologies when he exclaims that „we 
expect to see continued growth online and more innovative mobile services 
attracting music fans into the legal digital market‟ (IF P I 2006b ). The revenues 
from these new outlets have to some extent been able to compensate for the 
limping CD business (e.g. IFPI 2006b; 2006c). The structure of the services is 
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also relatively similar to traditional music business models, which makes the 
concept easy to understand and accept for the conventional music industry 
decision maker. 
 Single-song download services seem to develop into yet another 
distribution technology, next to the CD, Compact Cassette, etc. The services 
may have a tremendous impact on several parts of the music industry, 
particularly those previously involved in physical music distribution, but also 
those parts concerning for instance the relationship between the artist and the 
music firm. However, although the impact of these services is considerable in 
some aspects, the services play a less significant role in the fundamental 
transformation of the media outlet structure discussed in this chapter. The 
option value offered by the single-song download services is similar to the 
option value of the traditional physical distribution technologies. Consequently 
their impact on the traditional two-set media outlet structure is limited. 
 
Music rental services 
While the challenge from single-song download services to the traditional 
media outlet structure is minor, there are other music services which play a 
more disruptive role. One such service category offers access to a large music 
library at a monthly fee (e.g. Napster, Urge or Rhapsody70). The subscriber is 
then able to download and listen to an unlimited number of songs from that 
library. As with songs downloaded from single-song download services, the 
user is able to listen to the songs from the computer, from a hi-fi stereo system, 
or from a portable device. The snag is that the license associated to the 
acquisition of the songs is tied to the subscription to the service. If the users 
terminate their subscription, the songs on their computers or portable devices 
will within a short period of time be useless and impossible to listen to. 
 Music rental services also come in a slightly different flavour which collect 
revenues from advertising rather than from monthly fees paid by the users (e.g. 
SpiralFrog71). The users consequently “p ay” fo r th e service b y b ein g exp o sed to  
commercial messages on a web site which they are required to visit regularly (at 
                                              
 
70 The services are available at http://www.napster.com, http://www.urge.com and 
http://www.rhapsody.com. The versions of these services which allow the transfer of songs to portable 
devices are branded as Napster-To-Go, Urge-All-Access-To-Go and Rhapsody-To-Go. 
71 http://www.spiralfrog.com 
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least on a monthly basis) in order for the downloaded content to stay active and 
working.  
 These services, regardless of flavour, create a completely new relationship 
between listeners and their music collections. By subscribing to a music rental 
service, the listener immediately gets access to a music collection which literally 
includes millions of songs. However, the option value of those songs is 
somewhat lower compared to the traditional music distribution technologies. 
The music industry decision makers greet these rental services positively but 
with a slight hesitation: 
 
… from a content owners perspective, one of the issues I 
think we all have is that if you as a consumer can rent 
music and take it with you and basically have as much 
m usic as yo u w an t fo r o n e m o n th ly fee…  … th en  h o w  
does that impact the sales of CDs? … how does that 
impact the sale of [single-song] downloads?…  …  o n e th in g 
that we have to ensure as a content owner is that we get 
the right price and closely monitor how these business 
models will impact other products of ours, other business 
models, because it would be great if we got a large 
percentage of the population to subscribe to the music 
services [… ], but again if that product completely replaces 
[… ] the need to buy music and own music as traditionally 
has been the case –  if they move from an ownership to a 
ren tal m o del…  [… ] maybe if the price is right the rental 
model will be great for the music industry and we would 
not have to worry about selling music for ownership 
p urp o ses an y m o re …  (Interview #36) 
 
  Music industry decision makers, such as the informant above, are basically 
worried about what would happen if every household stops buying music “the 
traditional way” and starts subscribing to music rental services. The hesitation 
which is expressed is based on the assumption that such a change would reduce 
the total size of the industry of recorded music to merely a fraction of its 
current size. Currently it is sufficient to conclude that music rental services 
constitute yet an example of a media outlet which is difficult to fit in the 
traditional media outlet structure. 
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 The remaining sections in this chapter will make conclusions regarding the 
transformation of the media environment, and its impact on music firms as 
manifested by the new outlets discussed above. 
 
9.3 A different logic 
The primary purpose of the outlets presented above is not easily defined as 
either exposure or distribution. As has already been stated, all music listening, 
regardless if it is via a radio or a CD, is some kind of promotion which may 
stim ulate th e co n sum ers‟ curio sity fo r m o re m usic (e.g. In terview  # 5). 
However, the new media outlets are also able to satisfy a greater portion of the 
audien ce‟s dem an d  fo r m usic th an  traditio n al mass media. This means that with 
the introduction of the new media outlets, the fraction of the audience who will 
be motivated to actually purchase the music on CDs, Compact Cassettes, 
DVDs, and nota bene, via single-song downloads, etc, shrinks.  
 The informants who participated in the study perceive this process very 
differently. Some decision makers in the traditional copyright firms do not 
recognise the change as particularly significant: 
 
There is no risk that the development of radio will make 
people stop buying music. People want to have immediate 
access, want to be able to listen to their favourite song 
fifteen times in a row. That is not possible yet. The 
problem arrives when you get on-demand music for free. 
That is not available yet, well yes from Yahoo Launch, but 
otherwise not. As long as you separate on-demand media 
from streaming media there will not be any risk that people 
will stop buying records. (Interview #29) 
 
 Free (and legal) on-demand music may still be rare, but there certainly are a 
number of services available which offer musical content on-demand to users 
for free. Both Yahoo! Music and Napster offer on-demand music for free 
(advertising funded) under relatively liberal access conditions. At the time of 
writing, other advertising funded services such as Qtrax, SpiralFrog and 
YouTube have recently signed agreements with major music firms which will 
enable them to offer on-demand content to users for free (e.g. SpiralFrog 2006; 
YouTube 2006). In addition, communication infrastructure providers (e.g. 
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Vodafone –  UK, 3 –  Hong Kong, or SK Telecom –  South Korea) bundle 
musical content with their offerings. A person who is subscribing to their 
telephony services may also get access to an extensive music library. Clearly, the 
informant cited above has slightly misjudged the state of the media 
environment, since the services he considers merely as a distant threat already 
are present and available to consumers. 
 Another informant makes a considerably more radical interpretation of the 
disruptive role of the new media outlets: 
 
… yes th ere is a b lurrin g o f th e lin es b etw een  a Napster-To-
Go and a digital radio station and a satellite radio station, 
these are just kind of just similar items, but where they 
contrast to traditional terrestrial radio is in their purpose…  
their purpose is not to drive sales of something else, as a 
record company you are just happy your song was played 
an d listen ed to … th at gen erated in co m e…  p erio d…  there 
do esn ‟t h ave to  b e an yth in g p ast th at…  … that is the 
reven ue…  … n o w , talk to  p eo p le at lab els an d th ey m ay 
not completely have got their head around this concept but 
as it begins to proliferate, these small pennies, which 
accumulate every time there is a listen, where there is a 
stream, begin to look like a substantial revenue stream, and 
th en  th ey w ill actually start to  treat it differen tly…   … righ t 
now they just looking at it as, “here is one more way to put 
it out there to sell our records”, but that is really not 
necessary true in  a w o rld five o r ten  years fro m  n o w …  
(Interview #20) 
 
 The two statements cited above manifest two very different mental models 
of the media environment and the workings of the music firm. While the 
former is holding on to the traditional structure, the latter informant is 
describing a system which is radically different. The latter mental model 
describes a logic where revenues do not primarily come from the sales of songs 
or albums, but where the primary revenues are generated by royalties from the 
use and playing of songs in various media outlets. In other words, the 
informant is envisioning a music industry which is dominated by a music 
publisher logic rather than a record label logic. The rising importance of 
revenues from royalties has already been discussed in the text, however, in that 
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earlier analysis the increase in revenues has been described as merely a positive 
but minor side-effect from the transformation of the media environment. The 
analysis in this chapter shows that the change is more profound since the 
increase in revenues should not be considered as an add-on to the existing 
business but as a substitution of the existing business. The core product of the 
music industry is to a lesser degree the song or album sold to a consumer, and 
to a greater degree a license sold to a media outlet. 
 This change is received differently by different music firms depending on 
the focus of the specific firm. The record label, which is focused on the sales of 
CDs, and similar products, perceives the new logic as a threat. In the statement 
below, a record label representative talks indirectly about the difficulty of 
managing media outlets aimed for distribution versus outlets aimed for 
exposure: 
 
… th e o th er th in g  that the record companies need to start 
thinking about is that maybe the limited [radio] playlists are 
quite a good thing…  because [… ] if you had access to all 
this wonderful content, [… ]…  yo u m igh t b e disin cen tive 
to subscribe a music service or buy [the album]…  so  at th e 
moment they should rightly campaign on variety but you 
never know it might be in their best interest to stop that…  
… if the radio station wants to play the most popular fifty 
so n gs o ver an d o ver again , fin e let th em  do  th at…  
(Interview #12) 
 
 The informant contemplates how the music industry should act in order to 
keep the two traditional sets of media outlets distinctively separated. In other 
words, his statement can be interpreted as an illustration of the traditional 
mental model. As a contrast, the blurring of the two sets is both recognised and 
quite well received by music publishers who are slowly being reinstated as the 
main character in the music industrial drama. A music publisher is pondering 
on the situation: 
 
… I th in k p ub lish ers h ave th e advan tage…  … th ey‟ve b een  
in the rights business for a very long time…  … [publishers] 
are used to adapting to new streams and new models in a 
way the record industry has to  learn  fo r th e first tim e…  
… that business has been so focused on selling plastic, and 
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it has taken them time to realise that they also operate in 
the rights business. (Interview #5) 
 
 The question of how copyright firms should adapt to a changing media 
environment is essential to this study. According to this informant, the record 
labels are less capable to adapt to the new media environment, while music 
publishers are more able to cope with the transformation. In the previous 
chapter, strategies based on the old logic were discussed and critiqued. The 
chapter showed that the strategies were either focused on how to expose 
personalities and musical content in an effective way, or how to ensure that the 
media presence encouraged consumers to purchase music at the distribution 
outlets assigned by the industry. This chapter continues from that analysis and 
shows that the reason w h y th ese strategies are un ab le to  so lve th e reco rd lab els‟ 
problems is that there is a “n ew ” m edia o utlet structure w h ich  differs 
sign ifican tly fro m  th e “o ld”. In order to be able to craft strategies which can 
deal with this new situation, decision makers have to challenge their old mental 
models, and engage in double-loop learning (cf. section 2.7). 
 There are examples of music firms who have launched strategic initiatives 
which seem to be based on a new understanding of the media outlet structure. 
Some of these examples will be discussed in the section below. 
 
9.4 A music publishing renaissance? 
„I think anyone who loses is anyone who tries to protect their traditional 
business. I think you‟ve got a bad 10 to 15 years ahead of you if you try to do 
that‟ (Chernin 2006). The statem en t w as uttered b y o n e o f th e w o rld‟s m o st 
influential media executives, Peter Chernin, president of News Corp. Most of 
the strategies discussed in the previous chapter were intended to protect the 
m usic firm s‟ traditio n al b usin esses. In this section, a number of less defensive 
initiatives will be discussed. The initiatives indicate that they are based on an 
understanding of the media environment which differs from traditional mental 
models. It should be noted though, that while these strategies at least so far 
seem to be successful (from a commercial standpoint), it is possible that they 
are not at all based on careful thinking but simply are the fruition of plain luck 
and good timing. 
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Everything is core business 
If a music fan in the beginning of the last century wanted to listen to music, she 
most likely had to play the music herself. She probably learned about music 
from friends, or by listening to music at the local bandstands and vaudevilles. 
When she heard a song that she liked, she bought the sheet music at the local 
stationery store, in order to play the piece on the piano in her living room. 
 The centre of gravity in the industry which produced the sheet music was 
located on 28th Street between Broadway and Sixth Avenue in New York City. 
In this area, often referred to as Tin Pan Alley72, offices of music publishing 
companies were packed wall to wall. In some rooms, songwriters wrote tunes at 
a piano, in another room a lyricist were trying to come up with new catchy 
phrases and somewhere else in the building, promoters were peddling the songs 
to vaudeville performers, in the hope that the songs would be picked up and 
used in  th eir n ext sh o w s. T h e p ub lish ers w ere in  th e driver‟s seat, co n tro llin g 
the intellectual properties, and actively seeking new songwriters and outlets 
where their songs could be displayed73. (E.g. Barfe 2004; Poe 1997) 
 The world has changed in many ways since the days of Tin Pan Alley, and 
so has the music industry. The gramophone, radio and film completely changed 
the world of entertainment and created the industry which is in the focus of this 
study. Sheet music is since long pushed into the periphery, and recorded music 
has supplanted its previous position as the core business of the music industry. 
However, the process discussed in the previous sections is once again 
transforming the structure of the industry. Parts of the value chain that 
previously were hidden to the audience or only considered as means to support 
the sales of audio recordings have suddenly become as important as the audio 
recordings themselves. This section will point at three manifestations of this 
phenomenon. 
 The first example shows how the A&R process has been branded, made 
public, and transformed into a revenue generating media event. Pop Idol and 
other similar televised talent shows (e.g. Fame Academy, Fame Factory, and 
Pop Star) have since the beginning of this millennium evolved into well-
established brands and profitable businesses74. As most unscripted television 
shows, these are not particularly well-respected by artists w ith  “cred ” or by the 
                                              
 
72 The nam e “Tin Pan Alley” w as originally a reference to the sound m ade by m any pianos all playing different 
tunes in this small area, producing a cacophony comparable to banging on tin pans.  
73 A short history of the international music history is presented in Appendix 1. 
74 A compelling case study of the US version of Pop Idol (American Idol), is given by Jenkins (2006: 59-92). 
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n atio n s‟ cultural elites (e.g. Hansson 2004; Svenska Dagbladet 2004). However, 
the shows receive high ratings in all three nations and make good economic 
sense to the parties involved. Broadcasters are happy since the format attracts 
an audience that advertisers are willing to purchase. Music firms are also happy 
since they are able to find talented personalities. Most importantly, the 
Audience-Media Engine is kick-started since these personalities become well-
known among the mainstream audience before the actual start of their musical 
careers. The format also allows the producers (e.g. the broadcaster, the telecom 
operator, and the music firm) to extend the show to products such as 
videogames, DVDs, websites, merchandise and live performances. (E.g. Deans 
2004; Guardian 2003) 
 One of the more successful formats, Pop Idol, co-owned by 
Fremantle Media and 19 Entertainment (UK), has been commissioned and 
produced in 32 territories around the world. It has been watched by an 
audience of 110 million, and since the launch of the programme in the UK in 
2001, 1.7 billion telephony votes have been cast by viewers around the world. 
Performers, who remain in the show until the end of the season, are offered a 
studio recording contract and possibly also marketing support by the 
participating music firm. An album is released and available in stores 
immediately after the final show. So far the media presence stirred by the show 
has been able to bring every winner‟s alb um  immediately to the top tier of the 
n atio n ‟s w eekly ch art. (http://www.freemantlemedia.com) 
 Some of the talents scouted during these shows, for instance Kelly 
Clarkson, Carrie Underwood, Darin Zanyar, Agnes Carlsson, Will Young, 
Gareth Gates, and many others, have had a strong development of their 
careers. For instance, Kelly Clarkson (US) was the winner of American Idol in 
2002. Her two albums since her Pop Idol appearance have been commercial 
successes and the last album received two US Grammy awards in February 
2006. Clarkson is the only Idol personality that has been able to expand her 
career beyond the national borders. Darin Zanyar (SE) and Will Young (UK) 
both have been able to launch careers that span more than one album. Young 
has received several Brit Awards and Zanyar received a Swedish Grammy in 
February 2006. However, neither Young nor Zanyar has been able to take the 
step from national recognition to international stardom. (http://www.bpi.co.uk; 
http://www.riaa.org; http://www.ifpi.se) 
 These talent shows are interesting examples of multimedia productions 
based on a complex business model and involving numerous media channels. 
However, the phenomenon will not in itself have a significant impact on the 
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workings of the music industry. The format has simply not room for more than 
one or possibly two new personalities per year and territory, and that is of 
co urse n o t en o ugh  to  sustain  an  en tire in dustry. It is also  likely th at th e fo rm at‟s 
repetitive structure eventually will wear down the current interest from the 
audience. While the show in the beginning of 2006 was still hugely successful in 
both  Sw eden  an d  th e U S, sign s fro m  th e U K  in dicate th e fo rm at‟s ap p ro ach in g 
demise (Deans 2006). However, though Pop Idol and its siblings may be unable 
to sustain the entire music industry, the productions are illustrative examples of 
how music firms are able to make good business by embracing the logic of the 
new media environment (Gibson 2006).  
 Another example of how the music industry is able to establish viable 
business models by converging with other copyright industries is found in the 
videogame domain. It has already been discussed in the text how music firms 
work with the videogame industry, both as a user and a promoter of music. 
However, there are other examples where the collaboration between music 
firms and videogame producers has been developed even further. During the 
production of their album Monkey Business in 2004, the Los Angeles based Hip-
Hop group Black Eyed Peas (A&M Records/Cherry Lane Music Publishing) 
collaborated with the videogame producer Electronic Arts and the videogame 
the Urbz: Sims in the City (Interscope 2004). The music publisher explains the 
general thinking of the project: 
 
… beside just licensing some tracks to the game we were 
actually having the band members as characters inside the 
gam e… w e lo aded th e gam e w ith  n in e so n gs in  Sim ilish75…  
… So we used the game as a launching pad for their next 
alb um  called M o n key B usin ess… an d th ere w as tracks fro m  
Monkey Business put into the Urbz game and we tied in 
iTunes as when you purchased the album in iTunes you 
got four free Similish  so n gs as w ell…  … so we really 
looked at it as a full turn key promotion instead of just 
seein g it as “L et‟s see h o w  m uch  m o n ey w e can  get fo r 
p uttin g in  th e m usic”…  (Interview #31) 
 
                                              
 
75 ‘Sim ilish’ is the language used by the characters in the Electronic Arts videogame franchise ‘the Sim s’. 
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 The music manager at Electronic Arts working with the project explains 
how intimately the videogames producer was involved in the production 
process: 
 
… we get invited by the artist to the studio to listen to the 
songs, maybe change the lyrics if they are not politically 
correct…  … I sp en t like, I do n ‟t kn o w  h o w  m an y h o urs, 
with the Black Eyed Peas in the studio, because they said 
“W e want to be in the game, what do we need to do, what 
does the song need to sound like?”…  (Interview #17) 
 
 Though this project is very different from the televised talent shows 
discussed earlier, both phenomena are examples of how the changing media 
environment transforms the core business of the music firm. While the core 
business previously was the selling of audio recordings to a mass audience, the 
new core business is to contribute in the production of multimedia products 
based on complex business models, multiple media channels and multiple 
revenue streams. 
 The third and very noticeable example of the core business transformation 
is different than the previous two, since it does not involve any aspect of media 
convergence. Due to the development of various media technologies, the music 
video has attained a value which is greater than merely promotional. As Figure 
8.1 (p. 166) shows, the sales of music videos are beginning to make a trace in 
the global sales statistics76. This statistics are only showing sales of physical 
products, but in addition, the online music retailer Apple iTunes started selling 
music videos acco rdin g to  th e “sin gle-song download” m o del to the US and 
UK market during 2005. Further, in September 2006, Warner Music signed a 
deal with the video sharing service YouTube to allow YouTube users to view 
Warn er‟s m usic video s fo r free, w h ile W arn er an d Y o uT ub e sh are th e reven ues 
generated from advertising (YouTube 2006). 
 The recognition of the music video as a valuable copyright product in itself 
rather than merely a tool for promotion, has spurred some music firms to move 
the costs of music video productions from the marketing budgets to the 
production budgets. From an outside point of view, this revised accounting 
practice is primarily of symbolic importance but essentially underscores the 
                                              
 
76 The sales of music videos illustrated in Figure 8.1 do not only include the sales of promotional videos, but 
also other kinds of music related videos, such as live concert videos. 
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process which is in progress. It shows yet again how the traditional business 
models based on a two-set media outlet structure become obsolete and how a 
multitude of other more complicated business models take its place. 
 Conclusively, the three examples presented in this section illustrate how 
activities that in the past were considered merely as activities supporting the core 
business now are viewed in a different light. Previously, activities and objects 
such as the ones discussed above were considered as means to create media 
presence, to achieve exposure, which then were supposed to generate sales of 
the core product, that is to say the audio recording. In the new media 
environment, revenues immediately generated from these tools for exposure are 
growing in importance while revenues from the sales of audio recordings are 
falling in significance. 
 
Music publishers challenge the record labels‟ dom ain  
The increasing importance of revenues from various forms of music licensing 
has raised the significance of the music publisher at the record label‟s expense. 
The music publisher which since many decades have been reduced to the 
reco rd lab el‟s side-kick, have regained some of its original weight. This process 
has been predicted by several scholars, for instance by Wallis (1995), but the 
change is no longer in the future but is rather a matter-of-fact. Several 
observations show how the role of the publisher is changing. This study has 
already reported how revenues from performance and synchronization royalties 
increase while revenues from mechanical royalties decrease. What is also 
in terestin g is h o w  tasks th at p revio usly w ere a p art o f th e reco rd lab el‟s do m ain  
increasingly are performed by music publishers. One such example is the 
control of the master recording77. Traditionally, music publishers have only 
been controlling the composition and the lyrics on behalf of the song-writer 
while the record label has been controlling the actual recording on behalf of the 
performer. During recent years it has become increasingly common that artists 
employ a music publisher to control not only the composition but also the 
recording. This enables the music publisher to act in new ways. The music 
publisher is able to license the recording to various purposes, without the need 
to involve a record label. Since music licensing is the core business of the music 
publisher, the publisher is often more capable and motivated than a licensing 
                                              
 
77 A master recording is an original recording from which copies may be made. 
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department at the record label in getting the most licensing monies out of a 
certain intellectual property.  
 
… th ere is a n eed to  exp lo it th e m aster sid e as w ell… it is 
not very different from the publishing side when you come 
to think about things as synchronization and even some 
new media…  [… ] … so we then have to put on our record 
label h at fo r a little w h ile…  … so  essen tially it‟s a 
n ecessity… fo r o ur clien ts th ey n eed so m eo n e to  lo o k after 
both sides and why not have us do it…  … it makes 
sen se…  [… ] … b ein g in  co n tro l o f p ub lish in g an d th e 
master side is very helpful, particularly in the new media 
w h ere co m p an ies w an t to  deal w ith  o n e en tity…  
(Interview #31) 
 
 The control of the master recording also enables the music publisher to act 
as a record label in other areas than the licensing domain. The decreased risk 
willingness among some music firms, especially record labels, has made the 
lab els‟ A & R  process slow and bureaucratic (Interview #14). Some music 
publishers have reacted to the record lab els‟ revised A & R  strategies by cutting 
the labels completely out of the loop and to release the records themselves (e.g. 
Interview #4). When physical distribution is required in a project, the music 
publisher may contract a record label to handle distribution, but if the song is to 
be exclusively distributed via the Internet, no involvement whatsoever from a 
label is required. 
 Other similar trends are discernable among music publishers. For instance, 
when record labels are reluctant to invest in new performer talent, 
opportunities have been opened up to music publishers. Some publishers have 
decided to nourish inexperienced p erfo rm er‟s careers in  a way which is similar 
to traditional record label activities: 
 
… I th in k yo u really h ave to  go  b ack to  th e days o f th e B rill 
Building years and the Tin Pan Alley, when there was no 
record labels because there were no records yet…  … the 
publishers were actually the promotional force behind the 
artist, because there was no medium outside the piano roll 
and the sheet music and it was the publishers that sort of 
peddled, they went door to door and promoted…  [… ] 
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… th e reco rd lab els cam e in  an d th en  th at kind of 
sign ifican tly ch an ged…  … .they took over that role of 
peddling and promoting acts…  … and now I view it as 
trying to go back, to a certain degree…  (Interview #31) 
 
 Conclusively; not only is the revenue stream from the licensing business 
growing in importance, in addition, the role of the music publishers is changing 
and is challenging the traditional domain of the record labels. While the record 
labels are on the retreat, music publishers are on the advance, and it is no 
longer obvious where the line between a record label and a music publisher 
should be drawn.  
 
9.5 Indications of double-loop learning 
The analysis in this chapter has shown how the traditional media outlet 
structure, which has been underpinning the music industry, is weakened due to 
the regulatory and technological development. The chapter has argued that the 
new media outlet structure makes old business models obsolete and challenges 
th e in dustry‟s traditio n al p o w er structures. 
 It is no longer possible to expose music at one outlet in the hope that it will 
lead to sales of the same music at another. Rather, while every instance of 
“music usage” is promotional, it should also be considered as an instance of 
distribution. 
 
TV and radio has built their business models on the 
assumption that they have access to free content from 
content owners. Content owners have assumed that to be 
promotion for their physical products. However, since 
physical product sales are going down, content owners 
have begun to demand royalties for the use of their 
content on outlets such as radio, TV, etc. (Interview #29) 
 
 The informant pinpoints how the traditional media outlet structure is 
falling apart and how music firms respond by collecting their revenues as 
performance royalties rather than from the traditional core business.  
 This chapter has also pointed at examples where music firms have 
embraced the new logic and used their intellectual property to develop novel 
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multimedia products based on complex business models. It seems as these 
strategic initiatives are based on a revised mental model of the media 
environment. The decision makers have recognised the new workings of the 
industry and have adapted their strategies accordingly. In other words, it seems 
as double-loop learning rather than single-loop learning has occurred. 
 It is also clear that these strategic initiatives are crafted by organisations 
which follow more aggressive adaptation policies than the organisations 
launching the strategies presented in the previous chapter. New products and 
unknown market opportunities are explored in  o rder to  develo p  th e firm ‟s 
businesses. The strategies are less defensive in their character and may 
consequently be placed relatively close to the prospector pole, using the Miles & 
Snow typology (cf. pp. 56f). Based on this observation and the reasoning in 
section 2.7, it is possible to conclude that these initiatives are more appropriate 
in a copyright industry setting than the strategic initiatives discussed in the 
previous chapter. 
 A relevant question at this point is whether the old and new music industry 
models discussed and developed by this study are able to represent the new 
industry dynamics. On the one hand, the old models presented in section 3.1, 
are all to a varying degree linear in their structure and intended to describe a 
music industry with clearly separated media outlets for exposure and 
distribution. These linear value chain models put their emphasis on the audio 
recording as the core product and explain how a set of sequential activities 
support the sales of those products. As has been established by the reasoning in 
this chapter, that logic is increasingly irrelevant and most linear music value 
chain models are consequently meeting a similar fate. On the other hand, the 
Music Industry Feedback Model (Figure 6.7, p. 131), which is nonlinear in its 
structure and has no emphasis on a specific product or delivery technology, is 
still able to capture the essence of the music industry dynamics. The new media 
outlet structures may be more complicated than previously, but MEDIA 
PRESENCE still is essential to gain AUDIENCE REACH and AUDIENCE APPROVAL. 
The Audience-Media Engine still is crucial for the music firm to function. In 
spite of the hampering strategic initiatives examined in the previous chapter, the 
Audience-Media Engine keeps on running at a steady pace. Primarily due to 
technological innovations, AUDIENCE ACTIONS are more intense than ever, but 
without generating the same kind of REVENUES as during the good old days. 
 In the next and final chapter, the contributions and findings made by this 
study will be summarised, conclusions will be made and suggestions how to 
forward will be given. 
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10  
The best of  times? 
It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of 
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was 
the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season 
of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair, 
we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all 
goin g direct to H eaven , w e w ere all goin g direct the oth er w ay…  
(Dickens 2003 [1859]) 
 
The opening phrases of A Tale of Two Cities refer of course to the French 
revolution. Revolution is a label that far too often is used to denote almost any 
kind of transition. I will not argue that the changes which are examined by this 
study should be characterised as a revolution. Nevertheless, Dickens‟ w o rds, 
work as an excellent illustration of current attitudes among music industry 
decision makers. Some express their frustration and despair, while others are 
unable to curb their enthusiasm. 
 This chapter will summarise the findings made by the study and make some 
general conclusions based on these. The chapter will then discuss the 
implications from the findings; for the copyright firm in general and for the 
music firm specifically. Suggestions will also be given how decision makers 
ought to change their behaviour in the light of the new findings. Finally, the 
chapter will suggest directions for how the study could be taken forward in 
future research projects. 
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10.1 Summary and conclusions 
The study has taken a relatively broad approach to the evolution of the music 
industry. In this section, the main currents of the study will be summarised, and 
conclusions based on the reasoning will be presented. 
 
Reluctantly virtual 
The purpose of this study has been to increase the understanding of music 
industry dynamics. The study has been focused on music industry decision 
makers and how they have perceived contemporary changes within the media 
environment. It has also examined how music firms have revised their 
strategies, policies and routines, in order to cope with the new conditions. 
 The extended answer to these questions is given by all the previous 
chapters, but the condensed answer is as follows: The contemporary dynamics 
of the music industry and m usic firm s‟ strategic adaptation processes could be 
characterised as reluctantly virtual. The term virtual is used as suggested by 
Castells (1997: 403-6), namely as an adjective which denotes a phenomenon 
occurring within the realms of electronic media, rather than in physical space. 
The study has shown how music firms in general have responded defensively to 
the changes in the media environment and with the main objective to protect 
their existing businesses. Decision makers have not challenged their mental 
models of the media environment but have remained focused on preserving the 
pivotal role held by their physical products. 
 The study argues that one of the most significant changes of the media 
environment is the development of new media outlets which are incompatible 
with the “traditional” media outlet structure. According to these traditional 
structures, a certain set of media outlets (primarily radio and television) is used 
by music firms to expose music to audiences, while a distinctively different set of 
media outlets (physical carriers such as CDs and Compact Cassettes) is used for 
distribution purposes. New media outlets are not as easily defined as either tools 
for exposure or tools for distribution. Rather, the new media outlets are 
members of both sets, at the same time. According to this new logic, it is no 
longer possible to expose music at one outlet and expect that it will generate 
sales of the same music at another. The audiences may be listening and enjoying 
music as ever before, but their actions are not immediately translatable into 
revenues. 
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 While revenues from consumer sales are falling in significance, other 
revenues are rising. The growing number of media outlets increases the demand 
for various kinds of music licensing. These licensing opportunities might be a 
plain and simple license to use a song in a soundtrack or a radio playlist, but it 
might also be a m usic firm ‟s co o p eratio n  w ith  o th er co p yrigh t firm s in  a joint 
development of multimedia products based on complex business models, 
multiple media channels and multiple revenues streams. The study has pointed 
at a few examples of these kinds of multimedia products from the realms of 
interactive entertainment and unscripted television. 
 The study argues that while some music firms remain attached to the old 
models, other music firms, primarily music publishers, have recognised the 
transformation and are beginning to thrive in the new environment. They have 
challenged their old mental models and embraced the new logic. 
 There are some indications that the courage to abandon an old core 
business and to search for new opportunities is growing among many music 
firms, not only among music publishers. For instance, some music firms are 
„tryin g to  create a 360 -degree entertainment proposition rather than a straight 
up and down record company‟ as Clive Rich of Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment explains (Gibson 2006). Other music firms seem to be heading 
in the same direction (e.g. SpiralFrog 2006; YouTube 2006), and seemingly, 
after many years of resistance and hesitation, music firms are reluctantly 
recognising the realities of a virtualised environment.  
 
Modelling copyright industry dynamics 
A qualitative system dynamics model, the Music Industry Feedback Model, has 
been developed to support the reasoning which was summarised above. The 
study argues that the linear music industry models developed by previous music 
industry research are unable to explain the new music industry dynamics. 
However, the Music Industry Feedback Model is quite able to do so. For 
instance, one of the vital structures of the model, termed the Audience-Media 
Engine, illuminates the reinforcing feedback loop which is the driving force 
behind any sound or song, band or brand. Other parts of the model explain the 
different strategic routes open to the music firm and how these influence the 
firm ‟s o p eratio n s an d fin an cials (Figure 6.7). 
 Section 3.1 (p. 73) argues that the value of a model should not be judged in 
terms of right or wrong but rather in terms of the usefulness of the model. 
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Section 5.5 (p. 111) argues further that models are preliminary „versions of the 
world‟ (Goodman 1978) which should be in a continuous state of development. 
Without a doubt, it is possible to continue the iterative development of the 
Music Industry Feedback Model in order to improve its ability to explain reality. 
However, in its current state, the model is already both useful and relevant as a 
tool for explaining music industry dynamics. This usefulness has been 
confirmed during the elaboration of the analysis in chapters 7 to 9, when the 
model was used to support and strengthen the arguments put forward. 
 A relevant question is whether the reasoning would hold even without the 
support from the model. The answer to this question is most likely „Y es‟. 
However, the written language may serve well to describe linear processes with 
a beginning and an end, but it has a limited ability to efficiently explain 
nonlinear dynamic phenomena (e.g. Ong 1982). A visual language such as 
influence diagramming, is more appropriate for such an endeavour. Therefore, 
though written language alone would have been able to examine the industry 
dynamics to some extent, the Music Industry Feedback Model is able to bring 
the analysis to a higher level and to increase the understanding of the music 
industry dynamics considerably. 
 
10.2 Implications and suggestions 
O n e im p o rtan t m arker o f a research  p ro ject‟s quality is th e relevan ce o f th e 
findings presented. The relevance is to a significant degree governed by the 
ran ge o f p h en o m en a w h ich  th ey are ab le to  exp lain , o r „th e exten t to  w h ich  th e 
findings are transferable to  o th er settin gs‟. (E.g. Corbin & Strauss 1990: 19; 
Hammersley 1992: 64) 
 It would be appealing if the validity of the Music Industry Feedback Model 
could be immediately extended to copyright industries other than the music 
industry. Indeed, without any major structural changes, the model has relevance 
as an analytical tool when examining aspects of other copyright industries, such 
as the book, videogame and the film industries78. However, the model is less 
apt to explain the dynamics of copyright industries where licensing revenues are 
of less importance and revenues from advertising are more significant. In order 
to build a model with relevance to all copyright industries, more empirical data 
                                              
 
78 The model also has some relevance to firms which are developing a media brand portfolio on a corporate 
level, for instance media conglomerates such as Dow Jones, Bonnier, EMap, and many others. 
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need to be gathered, something which remains for future research projects to 
do. 
 Although the model is not immediately transferable to every copyright 
industry, the reasoning and the conclusions facilitated by the model are of 
major relevance to many of these industries. In the sections below, implications 
of the most significant findings have been summarised. In connection to each 
finding, some suggestions are given how copyright firms may go forward. It 
should be noted that the findings discussed below are not completely distinct, 
and that some parts of the reasoning may be mentioned more than once. 
 
Explicate and challenge mental models 
One of the most fundamental reasons why decision makers are unable to adapt 
their organisations to a changing environment is the inflexibility of their mental 
models (e.g. Argyris 2004; Beinhocker 2006; Sterman 1994). The structure and 
lo gic o f th e w o rld ch an ge, b ut th e decisio n  m akers‟ un derstan din g o f th at w o rld  
remains intact. The study has shown how decision makers in the music industry 
continue to defend their old core business although a radical transformation of 
the media environment is taking place.  
 In order to be able to continuously challenge their mental models, it is 
important that the decision makers are able to explicate and surface their beliefs 
and assumptions. One way of explicating mental models is to use a modelling 
technique such as qualitative system dynamics. By developing influence 
diagram s w h ich  rep resen ts th e decisio n  m akers‟ m en tal m o d els, th e 
assumptions are brought out from the subconscious and into the open. This 
process then makes it easier to overcome some of the learning impediments 
and defensive routines discussed earlier in the text (p. 60). Thereby, the 
development of an organisation that is able to swiftly adapt to changing 
environmental conditions is facilitated. (E.g. Senge 1990; Sterman 1994) 
 Even though the Music Industry Feedback Model is not a visualisation of a 
specific decisio n  m aker‟s p erso n al m en tal m o del o r a m usic firm ‟s sh ared ditto, 
it may n everth eless b e used to  sup p o rt a m usic firm ‟s d ecisio n  making 
processes. One structure that probably is especially relevant is the Audience-
Media Engine. If decision makers are able to grasp the logic encapsulated by 
the Audience-Media Engine and thereby are able to foresee the dynamic impact 
of their decisions, the likelihood of making decisions which are directly 
damaging to this structure, might at least be somewhat reduced.  
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Another day, another core business 
The study shows how a new media outlet structure makes old business models 
obsolete. New opportunities have to be explored in order to sustain in an 
environment characterised by continuous development. The study shows how 
music industry decision makers struggle with the new media outlet structure. 
Their struggle mainly concerns how to take advantage of new opportunities 
without hurting old businesses. This challenge is shared by players in other 
copyright industries: 
 
C learly, th e trick in  m ed ia‟s b rave n ew  w o rld is to  structure 
emerging distribution modes so that they are additive, not 
cannibalistic, to new and existing content exhibition 
windows while providing new venues for advertisers. 
(Mermigas 2006) 
 
 Surely this ambition is understandable, but it is also associated with a high 
level of risk. By applying a relatively defensive strategy, such as suggested by 
Mermigas, the firm runs the risk of being unable to respond to major shifts in 
their environment (Miles & Snow 1978). Quite self-explanatory, such a strategy 
is not very appropriate in the roaring copyright industries. A more appropriate 
adaptation strategy is the prospector approach where innovation is of highest 
priority. The prospector is a more sustainable strategy although it, in the short 
term, may yield lower profit levels than the defender strategy. 
 The study points at a few examples of how music firms in cooperation with 
other copyright firms have been able to launch successful business initiatives 
(pp. 194ff). These examples are not businesses that will remain viable for 
decades; rather, they will probably be outdated quite soon. However, it is 
initiatives like these which music firms continuously have to develop (and 
abandon) in order to create a sustainable copyright business. No doubt, 
Schumpeter‟s (1942) principles of creative destruction remain as valid as ever. 
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Cost-cutting and risk reduction is not strategy 
The previous section discussed innovation and risk from a business model 
perspective, but the true core of the music industry is of course the songs and 
the personalities. No business model, no matter how ingeniously designed, is 
able to support a firm that lacks good songs or charismatic personalities. 
Nevertheless, the study shows how music firms are trying to reduce costs, and 
to create novelties without engaging in risky intellectual property development. 
 The m usic firm s‟ risk aversive strategy is to some extent understandable. In 
order to meet short-term financial goals, defensive strategies such as risk 
reduction and cost cutting often are closer at hand than the revenue enhancing 
strategies which usually are associated which considerable time lags (cf. section 
6.5). However, cost-cutting strategies are rarely able to solve a firm‟s lo n g-term 
difficulties. Operational effectiveness is of course a necessity to any firm, but it 
is difficult to replace offensive revenue enhancing strategies with defensive cost-
cutting initiatives. Operational effectiveness initiatives are easily mirrored by the 
competition, which quickly eradicates any competitive advantages that might 
have been established. In order to regain the advantage, new cost-cutting 
initiatives have to be launched. Thereby, a reinforcing feedback loop, 
sometimes labelled „hypercompetition‟, is established (Porter 1996). This study 
has discussed a similar kind of dynamics in relation to accelerating marketing 
costs (p. 154ff). Hypercompetition is an analogous „race of chicken‟, w h ere th e 
contestants get ever thinner and more homogenous. Michael Porter describes 
the phenomenon as follows: 
 
Continuous improvement h as b een  etch ed o n  m an agers‟ 
brains. But its tools unwittingly draw companies toward 
imitation and homogeneity. Gradually, managers have let 
operational effectiveness supplant strategy. The result is 
zero-sum  co m p etitio n , [… ] an d p ressures o n  co sts th at 
co m p ro m ise co m p an ies‟ ab ility to  in vest in  th e b usin ess fo r 
the long term. (Porter 1996: 64) 
 
 In a copyright industry, cost-cutting and risk reduction strategies is even 
more devastating than in most other industries. It is not by developing 
intellectual properties more efficiently that will make a copyright firm successful 
in the long term; it is by developing intellectual properties differently that will. 
This differentiation is only achievable by creating an environment where risk is 
welcomed, and intrinsically motivated creativity is allowed to flourish. 
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Convergence within the organisation 
The study shows how previously distinctively separate concepts converge. First, 
the line between distribution and exposure outlets is blurred. Second, the 
definition of a music publisher and a record label is no longer as clear-cut as 
previously. Third, due to the declining difference between outlets for 
distribution and outlets for exposure; licensing and marketing activities become 
increasingly indistinguishable. 
 In spite of these processes, the organisational structures within major music 
firms are still functionally structured as licensing, marketing, publishing, etc. 
The communication and cooperation between the different departments is 
limited, and leads to sub-optimisation and inflexibility. 
 The convergence in the marketplace needs to influence the internals of 
music firms. The cooperation between publishing branches and recorded music 
branches needs to be improved and the current organisational structures need 
to be challenged. 
 
Fiery negotiations await between content owners and media outlets 
The study shows how revenues immediately gathered from audience actions are 
diminishing, while revenues from licensing are growing in importance. This 
shift of balance has a significant impact on the contractual agreements between 
owners of content and media outlets. A quote from an informant indicated 
previously (p. 200) how content owners demand higher royalties from media 
outlets to compensate for the reduced sales of physical products. A quote from 
another informant (p. 160) indicates how media outlets push hard to lower the 
royalties since they argue that exposure of the content is of significant value to 
the content owner. This clash will intensify as the transformation of the media 
environment continues. The music industry will most likely take the lead in this 
process since their situation is a notch more desperate than that of the media 
outlets. Based on the reasoning brought forward by the study, the music 
in dustry‟s argum en t weighs somewhat heavier than the argument from media 
outlets. Consequently, when negotiating the fee for using a song in a particular 
setting, the potential promotional value of the exposure should not be 
exaggerated. The fee should primarily be determined by the artistic value the 
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song brings to the media outlet and should only be minutely influenced by the 
promotional value the exposure may bring back to the owner of the intellectual 
property. 
 One way to resolve the potential stalemate might be to increase the license 
fee paid by media outlets to content owners, but to let the fee be influenced by 
the advertising revenues the content owner collects. This contractual structure 
has already been used for instance in the agreements between SpiralFrog and 
EMI and between YouTube and Warner Music (SpiralFrog 2006; YouTube 
2006). It is still too early to determine the robustness and longevity of the 
model, and it remains to bee seen whether it eventually will spread into more 
traditional media outlets such as terrestrial broadcast radio. 
 
10.3 The media research agenda 
The copyright industries, and the products these organisations create, are 
increasingly important in our societies. It is consequently of great importance to 
increase our understanding of these industries and products. Many issues and 
questions need to be explored. During many years, media research has been 
focused on questions regarding the meaning and interpretation of these 
products while issues related to their creation have been somewhat pushed into 
the margin. It may certainly be highly motivated to explore the meaning of 
copyright products and the interplay between copyright products and society. 
However, without understanding how and why copyright products were 
created, the knowledge from these research initiatives is incomplete and 
sometimes even irrelevant. In order for media research to increase its relevance, 
the attention of media researchers needs to be moved away from subjective 
speculations o f h o w  “art imitates life” and closer to empirically grounded 
examination of organised production of culture. 
 In those cases where media researchers have been exploring production 
issues; sociological or behavioural sciences have often been the dominating 
theoretical lenses. Much can be learned by assuming these perspectives, but 
there are also insights that are missed or only vaguely understood. Organised 
production of culture, both commercial and public service, is highly influenced 
by economical aspects. The understanding of the production of culture can 
consequently be taken much further by combining the traditional perspectives 
used by media researchers with the body of knowledge accumulated within the 
realms of economics and management research. 
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 This particular study is one small contribution to the kind of research 
proposed above, but of course there still remain much ground to be covered. A 
few suggestions how the study could be taken forward are presented below. 
 
Continued model development 
The approach used in this study could be expanded to other copyright 
industries. For instance, the transformation which currently is experienced by 
th e “audio ” in dustries (e.g. radio  and music) is rapidly moving on to the 
“video ” in dustries (e.g. televisio n , film). Qualitative system dynamics is an 
effective approach for modelling complex dynamic phenomena and could also 
be used to increase the understanding of these evolutionary processes. 
Probably, the Music Industry Feedback Model could be used as a starting point 
in such an endeavour. 
  The model might also be extended into other settings, such as issues 
related to intellectual property portfolio management in general (e.g. patents or 
consumer brands). Another relevant enhancement of the model would be the 
introduction of more advanced system dynamics concepts (e.g. stock and flow 
diagramming or computer modelling and simulation) in order to further deepen 
the understanding of copyright industry dynamics. 
 
On new tastemakers 
A tastemaker is someone or something that is able to influence which fads or 
fashions that are in vogue or not. Broadcast media has been the most important 
tastemaker in the music industry during several decades, but new Internet based 
services are challenging the role of these traditional players. The study has 
already presented various media outlets that are performing the role of the 
tastemaker (section 9.2) but there are other outlets aiming for that position. 
Internet based services such as betterPropaganda, Last.fm, Pandora, and online 
communities and social networking services such as Bebo, Lunarstorm, 
MySpace, etc79, constitute new opportunities for experimentation and 
communication between symbol creators, music firms and audiences. The 
                                              
 
79 http://www.pandora.com; http://www.last.fm; http://www.betterpropaganda.com; 
http://www.bebo.com; http://www.lunarstorm.se; http://www.myspace.com 
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understanding of how these services will influence the fads and fashions in the 
music industry is still unsatisfactory and there is a need for future research 
initiatives to look into the issue.  
 
On the relationship between symbol creators and copyright firms 
One of the implications from the study concerns the changing relationship 
between content owners and media outlets, and how this will require a revision 
of the contractual agreements between these parties (p. 209). Indications from 
the study also show that the relationship between the symbol creator and the 
copyright firm is changing in a similar fashion. For instance, the concept of the 
music album which previously has been a structuring factor behind most 
aspects of the music business seems to be of diminishing importance. This 
transformation may have implications on many aspects of music production, 
including the contractual relationships between symbol creators and music 
firms. These and other related issues are outside the scope of this particular 
study, but the attention of future research initiatives needs to be turned towards 
the matter. 
 
10.4 A final word 
Music may permeate most parts of society, but the music industry per se, plays a 
relatively peripheral role in the global economy. Nevertheless, the knowledge 
attained by exploring this small but dynamic industry can be of considerable 
value to many copyright industry decision makers. The aim of this study has 
been to provide such knowledge, and to facilitate th ese decisio n  m akers‟ 
understanding of contemporary copyright industry dynamics. Hopefully, they 
will thereby be better equipped in order to create sustainable and adaptable 
copyright businesses, where creativity and diversity is championed, to the 
benefit of creatives, audiences and shareholders, alike. 
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Appendix 1:  
A very short history of  the 
international music industry 
This appendix gives a very condensed account of the evolution of the music 
industry, with a particular focus on the multinational music firms and on 
changing distribution technologies during the last century. Several reports of 
the history of the international music industry have been written and published 
during the last decades (e.g. Barfe 2004; Coleman 2003; Gelatt 1977; Gronow 
1983; Gronow & Saunio 1998; Qualen 1985; Read & Welch 1976). This 
presentation is in its entirety based on these sources. 
 The music industry, or more particularly the recorded music industry, is by 
definition intrinsically connected to the development of technologies for 
recording and disseminating music. Various technologies have been developed 
for that purpose, and the table below lists some of the more important 
milestones in this evolution.  
 
1877   Edison demonstrates cylinder phonograph. 
1887   Emile Berliner granted patent for disc gramophone. 
1906   Victor introduces the Victrola, the first successful mass-market phonograph. 
1925   The Victor Co. releases the first commercial electrical recording. 
1948   Columbia introduces the 33 RPM record. 
1949   RCA introduces the 45 RPM record. 
1958   Audio Fidelity releases the first commercial stereo record. 
1964   Philips presents the Compact Cassette tape (CC) format. 
1979   Sony offers a personal tape player called the Soundabout, the first Walkman. 
1982   Sony and Philips introduce the compact disc (CD) format. 
1989   MP3 compression technology patented by Fraunhofer Institute in Erlangen, 
Germany. 
1993 IUMA (Internet Underground Music Archive) opens. 
1998   Portable MP3 player created by Diamond Multimedia. 
1999 Shawn Fanning launched Napster, the first popularized file-sharing peer-to-peer 
network. 
2003   iTunes Music store launched by Apple. 
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At numerous times throughout history, transitions from one technology to 
another has challenged industry power structures. For instance, before the 
advent of the cylinders and the discs, printed sheet music was the primary 
vehicle for music distribution. The pre-Edison music industry was very similar 
to the book industry, and music publishers were considered as its most 
important actors. 
 The new sound recording technologies, primarily developed by Edison, 
Columbia, and Victor, challenged the old industry structure, and changed the 
core product of the music industry from printed sheet music to shellac discs. 
Initially, these three companies considered musical content as merely a means 
for promoting gramophone sales, but during the 1920s the focus was more and 
more turned towards the musical content and away from the hardware. 
 T h e th ree firm s m o re o r less defin ed th e ro le o f th e “reco rd co m p an y”. 
They chose to include the task of finding and developing new musical 
personalities, as well as the manufacturing, marketing and distribution of the 
physical products as parts of their businesses. The music publishers which 
previously had been such important actors in the music industry were reduced 
to administrate copyrights of composers and lyricists, and to collect royalties 
from the sales of records and other kinds of music licensing. 
 During the 1930s and 1940s the music industry continued to be moulded 
by societal and technological developments. The three original major music 
firms evolved through mergers, bankruptcies and acquisitions into a new trio –  
RCA/Victor, EMI and CBS Records. These three companies came to dominate 
the international music industry during the following decades and they still 
co n stitute th e co re o f tw o  w o rld‟s largest m usic firm s (E M I an d So n y B M G ). A  
few new record companies (e.g. Decca, Mercury, and Capitol) joined the trio 
during this period, but the music industry structure largely continued to be 
characterised by a high level of concentration. 
 In the end of the 1950s and during the 1960s the consolidated structure of 
the music industry were shaken in its foundations. The development is usually 
explained by referring to th e adven t o f ro ck „n  ro ll m usic in  co n cert w ith  
changes in the broadcast media environment. First, although the major firms 
successfully sign ed a n um b er o f sign ifican t ro ck „n  ro ll acts, th e n ew  gen re 
enabled smaller innovative firms to become at least temporarily commercially 
successful on the expense of the major firms. Second, in broadcast media, the 
growth of the television medium forced radio stations to revise their 
programming. In order to face the competition from the new medium, the 
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radio turned to music in order to get access to popular content for free or at a 
low price. 
 One important consequence of the evolution of the media environment 
w as th e estab lish m en t o f th e radio  m edium  as th e m usic firm s‟ m o st im p o rtan t 
promotional tool. By exposing their music in the broadcast media, a portion of 
the audience was encouraged to purchase the same music in the record stores. 
This straight-forward business model, which was established in the mid 1950s, 
has been prevailing for several decades, and it has not been challenged until the 
coming of Internet-based music distribution technologies at the end of the last 
century. 
 During the 1970s, a new wave of consolidation ensued as music firms were 
faced by the global economic recession and an inability to keep up the creative 
vitality fro m  th e ro ck „n  ro ll era. In dustry reven ues declin ed an d several sm all 
independent record labels, were acquired by the dominating firms. The 
beginning of the 1980s marks the end of these difficult times and the start of 
one of the most prosperous eras in the history of recorded music. The launch 
of MTV in 1981, in combination with the introduction of the compact disc 
technology in 1983 enabled the industry to grow at a previously unseen rate. 
This period of strong growth peaked in 1999; the very same year a student at 
Northeastern University in Boston, USA, launched the Internet based peer-to-
peer network known as Napster. The version of Napster which was launched in 
1999 is now closed, but similar technologies still enable unsanctioned music 
distribution via the Internet, and thereby constitute a major concern for the 
music industry. 
 As this very brief account of the history of the international music industry 
illustrates, the industry has at most times been dominated by a small number of 
large multinational organisations80. At the time of writing, this statement still 
remains true, as currently a handful of organisations dominate the international 
music industry: EMI Group; Sony BMG Music Entertainment; Universal Music 
Group; Warner Music Group; and the music publishers BMG Music Publishing 
and Sony/ATV Music. In Appendix 2, some significant features of these 
organisations are presented.  
                                              
 
80 The development of music industry concentration has been the subject of several research initiatives (e.g. 
Peterson & Berger 1975) and is discussed in section 3.2 on pp. 74ff. 
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Appendix 2:  
The majors 
This appendix presents relevant features of the organisations which currently 
dominate the international music industry. The information used to create this 
compilation has primary been gathered from different corporate web sites81. 
However, some data has been difficult to attain for all the relevant 
organisations which unfortunately has caused the presentation to be only 
partially complete. 
 The international music industry is currently dominated by a handful of 
multinational organisations: EMI Group; Sony BMG Music Entertainment; 
Universal Music Group; Warner Music Group; and the music publishers BMG 
Music Publishing and Sony/ATV Music. The illustration below explains the 
o w n ersh ip  o f th e w o rld‟s m ajo r reco rd  companies and music publishers. 
 W arn er M usic G ro up , E M I G ro up , an d U n iversal M usic G ro up  are “full 
service” m usic firm s an d co n sist o f divisio n s b o th  fo r reco rd ed m usic an d 
music publishing. While Warner Music and EMI are publicly traded, Universal 
Music is a fully owned subsidiary of Vivendi (France). Sony BMG Music 
Entertainment is a record company jointly owned by Bertelsmann (Germany) 
and Sony (Japan). The joint venture was created in 2004 and did not include the 
publishing units of the two participating music organisations. Consequently, 
BMG Music Publishing is still owned by Bertelsmann and Sony/ATV remains 
as a joint venture controlled by Sony and Mr. Michael Jackson. 
 There are continuously rumours concerning potential mergers and 
acquisitions among the majors. At the time of writing Bertelsmann is 
considering a divestment of all their music assets and a bid from Vivendi for 
BMG Music Publishing was in September 2006 accepted by Bertelsmann. In 
addition, EMI has during several years tried to acquire Warner Music Group 
(and vice versa), but no deal has yet been realised.  
                                              
 
81 http://www.bmgmusicsearch.com; http://www.emigroup.com; http://www.sonybmg.com; 
http://www.sonyatv.com; http:www.umusic.com; http://www.wmg.com; http://www.bertelsmann.de; 
http://www.sony.net; http://www.vivendi.fr 
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Company: BMG Music Publishing (Music publisher) 
Headquarters: New York City, USA 
Global presence: Offices in 25 countries. 
Global market position (music publishing): #3 or #4 
Parent company: Bertelsmann AG (Germany) 100% 
Management: Nicholas Firth (Chairman and CEO) 
Employees worldwide: 575 
Turnover (2005): €372 m illio n  
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Administers or owns works by artists/songwriters such as: 
Erykah Badu; Backstreet Boys; B.B. King; Coldplay; Elvis Costello; The Cure; 
R. Kelly; Natalie Imbruglia; Joan Jett; Annie Lennox; Limp Bizkit; Linkin Park; 
Kenny G; HIM; Maroon5; Alanis Morissette; N‟Sync; Britney Spears; Justin 
Timberlake; Pete Townshend; Robbie Williams; and Wu-Tang Clan. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company: EMI Group (Music publisher and record company) 
Headquarters: London, UK 
Global presence: Offices in 50 countries. 
Parent company: Publicly traded at the London Stock Exchange. 
Management: Eric Nicoli (Chairman) 
 
Recorded music (EMI Music) 
Headquarters: London, UK 
Management: Alan Levy (Chairman and CEO) 
Global market position (recorded music): #4 (Market share: 13%) 
Employees worldwide: 6,000 
Turnover (2004/2005): €2.43  billion 
Operating profit (EBITA) (2004/2005): €212 million 
Controls record labels such as: Angel, Blue Note, Capitol, Mute, Parlophone, 
Virgin, etc. 
Represents artists such as: Richard Ashcroft; Anita Baker; The Beach Boys; 
the Beatles; Blur; David Bowie; Sarah Brightman; Kate Bush; Coldplay; Daft 
Punk; Dandy Warhols; Depeche Mode; Gorillaz; Ed Harcourt; Iron Maiden; 
Janet Jackson; Norah Jones; Kraftwerk; Lenny Kravitz; Kylie; John Lennon; 
Massive Attack; Paul McCartney; Moby; Pet Shop Boys; Pink Floyd; Iggy Pop; 
Queen; Radiohead; Cliff Richard; the Rolling Stones. 
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Music publishing (EMI Music Publishing) 
Headquarters: New York City, USA 
Management: Martin Bandler (Chairman and co-CEO) 
Global market position (music publishing): #1 
Employees worldwide: 630 
Turnover (2005/2006): €614  million 
Operating profit (EBITA) (2005/2006): €154  million 
Administers or owns works by artists/songwriters such as: 
ABBA; Arctic Monkeys; Louis Armstrong; Count Basie; Natasha Bedingfield; 
James Blunt; Blur; David Bowie; Kate Bush; Phil Collins; Sean  „P. Diddy‟ 
Combs; Miles Davis; Depeche Mode; Fats Domino; Duran Duran; Earth, Wind 
& Fire; Norah Jones; Judas Priest; Alicia Keys; John Lennon & Yoko Ono; 
Nirvana; The Prodigy; Queen; Rod Stewart; Sting; Usher; Kanye West; White 
Stripes; Pharrell Williams; Stevie Wonder. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company: Sony BMG Music Entertainment (Record company) 
Headquarters: New York City, USA 
Global presence: Offices in 43 countries. 
Global market position (recorded music): #2 
Parent company: Sony (Japan) 50%, Bertelsmann AG (Germany) 50% 
Management: Rolf Schmidt-Holz (CEO) and Andrew Lack (Chairman) 
Employees worldwide: Approximately 6,000 
Turnover (2005): €3.5 billion 
Controls record labels such as: Arista Records; Burgundy Records; Columbia 
Records; Epic Records; J Records; Jive Records; LaFace Records; Legacy 
Recordings; RCA Records; Sony BMG Nashville; SONY BMG Masterworks; 
Sony Urban Music; Sony Wonder; Verity Records 
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Represents artists such as: Celine Dion; Bob Dylan; Foo Fighters; Kenny G; 
Alicia Keys; Avril Lavigne; Sarah McLachlan; Elvis Presley; Eros Ramazzotti; 
Santana; Shakira; Bruce Springsteen und Rod Stewart. 
 
 
 
 
Sony/ATV Music Publishing 
 
Company: Sony/ATV Music Publishing (Music publisher) 
Headquarters: Santa Monica, USA 
Global presence: Offices in 40 countries. 
Global market position: #5 
Parent company: Sony (Japan) 50%, Michael Jackson (USA) 50% 
Management: David Hockman (Chairman and CEO) 
Administers or owns works by artists/songwriters such as: 
Babyface; the Beatles; Brooks & Dunn; Leonard Cohen; Miles Davis; Neil 
Diamond; Bob Dylan; The Everly Brothers; Jimi Hendrix; Sarah McLachlan; 
Joni Mitchell; Graham Nash; Willie Nelson; Roy Orbison; Stephen Stills; and 
Hank Williams. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Company: Universal Music Group (Record company and music publisher) 
Headquarters: Santa Monica and New York City, USA 
Global presence: Offices in 71 countries. 
Parent company: Vivendi (France) 100% 
Management: Douglas Morris (Chairman and CEO) 
Employees worldwide: 7,915 
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Turnover (2005): €4.9 billion 
Operating profit (2005): €480 m illio n  
 
Recorded music 
Global market position (recorded music): #1 (Market share 25.6%) 
Controls record labels such as: Geffen; Interscope; A&M; Decca Music 
Group; Def Jam; Island Records Group; Lost Highway; MCA Nashville; 
Mercury Nashville; Motown; Polydor; Stockholm Records; Universal Records; 
and Verve Music Group. 
Represents artists such as: Akon; Erykah Badu; Beck; Black Eyed Peas; Mary 
J. Blige; Bon Jovi; Mariah Carey; Sheryl Crow; Eminem; 50 Cent; Hoobastank; 
India Arie; Jay-Z; Diana Krall; Ludacris; No Doubt; Snoop Dogg; Gwen 
Stefani; Shania Twain; Stevie Wonder; Sting; Weezer; Kanye West; Bryan 
Adams; A-Ha; The Cardigans; The Hives; Elton John; Kaiser Chiefs; Keane; 
Ronan Keating; Rammstein; Sugababes; Texas; U2; and Zucchero.  
 
Music publishing (Universal Music Publishing Group) 
Global presence: Offices in 41 countries. 
Management: David Renzer (Chairman and CEO) 
Global market position (music publishing): #3 or #4.  
Administers or owns works by artists/songwriters such as: 
U2; Shania Twain; Bon Jovi; Prince; Ashanti; Mary J. Blige; Anastacia; 50 Cent; 
3 Doors Down; The Corrs; Chemical Brothers; No Doubt; Blink-182; 
Godsmack; Glen Ballard; Stereophonics; Eve; Musiq, Everclear; Andre Riéu; 
The Beastie Boys; Fatboy Slim; Noir Desir; Sonique; Zucchero; Miguel Bosé; 
and Brian McKnight. 
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Company: Warner Music Group (Record company and music publisher) 
Headquarters: New York City, USA 
Global presence: Offices in 41 countries. 
Parent company: Publicly traded at the New York Stock Exchange. 
Management: Edgar Bronfman, Jr. (Chairman and CEO) 
Employees worldwide: Approximately 4,000. 
 
Recorded music 
Global market position (recorded music):  #3 
Turnover (2005): €2.3  billion 
Operating profit (2005): €48  million 
Controls record labels such as: Asylum; Atlantic; Bad Boy; Cordless; Elektra; 
East West; Lava Maverick; Nonesuch; Reprise; Rhino; Sire; Warner Bros.; 
Word. 
Represents artists such as: Eric Clapton; Faith Hill; Green Day; Led 
Zeppelin; Madonna; Red Hot Chili Peppers; Rob Thomas; and T.I. 
 
Music publishing (Warner/Chappell Music) 
Management: Richard Blackstone (Chairman and CEO) 
Global market position (music publishing): #2 
Turnover (2005): €480 million 
Operating profit (2005): €19  million 
Administers or owns works by artists/songwriters such as: 
George and Ira Gershwin; Cole Porter; Eric Clapton; Madonna; Laura Pausini; 
Green Day; Morrissey; Dr. Dre, and Nickelback. 
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Appendix 3:  
Informants 
The table below lists the informants who participated in the study. Do note that 
Organisation, Position, and Country may have changed since the time of the 
interview. 
 
Name Organisation Position  
Michelle Bayer Shelly Bay Founder & CEO US 
Catherine Bell Chrysalis Music Director of Rights UK 
James Brown International Artist M anagers’ 
Assoc. 
Managing Director UK 
Scott Cohen The Orchard Founder & VP International  US 
Jim Collins Sirius Satellite Radio VP Corporate 
Communications  
US 
Niclas Ekstedt BMG Sweden Head of Marketing SE 
Antje Fallen Electronic Arts Music Marketing Manager US 
Ray Farrell eMusic VP Label Acquisition  US 
Sarah Faulder British M usic Publisher’s Assoc. CEO UK 
Andrew Feigenbaum Atlantic Records Manager A&R  US 
David Ferguson British Academy of Comp. and 
Songw. 
Chairman  UK 
Victor Fredell Sony BMG Sweden Head of Business 
Development  
SE 
Neil Gardner Ofcom Radio Executive  
Content & Standards  
UK 
Thomas Gewecke Sony BMG SVP Global Digital 
Business Group  
US 
Chris Green British Academy of Comp. and 
Songw. 
CEO  UK 
Tim Grimsditch Frukt Music Marketing Head of Research and Insight  UK 
Thomas Hagström EMI COO Continental Europe UK 
Keith Harris Musictank Chairman  UK 
Eric Hasselqvist Stockholm Records / Universal 
Music 
Deputy Managing Director  SE 
Keith Jopling IFPI Head of Market Research  UK 
Christer Jungeryd Radiobranschen CEO  SE 
Justin Kalifowitz Spirit Music Publishing Senior Director A&R US 
Karin Kiesbye MNW Head of Marketing SE 
Florian Koempel British Music Rights Legal Affairs Advisor  UK 
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(List of informants (con t‟d) 
Name Organisation Position  
Carl Lindencrona SMFF CEO  SE 
Ben Malén Air Chrysalis Scandinavia Managing Director  SE 
Gerrit Meier Clear Channel 
Online Music & Radio 
VP & General Manager  US 
Roger Östman SSG Publishing Creative Director  SE 
Stephen Palmer EMap Strategy and Development 
Director  
UK 
Patrik Pihl Bonnier Amigo Head of Marketing  SE 
Thomas V. Ryan EMI SVP Mobile Development  US 
Roland Sandberg STIM/MIC CEO  SE 
Richard Stumpf Cherry Lane Music Publishing VP Strategic Marketing  US 
Ricardo Torres Ortiz Ultra Records Int’l &  Single Sales &  
Promotion Manager  
US 
Julian Wall Sanctuary Group VP Int’l M arketing &  
Promotion  
UK 
Simon Wheeler Beggars Group Head of New Media  UK 
Nick White Virgin Mobile Head of Value Added Services  UK 
Therése Wieselqvist SMFF Public Relations  SE 
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Appendix 4:  
Measuring compilation album 
success 
Sales data is required to be able to examine the commercial success of different 
kinds of albums. However, accurate and detailed sales data is not readily 
accessible, simply due to  th e m usic firm s‟ un w illin gn ess to  reveal th at kin d o f 
information about their businesses. In some markets, for instance the UK, 
fragments of accurate sales data are available, but the data is not available 
electronically, which makes the data processing a very labour-intensive 
endeavour. However, there are other ways to measure the commercial success 
of albums within a specific market. 
 One way is to use the well established sales charts which announce which 
albums are commercially successful during a specific period. In different 
markets, different organisations have been able to establish themselves as the 
provider of the official chart. In Sweden this organisation is Grammofon-
leverantörernas förening (GLF); in the UK, the local IFPI organisation (BPI) 
presents the charts; and in the US the most recognised chart is provided by the 
trade m agazin e B illb o ard. C h art data h as b een  used to  in dicate an  alb um ‟s 
commercial success in several music industry research initiatives. For instance, 
most of the research on concentration and diversity has been based on this kind 
of data (e.g. Burnett 1990; Christianen 1995; DiMaggio 1977; Dowd 2000; 
Lopes 1992; Peterson & Berger 1975).  
 Another method is based on the Silver-Gold-Platinum award system used 
by the local IFPI organisations to recognise commercially successful albums. 
The thresholds for the different awards vary between countries depending on 
the size of the market. For instance, the threshold for the Platinum award is 
300,000 units in the UK; 60,000 units in Sweden, and 1,000,000 units in the US. 
 The availability of data differs between the three countries. Domestic charts 
announcing the top 100 best-selling albums during a year were available in 
Sweden and in USA. In Sweden, data was available between 1991 and 2005, and 
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in USA data was available between 1976 and 200582. In the UK no 
corresponding chart data was available. Therefore, lists of Platinum awarded 
albums between 1976 and 2005 had to be used in the analysis. 
 When all data regarding the albums had been collected, the titles were 
categorised as either a compilation or a traditional album. Most albums were 
easily iden tifiab le, sim p ly b y th e title o f th e alb um  (B est o f… ; N o w  th at‟s w h at I 
call m usic; A b so lute… ; G reatest h its… ). However, some albums which could 
not be immediately identified w ere lo o ked up  in  G racen o te‟s In tern et b ased  
music database CDDB83. 
 Next, the percentage of compilation albums in the charts or lists during 
each year was determined. However, since the data fluctuates heavily from one 
year to another, average values were calculated to make trends more discernable 
an d to  facilitate th e an alysis. A verages w ere calculated fo r th e p erio ds ‟76 -‟80, 
‟81-‟85, ‟86-‟90, ‟91-‟95, ‟96-‟00, an d  ‟01-‟05 , and used as the basis for the graph 
which is illustrated by Figure 8.2. 
 
 
 SE UK US 
1976 - 8% 9% 
1977 - 28% 10% 
1978 - 14% 5% 
1979 - 25% 6% 
1980 - 16% 7% 
1981 - 27% 8% 
1982 - 12% 7% 
1983 - 26% 5% 
1984 - 13% 9% 
1985 - 29% 6% 
1986 - 22% 7% 
1987 - 20% 4% 
1988 - 29% 4% 
1989 - 22% 7% 
1990 - 24% 6% 
 
  SE UK US 
1991 20% 28% - 
1992 27% 31% - 
1993 26% 24% 11% 
1994 47% 29% 14% 
1995 38% 30% 17% 
1996 37% 28% 13% 
1997 42% 24% 18% 
1998 42% 28% 19% 
1999 46% 26% 15% 
2000 34% 26% 10% 
2001 45% 34% 12% 
2002 46% 23% 21% 
2003 49% 27% 18% 
2004 40% 32% 15% 
2005 26% 16% 12% 
 
Table: Measurements for each year from Sweden, the UK and the US 
 
                                              
 
82 Data from the US market was missing for the years 1991-1992. 
83 http://www.gracenote.com/music 
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Appendix 5:  
Model variable definitions 
The table below lists the definitions of the endogenous variables used in the 
Music Industry Feedback Model (Figure 6.7). 
  
Variable Definition 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF IP 
PORTFOLIO 
The ability of the firm ’s intellectual property portfolio to gain 
approval among the audience.  
AUDIENCE ACTION 
The fraction of the total audience who perform actions related to 
the m usic firm ’s intellectual properties. E.g. purchase a CD; make a 
mixtape; share a song via a P2P network; attend a music concert; 
publish a fanzine…  
AUDIENCE APPROVAL The fraction of the audience who respond positively when exposed to the firm’s intellectual properties. 
AUDIENCE REACH The fraction of the total audience who are reached by the music 
firm ’s intellectual properties through the media. 
IP DEVELOPMENT Resources invested by the music firm in intellectual property development. 
LICENSING MEDIA PRESENCE generated by LICENSING EFFORT.   
LICENSING EFFORT Resources invested in order to increase the LICENSING of the media 
firm ’s intellectual properties. 
MARKETING MEDIA PRESENCE generated by MARKETING EFFORT.   
MARKETING EFFORT Resources invested in order to increase MEDIA PRESENCE with the purpose to stimulate AUDIENCE ACTION. 
MEDIA PRESENCE 
The total number of media outlets where the intellectual 
properties of the music firm currently appear. Equals the sum of 
MARKETING and LICENSING. 
NOVELTIES Outcome of the IP DEVELOPMENT process. Novelties add to the 
ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE IP PORTFOLIO. 
OBLIVION 
A natural process of decay which reduces the attractiveness of the 
IP PORTFOLIO. O blivion affects different IP’s in different w ays. While 
the longevity of some properties is measured in weeks, others 
have a lifespan that lasts for decades. The variable is exogenous. 
PRESSURE The pressure exerted by shareholders on the music firm in order to reduce PROFIT GAP. 
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Model variable defin ition s (con t‟d) 
Variable Definition 
PROFIT The money that remains after expenses are subtracted from income. 
PROFIT GAP The difference between REQUIRED PROFIT and actual PROFIT.  
REQUIRED PROFIT Financial goals defined by the shareholders. The variable is exogenous. 
REVENUES Revenues from ROYALTIES and AUDIENCE ACTION.  
RISK WILLINGNESS The willingness of the music firm to accept risk in the development of new intellectual properties. 
ROYALTIES Fees paid by licensees using the music firm ’s intellectual properties in various applications.  
 
 
The table below lists the definitions of the exogenous variables used to 
contextualise the Music Industry Feedback Model in a changing media 
environment (defined in chapter 7). 
 
Variable Definition 
ACCESSIBILITY The ease or difficulty for the audience to access and use the music 
firm ’s intellectual properties. 
APPROPRIABILITY The m usic firm ’s ability to convert AUDIENCE ACTION into actual 
REVENUES. 
AUDIENCE 
FRAGMENTATION 
The level of fragmentation of the total audience. If the time spent by 
the audience using media is constant and the number of MEDIA 
OUTLETS increase, the audience fragmentation is assumed to rise. 
CONTENT DEMAND The demand from MEDIA OUTLETS to license and use musical content. 
AUDIENCE 
VOLATILITY 
The tendency of the audiences to jump between different media 
outlets. 
MARKETING 
EFFICIENCY 
Resources required by the music firm to get accepted by a media 
outlet and added to their events and their playlists. 
MEDIA OUTLETS The number of relevant media outlets available to the audience.  
MEDIA RISK 
WILLINGNESS 
The willingness among media outlets to accept risk when 
determining which music content should be added to their events 
and their playlists. 
PLAYLIST ENTRY 
BARRIERS 
Routines and policies followed by the media when adding new 
content to events and playlists. These routines and policies govern 
whether the barriers to enter the events and playlists are easy or 
difficult to pass. 
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